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LEARNING
In the learning sub-model, learning takes place in the following way. For a learning community (for 
example, farmers or extension workers), there is some maximum level of knowledge that they can 
attain, as determined by the global level of knowledge. The global level is set as an exogenous 
parameter, with a value of zero representing no information at all and a value of one representing 
thorough knowledge that supports routine operations and standardization. If the maximum level for the 
“learning index” λ(t) is λmax(t), then the stock of knowledge (the learning index) changes over time as
d t 
d t = P t max t −t  . (71)
In this equation, annual production is given by P(t). The parameter κ sets the maximum rate of 
accumulation of knowledge. Learning is fast if there is a large gap between local and general 
knowledge, and it slows down as the community’s knowledge approaches the maximum level, which 
can change over time.
For feedstocks, the model for farmer knowledge applies a nested version of Equation (71). First, 
knowledge of extension workers grows toward an exogenously-specified global level. Second, 
smallholder knowledge approaches a weighted average of the initial level and extension worker 
knowledge, depending on how effective extensive services are (a user-specified policy variable). 
Farmers on estates are assumed to have the same level of knowledge (or to have access to the same 
knowledge) as extension agents.
For the biofuel processing sector, Equation (71) is applied directly, with global experience specified 
exogenously and domestic experience approaching the global level with cumulative production.
Learning curves
In Equation (71), learning only takes place if there is production, consistent with conventional models 
of industrial learning [37]. This is a consequence of the factor P(t) before the expression in parentheses. 
The solutions to Equation (71) can be related to observations from studies of industrial learning. In the 
special case where λmax(t) is constant in time, Equation (71) can be solved explicitly to give
t =max−e−Pcum t  max−0  , (72)
where λ0 is the initial value for λ(t) and Pcum is cumulative (rather than annual) production. A sample 
curve is shown in Figure 4. As shown in the figure, the learning index increases in an s-shaped fashion 
with cumulative production. This is the shape observed in learning curves within firms, where 
“learning” is measured by worker productivity [37]. This pattern contrasts with the constant slope 
observed for “experience curves,” which plot the logarithm of unit cost against the logarithm of 
cumulative production within a sector, and are a conventional tool in business and management [38]. 
However, there is good reason to think that the linear slope of experience curves has more to do with 
the benefits of increasing scale and other factors, rather than learning [37]. As scale economies are 
explicitly taken into account in the model described in this report, it is reasonable that the learning 
curve described by Equations (71) and (72) follow the s-shaped pattern observed in studies of industrial 
learning. Nevertheless, we add as a caution  that industrial learning curves are based on the experience 
of individual plants, whereas Equations (71) and (72) are applied at sector level.
26
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1. Introduction
The design constraints for the model were set in 
a series of engagements with the South African 
Development Community (SADC) Biofuels 
Task Force in the context of an ongoing project 
on biofuels, sustainability and forests, funded by 
the European Commission (EC). The Center for 
International Forestry Research (CIFOR) led the 
EC biofuels project and, together with the South 
African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR), collaborated closely with the Stockholm 
Environment Institute (SEI) on the development of 
the model. Several people provided substantive input 
into the design and structure of the model.
The model described in this working paper, the 
National Bioenergy Investment Model (NBIM), 
simulates the decisions of domestic and international 
direct investors on whether to invest in biofuel 
projects in a developing country. The model 
can inform scenarios that assess the potential 
contribution of biofuel production to national 
development goals. It can also be run interactively, 
with users specifying policy packages and trajectories 
for highly influential but uncertain factors, such as 
fossil fuel prices.
2. Model overview
The core logic of the model is that investment 
provides capital that is then combined with other 
factors, such as labour and land, to produce 
feedstocks and fuels that are sold on domestic and 
international markets. Investment allocations are 
determined by prices and perceived risks, which can 
be influenced, but not determined, by policymakers.
Prices, demands, investment and production, are 
calculated using a dynamic non-equilibrium model 
(Ferguson 1998) that operates at a quarterly time-
step. In the model, prices adjust, after a lag of one 
time-step, in the direction of their equilibrium level, 
depending on the gap between supply and demand. 
The model features ‘myopic’ investors, who make 
investment decisions based on current and historical 
prices. The components of the model are:
 • simulation of investor decision making;
 • simulation of domestic demand for fuels 
and feedstocks based on prices and income, 
where demands are segmented by rural and 
urban consumers;
 • simulation of production of fuels and feedstocks, 
distinguished by production model;
 • estimation of prices in an equilibrium-seeking 
framework based on the gap between production 
and demand.
The choice of a dynamic, non-equilibrium model 
is dictated by the realities of agricultural economies 
in developing countries (Colman and Young 1989). 
Markets typically clear only after a time lag, and 
may never be in equilibrium, while the drivers of 
demand are changing rapidly and causing uncertainty 
in many developing countries. Thus, the size of the 
market can change dramatically over the course of 
a few years. The decision to represent investors as 
myopic is dictated by the nature of the model: as a 
simulation model, rather than an optimising model, 
it cannot contain physically impossible features, such 
as investors with perfect foresight.
The model is implemented in the Vensim 5 DSS 
environment, and is being released under the open 
source Apache License Version 2.0 (the license text is 
in Annex 2). The model can be run in an interactive 
model, in which users set values for policy variables 
and uncertainties. The main interactive screen is 
shown in Figure 1. The blue line in the figure reflects 
the user settings, while the orange line corresponds 
to the default settings. The yellow areas around the 
default trajectories show the variability in outputs 
arising from uncertainty in the model parameters 
when run using the default settings.
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information that would be used by an MNE but that 
does not enter the model estimate.
3.1 Business models
Business models are specified in the NBIM by the 
quantity of inputs they require, such as capital, land 
and labour, to produce a certain amount of output 
– feedstock, biofuel and by-products. Production 
processes are assumed to combine resources in 
fixed proportions (that is, they are characterised by 
Leontief production functions). The quantity Qi of 
input [i] required to produce an amount [F] of some 
output, whether feedstock or biofuel, is therefore 
given by a constant ratio, the productivity [πi],
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹. (1)
𝐹𝐹 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (2)
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼. (3)
𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐼𝐼, (4)
𝑋𝑋up-front = � 𝐼𝐼 for biofuel operations,�1 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝐼𝐼 for feedstock operations.
� (5)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (6)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡� 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (7)
𝑅𝑅expect = �?¯?𝑝prod + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur�𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (8)
?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 = ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 + 1𝐷𝐷 �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 − ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1�. (9)
     (1)
Because resources are combined in fixed proportions, 
a capital investment [I] in a business model that is 
operating at full capacity corresponds to a definite 
amount of output, determined by the capital 
productivity [πK],
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1
𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹. (1)
𝐹𝐹 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (2)
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼. (3)
𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐼𝐼, (4)
𝑋𝑋up-front = � 𝐼𝐼 for biofuel operations,�1 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝐼𝐼 for feedstock operations.
� (5)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (6)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡� 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (7)
𝑅𝑅expect = �?¯?𝑝prod + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur�𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (8)
?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 = ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 + 1𝐷𝐷 �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 − ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1�. (9)
     (2)
Combining equations 1 and 2, the amount of input 
required to produce the output that corresponds to 
an investment [I] is
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metrics for a project – net present value, adjusted present values, internal rate of return – and consider a 
variety of factors, including the firm’s debt position, the size of the planned investment, its strategic 
importance and the strategies of competing firms, and risks at the industry, country, firm, and project 
level. However, much of the information that enters into investment decisions is proprietary, and it is 
not possible to capture all of these considerations within a simulatio  model. Accordingly, we base the 
simulation of the investment decision on one indicator – th  profitability index – and then 
mathematically “blur” the investment flows among ifferent projects to account for the additional 
information that would be used by an MNE but that does n t enter the model estimate.
BUSINESS MODELS
Business models are specified in the NBIM model by the quantity of inputs they require – such as 
capital, land, and labor – to produce a certain amount of output – feedstock, biofuel, and byproducts. 
Production processes are assumed to combine resources in fixed proportions (that is, they are 
characterized by Leontief production functions). The quantity Qi of input i required to produce an 
amount F of some output, whether feedstock or biofuel, is therefore given by a constant ratio, the 
productivity πi,
Qi= 1i F . (1)
Because resources are combined in fixed proportions, a capital investment I in a business model that is 
operating at full capacity corresponds to a definite amount of output, determined by the capital 
productivity πK,
F=K I . (2)
Combining Equations (1) and (2), the amount of input required to produce the output that corresponds 
to an investment I is
Qi=Ki I . (3)
The initial expenditure for biofuels is the up-front investment I. For feedstocks, an initial land purchase 
is also required. The area A of land that corresponds to an initial investment I is determined by the ratio 
of the productivities, as in Equation (3),
A=KN I , (4)
where the conventional notation N is used to indicate land. If the land price at the time of purchase is 
pN, then the up-front expenditure for feedstocks is Ip N A . Thus, using Equation (4), up front 
expenditure Xup-front is
X up-front={ I for biofuel operations,1KN p N I for feedstock operations. (5)
Following the initial investment, revenue in each time period t depends on the prices of inputs pi,t in 
that time period. In the model, only the inputs capital, land, labor, and biofuel feedstock are tracked 
6
     (3)
The initial expenditure for bi fuels is the up-front 
investment [I]. For feedstocks, an initial land 
purchase is also required. The area [A] of land that 
corresponds to an initial investment [I] is determined 
by the ratio of the productivities, as in Equation 3,
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹. (1)
𝐹𝐹 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (2)
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼. (3)
𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐼𝐼, (4)
𝑋𝑋up-front = � 𝐼𝐼 for biofuel operations,1 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝐼𝐼 for feedstock operations.
� (5)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (6)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡� 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (7)
𝑅𝑅expect = �?¯?𝑝prod + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur�𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (8)
?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 = ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 + 1𝐷𝐷 �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 − ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1�. (9)
     (4)
where the conventional notation N is used to indicate 
land. If the land price at the time of purchase 
is pN, then the up-front expenditure for feedstocks 
Investors in the model are either domestic investors 
or multinational enterprises (MNEs) engaging in 
foreign direct i vestment (FDI). The question the 
model seeks to answer is, which of a set of business 
models are likely to receive domestic investment 
funds or FDI, and in what quantities? In contrast, 
most research on FDI focuses on other factors, 
including: FDI flows to countries (rather than 
projects) (Asiedu 2002, Sethi et al. 2002, Akinkugbe 
2003, Ahlquist 2006, Blo igen et al. 2007, Busse and 
Hefeker 2007, Jinj rak 2007, Lim 2008, Dippenaar 
2009); mode of e try (Kog t and Nath 1988, 
Hennart and Park 1993, Li and Filer 2007, Li and 
Rugman 2007, Nocke and Yeaple 2007, Asmussen 
et al. 2009); the impact of FDI on host countries 
(Jenkins 2006, Adams, 2009, Chaudhuri 2010); 
and the decision making process within a particular 
firm (Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001, Moosa 2002, 
White and Fan 2006, Carlesi et al. 2007, Dippenaar 
2009, Klier 2009, Kinda 2010). A survey of the 
literature on FDI identified one paper assessing the 
potential of projects within a portfolio to attract 
foreign investment (Li and Sherali 2003); however, 
the methodology in that paper requires detailed 
knowledge of th  project  nd is unsuitable for a 
simulation model.
The NBIM design draws upon recommendations 
made to the managers of MNEs (Solnik 2000, 
Moosa 2002, White and Fa  2006, Klier 2009) 
and the practices used by financial officers (Graham 
and Harvey 2001). In practice, MNE management 
might examine a variety of metrics for a project – net 
present value, adjusted present values, internal rate of 
return – and consider a variety of fact rs, including 
the firm’s debt position, t e size of the planned 
investment, its strategic importance and the strategies 
of competing firms, and risks at the industry, country, 
firm, and project level. However, much of the 
information that enters into investment decisions is 
proprietary, and it is impossible to capture all of these 
considerations in a simulation model. Accordingly, 
we base the simulation of the investment decision 
on one indicator – the profitability index – and then 
mathematically ‘blur’ the investment flows among 
different projects to account for the additional 
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The NBIM design draws upon recommendations made to the managers of MNEs (Solnik 2000, Moosa 
2002, White and Fan 2006, Klier 2009) and the practices used by financial officers (Graham and 
Harvey 2001). In practice, MNE management might examine a variety of metrics for a project – net 
present value, adjusted present values, internal rate of return – and consider a variety of factors, 
including the firm’s debt position, the size of the planned investment, its strategic importance and the 
strategies of competing firms, and risks at the industry, country, firm, and project level. However, much 
of the information that enters into investment decisions is proprietary, and it is impossible to capture all 
of these considerations in a simulation model. Accordingly, we base the simulation of the investment 
decision on one indicator – the profitability index – and then mathematically ‘blur’ the investment 
flows among different projects to account for the additional information that would be used by an MNE 
but that does not enter the model estimate.
3.1. Business models
Business models are specified in the NBIM by the quantity of inputs they require, such as capital, land 
and labour, to produce a certain amount of output – feedstock, biofuel and by-products. Production 
processes are assumed to combine resources in fixed proportions (that is, they are characterised by 
Leontief production functions). The quantity Qi of input [i] required to produce an amount [F] of some
output, whether feedstock or biofuel, is therefore given by a constant ratio, the productivity [πi],
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹. (1)
Because resources are combined in fixed proportions, a capital investment [I] in a business model that 
is operating at full capacity corresponds to a definite amount of output, determined by the capital 
productivity [πK],
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. (2)
Combining equations 1 and 2, the amount of input required to produce the output that corresponds to an 
investment [I] is
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. (3)
The initial expenditure for biofuels is the up-front investment [I]. For feedstocks, an initial land 
purchase is also required. The area [A] of land that corresponds to an initial investment [I] is 
determined by the ratio of the productivities, as in Equation 3,
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, (4)
where the conventional notation N is used to indicate land. If the land price at the time of purchase is 
pN, then the up-front expenditure for feedstocks i  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. Thus, using Equation 4, up-front 
expenditure [Xup-front] is
𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋up-front = � 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 for biofuel operations,�1 + 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁� 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 for feedstock operations.
 (5)
Following the initial investment, revenue in each time period [t] depends on the prices of inputs [pi,t] in 
that time period. In the model, only the inputs capital, land, labour and biofuel feedstock are tracked 
. Th s, sing Equation 4, up-front 
expenditure [Xup- front] is
 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹. (1)
𝐹𝐹 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (2)
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼. (3)
𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐼𝐼, (4)
𝑋𝑋up-front = � 𝐼𝐼 for biofuel operations,�1 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝐼𝐼 for feedstock operations.
� (5)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (6)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡� 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (7)
𝑅𝑅expect = �?¯?𝑝prod + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur�𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (8)
?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 = ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 + 1𝐷𝐷 �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 − ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1�. (9)
       (5)
Following the initial investment, revenue in each time 
period [t] depends on the prices of inputs [pi,t] in that 
time period. In the model, only the inputs capital, 
land, labour and biofuel feedstock are tracked explicitly. 
Other inputs are collected into a single term for all 
other recurring costs. The revenue stream over time is 
given as income net of costs,
 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹. (1)
𝐹𝐹 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼 (2)
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼. (3)
𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐼𝐼, (4)
𝑋𝑋up-front = � 𝐼𝐼 for biofuel operations,�1 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝐼𝐼 or feedstock operations.
� (5)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (6)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡� 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (7)
𝑅𝑅expect = �?¯?𝑝prod + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur�𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (8)
?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 = ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 + 1𝐷𝐷 �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 − ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1�. (9)
 (6)
In Equation 6, income is given as the sum of the 
product price and the value of by-products per unit 
of output [vby], multiplied by the output in each time 
period [Ft]. Costs are given by the total of inputs that 
are explicitly tracked, such as feedstocks and labour, 
and all remaining recurring costs [crecur,tFt], where crecur,t 
is recurring costs per unit of output. Using Equation 1, 
Equation 6 can be rewritten
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹. (1)
𝐹𝐹 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (2)
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼. (3)
𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐼𝐼, (4)
𝑋𝑋up-front = � 𝐼𝐼 for biofuel operations,�1 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝐼𝐼 for feedstock operations.
� (5)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (6)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡� 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (7)
𝑅𝑅expect = �?¯?𝑝prod + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur�𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (8)
?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 = ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 + 1𝐷𝐷 �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 − ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1�. (9)
 (7)
Equation 7 gives the actual revenues over time, as 
calculated in the model. During a model run, total 
output from a particular business model might fall 
below its full capacity, while prices of products and 
inputs change over time. As indicated by the notation, 
the value of by-products per unit of output is assumed 
to not change over time, while recurring costs 
can change.
Investors cannot know the future revenue stream of an 
investment with any certainty. Instead, they form an 
expectation of the future revenue stream [Rexpect]. In the 
model this is given as
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹. (1)
𝐹𝐹 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (2)
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼. (3)
𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐼𝐼, (4)
𝑋𝑋up-front �
𝐼𝐼 for biofuel operations,
�1 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝐼𝐼 for feedstock operations.
� (5)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (6)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡� 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (7)
𝑅𝑅expect = �?¯?𝑝prod + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur�𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (8)
?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 = ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 + 1𝐷𝐷 �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 − ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1�. (9)
(8)
By equating the expected value of Ft with πKI, using 
Equation 2, the model assumes that investors expect 
production to always be at full capacity. Prices and 
recurring costs are assumed to be at the level that 
prevails when the investment decision is taken, 
which is indicated in this equation by dropping the 
time index. For biofuels, the expected price for the 
product is the price at the time of the investment. 
However, for feedstocks, the expected product price 
is smoothed over previous time-steps, to take into 
account the delay between an investment in feedstock 
production and actual production; this is indicated 
by the overbar on the product price. Specifically, for 
a feedstock crop that takes D time-steps to mature, 
9
explicitly. Other inputs are collected into a single term for all other recurring costs. The revenue stream 
over time is given as income net of costs,
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣by�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 − ∑
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 . (6)
In Equation 6, income is given as the sum of the product price and the value of by-products per unit of 
output [vby], multiplied by the output in each time period [Ft]. Costs are given by the total of inputs that 
are explicitly tracked, such as feedstocks and labour, and all remaining recurring costs [crecur,tFt], where 
crecur,t is recurring costs per unit of output. Using Equation 1, Equation 6 can be rewritten
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 . (7)
Equation 7 gives the actual revenues over time, as calculated in the model. During a model run, total 
output from a particular business model might fall below its full capacity, while prices of products and 
inputs change over time. As indicated by the notation, the value of by-products per unit of output is 
assumed to not change over time, while recurring costs can change.
Investors cannot know the future revenue stream of an investment with any certainty. Instead, they
form an expectation of the future revenue stream [Rexpect]. In the model this is given as
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅expect = �?¯?𝑝𝑝𝑝prod + 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐recur�𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. (8)
By equating the expected value of Ft with πKI, using Equation 2, the model assumes that investors 
expect production to always be at full capacity. Prices and recurring costs are assumed to be at the level 
that prevails when the investment decision is taken, which is indicated in this equation by dropping the 
time index. For biofuels, the expected price for the product is the price at the time of the investment. 
However, for feedstocks, the expected product price is smoothed over previous time-steps, to take into 
account the delay between an investment in feedstock production and actual production; this is 
indicated by the overbar on the product price. Specifically, for a feedstock crop that takes D time-steps 
to mature, ?¯?𝑝𝑝𝑝prod at time [t] is given as
?¯?𝑝𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = ?¯?𝑝𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 − ?¯?𝑝𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1�. (9)
3.1.1. Feasible combinations of investors and business models
There are two kinds of investor, international and domestic, and, separately for fuels and feedstocks, 
two classes of business model. Aside from the specific feedstock that is produced or consumed, 
feedstock business models can be outgrower or estate, while biofuel business models can be small-
scale or large-scale. The model assumes that only certain combinations of investor type and business 
model are possible. While the user can change these settings, by default the model assumes that 
domestic investors are all focused on small-scale investments, and so do not invest in estate feedstock 
production or large-scale biofuel plants. The model also assumes that international investors do not 
invest in small-scale biofuel production, although they may invest in outgrower schemes.
 at ti e [t] is given as
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹. (1)
𝐹𝐹 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (2)
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼. (3)
𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐼𝐼, (4)
𝑋𝑋up-front = � 𝐼𝐼 for biofuel operations,�1 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝐼𝐼 for feedstock operations.
� (5)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (6)
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur,𝑡𝑡� 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡. (7)
𝑅𝑅expect = �?¯?𝑝prod + 𝑣𝑣by − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐recur�𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. (8)
?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡 = ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 + 1𝐷𝐷 �𝑝𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1 − ?¯?𝑝prod,𝑡𝑡−1�. (9)(9)
3.1.1 Feasible combinations of investors and 
business models
There are two kinds of investor, international and 
domestic, and, separately for fuels and feedstocks, 
two classes of business model. Aside from the 
specific feedstock that is produced or consumed, 
feedstock business models can be outgrower or 
estate, while biofuel business models can be small-
scale or large-scale. The model assumes that only 
certain combinations of investor type and business 
model are possible. While the user can change 
these settings, by default the model assumes that 
any investment option is possible except that 
international investors do not invest in small-scale 
fuel production operations.
3.2 Profitability
The question for the investor is, which of several 
potential investments, represented by business 
models, will yield the highest profit. In practice, 
investors might use one of several metrics to estimate 
potential profitability, but all of them rely on a 
calculation of the net present value (NPV), which is 
the value of the future stream of income discounted 
to the present, net of the original investment 
(Moosa 2002).
The simplest form for NPV [n0] is
𝑛𝑛0 = 𝑅𝑅expect ∑
𝑡𝑡=𝐷𝐷+1
𝑇𝑇 1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 − 𝑋𝑋up-front, (10)
𝑛𝑛 = (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑅𝑅expect ∑
𝑡𝑡=𝐷𝐷+1
𝑇𝑇 1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏 ∑𝑡𝑡=1𝑇𝑇 (1−𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 + 1−𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆 − 𝑋𝑋up-front. (11)
𝑆𝑆 = � (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇𝜏𝜏 for biofuel operations
�(1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝜏𝜏 for feedstock operations
�. (12)
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥) ≡ ∑
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑇𝑇
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 𝑥𝑥 1−𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇
1−𝑥𝑥
. (13)
𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼
= (1 − 𝜏𝜏) 𝑅𝑅expect
𝐼𝐼
�𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �
1
1+𝑟𝑟
� − 𝛴𝛴𝐷𝐷 �
1
1+𝑟𝑟
��+ 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �1−𝛿𝛿1+𝑟𝑟�+ 1−𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 − 𝑋𝑋expect𝐼𝐼 , (14a)
where
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(1 + 𝑟𝑟) = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−1𝑟𝑟(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 , (14b)
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �
1−𝛿𝛿
1+𝑟𝑟
� = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−(1−𝛿𝛿)𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟+𝛿𝛿)(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 . (14c)
𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼
≡ 𝛷𝛷model(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏), (15)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟curr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micro,𝑖𝑖 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖. (16)
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏). (17)
  (10)
where T is the time period of the investment and r 
is the discount rate. In the model, the discount rate 
is set equal to the equity cost of capital – that is, the 
return that a lender would expect to receive from a 
for biofuel operations
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capital loan. The sum over the time index [t] begins after 
a delay of time [D] for crops to mature.1
Equation 10 is the simplest expression of NPV. The 
model uses a more complete formula that takes into 
account taxes on profit, and depreciation. The net present 
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The first term in the sum on the right-hand side of 
Equation 11 is the discounted stream of net benefits, as 
in Equation 9, but now reduced by the tax rate [x ]. The 
second term is the tax rebate for depreciation, where d  is 
the depreciation rate; this term accounts for the common 
rule that taxes are not paid on reasonable depreciation of 
capital equipment, which is treated as a loss. The third 
term is the discounted salvage value after depreciation 
over the lifetime of the investment,2 where the salvage 
value [S] is given as the depreciated value of the initial 
investment plus the cost of land for feedstock operations,
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The sums over the time periods from one to [T] of the 
investment in Equation 11 start from the first time-
step after the initial investment, t = 1, assuming a one 
time-step delay between investment and the receipt of 
income. The sums can be done explicitly using standard 
techniques. The relevant formula is:
1  Equation 10 simplifies the reality of starting a new enterprise, 
which at a minimum includes an establishment or transitional phase 
that is quite distinct from the operating phase. In principle, it is 
not difficult to adapt the model to handle these additional details. 
However, it is unlikely that the necessary data will be available.
2  Note that depreciation is used in this formula in a conventional 
way to estimate the future value of equipment for tax purposes 
and salvage. The same depreciation rate is also used elsewhere in 
the model as the rate at which capital is permanently removed 
from productive use. This removal can occur for reasons other 
than ordinary wear-and-tear of equipment, such as insolvency, 
mismanagement and catastrophic damage, and so its rate does 
not have to equal the capital depreciation rate used for estimating 
net income. The assumption that the two rates are equal is not 
essential to the model, but it is reasonable to assume that the rates 
are of a similar magnitude, and it removes the need to specify an 
additional parameter.
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𝑛𝑛0 = 𝑅𝑅expect ∑
𝑡𝑡=𝐷𝐷+1
𝑇𝑇 1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 − 𝑋𝑋up-front, (10)
𝑛𝑛 = (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑅𝑅expect ∑
𝑡𝑡=𝐷𝐷+1
𝑇𝑇 1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏 ∑𝑡𝑡=1𝑇𝑇 (1−𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 + 1−𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆 − 𝑋𝑋up-front. (11)
𝑆𝑆 = � (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇𝜏𝜏 for biofuel operations
�(1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝜏𝜏 for feedstock operations
�. (12)
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥) ≡ ∑
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑇𝑇
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 𝑥𝑥 1−𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇
1−𝑥𝑥
. (13)
𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼
= (1 − 𝜏𝜏 𝑅𝑅expect
𝐼𝐼
�𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �
1
1+𝑟𝑟
� − 𝛴𝛴𝐷𝐷 �
1
1+𝑟𝑟
��+ 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �1−𝛿𝛿1+𝑟𝑟�+ 1−𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 − 𝑋𝑋expect𝐼𝐼 , (14a)
where
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(1 + 𝑟𝑟) = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−1𝑟𝑟(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 , (14b)
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �
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� = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−(1−𝛿𝛿)𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟+𝛿𝛿)(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 . (14c)
𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼
≡ 𝛷𝛷model(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏), (15)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟curr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micro,𝑖𝑖 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖. (16)
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏). (17)
            (14a)
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𝑇𝑇 1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 − 𝑋𝑋up-front, (10)
𝑛𝑛 = (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑅𝑅expect ∑
𝑡𝑡=𝐷𝐷+1
𝑇𝑇 1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏 ∑𝑡𝑡=1𝑇𝑇 (1−𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 + 1−𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆 − 𝑋𝑋up-front. (11)
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𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥) ≡ ∑
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𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 𝑥𝑥 1−𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇
1−𝑥𝑥
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��+ 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �1−𝛿𝛿1+𝑟𝑟�+ 1−𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 − 𝑋𝑋expect𝐼𝐼 , (14a)
where
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(1 + 𝑟𝑟) = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−1𝑟𝑟(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 , (14b)
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �
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1+𝑟𝑟
� = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−(1−𝛿𝛿)𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟+𝛿𝛿)(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 . (14c)
𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼
≡ 𝛷𝛷model(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏), (15)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟curr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micro,𝑖𝑖 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖. (16)
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏). (17)
             (14b)
𝑛𝑛0 = 𝑅𝑅expect ∑
𝑡𝑡=𝐷𝐷+1
𝑇𝑇 1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 − 𝑋𝑋up-front, (10)
𝑛𝑛 = (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑅𝑅expect ∑
𝑡𝑡=𝐷𝐷+1
𝑇𝑇 1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏 ∑𝑡𝑡=1𝑇𝑇 (1−𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 + 1−𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆 − 𝑋𝑋up-front. (11)
𝑆𝑆 = � (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇𝜏𝜏 for biofuel operations
�(1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝜏𝜏 for feedstock operations
�. (12)
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥) ≡ ∑
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑇𝑇
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 𝑥𝑥 1−𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇
1−𝑥𝑥
. (13)
𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼
= (1 − 𝜏𝜏) 𝑅𝑅expect
𝐼𝐼
�𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �
1
1+𝑟𝑟
� − 𝛴𝛴𝐷𝐷 �
1
1+𝑟𝑟
��+ 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �1−𝛿𝛿1+𝑟𝑟�+ 1−𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 − 𝑋𝑋expect𝐼𝐼 , (14a)
where
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(1 + 𝑟𝑟) = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−1𝑟𝑟(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 , (14b)
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �
1−𝛿𝛿
1+𝑟𝑟
� = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−(1−𝛿𝛿)𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟+𝛿𝛿)(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 . (14c)
𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼
≡ 𝛷𝛷model(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏), (15)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟curr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micro,𝑖𝑖 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖. (16)
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏). (17)
                (14c)
Equations 14a–c are used in the model to determine 
the optimal investment strategy. The expression 
11
Applying this formula, and dividing through by the initial investment [I] gives the following key result:
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
= (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅expect
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
�𝛴𝛴𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 �
11+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟� − 𝛴𝛴𝛴𝛴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 � 11+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟��+ 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝛴𝛴𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 �1−𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�+ 1−𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋expect𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 , (14a)
where
𝛴𝛴𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) = (1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇−1𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 , (14b)
𝛴𝛴𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 �
1−𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟� = (1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇−(1−𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟+𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏)(1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 . (14c)
Equations 14a–c are u ed in the model to determine the optimal investment strategy. The expression 1 + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, the ‘profitability index’, is a standard metric for deciding on the profitability of a potential 
investment (Moosa 2002).3
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
≡ 𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷model(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏), (15)
where the subscript ‘model’ indicates that the factor is dependent on the business model. As indicated 
by the notation, it also depends on the tax and depreciation rates. Also as indicated, it does not depend 
on the initial investment [I] because in equations 5, 8, and 12, Rexpect, S, and Xup-front are proportional to 
I. This convenient result is a consequence of using Leontief production functions.
Equations 14a–c are also used in the model to calculate a threshold producer price above which the 
investment is attractive and below which it is not attractive. This is determined by setting n = 0, 
substituting for Rexpect using Equation 8, and then solving for the producer price.
For convenience, we refer to the right-hand side of Equation 14a as 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷model(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏),
3.3. Investor discount rate: the equity cost of capital
The investor decision making submodel is based on financial portfolio theory, and considers both 
domestic and international investors to be comparing an investment in biofuel feedstock production or 
processing to similar investments in a larger market. In portfolio theory, risk is considered to be either 
systematic or non-systematic; systematic risk captures how the potential investment moves with the 
market as a whole, while non-systematic risk captures idiosyncratic investment, firm and location 
factors. In theory, investors can remove non-systematic risk through diversification, leaving only 
systematic risk (Solnik 2000). However, in practice, and in particular for FDI, opportunities for 
diversification are limited and firms routinely include non-systematic risk in their evaluation of projects 
(White and Fan 2006). Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return [rE,i] –
the equity cost of capital – for business model i where
                                                 
3 In a survey of financial officers, the profitability index (PI) was found to be a less popular method for evaluating projects
than either NPV or the internal rate of return (IRR) (Graham and Harvey 2001). However, since NPV scales directly 
with the initial investment [I] – under the model assumption that output scales directly with input (Leontief production 
functions) – if two projects have equal initial investments, then NPV and PI will give equivalent rankings, because PI is 
simply NPV/I + 1. Thus, within the model, NPV and PI are equivalent. IRR may give a different ranking than PI or 
NPV, but IRR and PI lead to identical go/no-go decisions for an individual investment: if the PI is positive at a discount 
rate [r], then the IRR will be higher than r. A drawback of IRR compared to PI is that it has units of 1/time, whereas PI is 
dimensionless. The use of a dimensionless indicator simplifies the model for estimating financial flows that is developed 
in Section 3.4.
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metric for d ciding on the profitability of a potential 
investment (Moosa 2002).3 For convenience, we 
refer to the right-hand side of Equation 14a as 
11
Applying this formula, and dividing through by the initial investment [I] gives the following key result:
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
= (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅expect
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
�𝛴𝛴𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 �
11+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟� − 𝛴𝛴𝛴𝛴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 � 11+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟��+ 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝛴𝛴𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 �1−𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�+ 1−𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋expect𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 , (14a)
where
𝛴𝛴𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) = (1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇−1𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 , (14b)
𝛴𝛴𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 �
1−𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟� = (1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇−(1−𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟+𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏)(1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 . (14c)
Equations 4a–c are us d in the model to d termine the optimal investment strategy. The expression 1 + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, he ‘profitability index’, is a standard metric for deciding on the profitability of a potential 
investment (Moosa 2002).3
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
≡ 𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷model(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏), (15)
wher  the subscript ‘model’ indicates that the factor is dependent on the business model. As indicated 
by t e n tation, it also depends on th  tax and depreciation rates. Als  as i dicated, it does not depend 
on the initial investment [I] because in equations 5, 8, and 12, Rexpect, S, and Xup-front are proportional to 
I. This convenient result is a consequence of using Leontief production functions.
Equations 14a–c are also used in the model to calculate a threshold producer price above which the 
investment is attractive and below which it is not attractive. This is determined by setting n = 0, 
substituting for Rexpect using Equation 8, and then solving for the producer price.
For convenience, we refer to the right-hand side of Equation 14a as 
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷model(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏),
3.3. Investor discount rate: the equity cost of capital
The investor decision making submodel is based on fi ancial p rtfolio theory, and considers oth 
domestic and international investors to be comparing an investment in biofu l fe dstock production or 
processing to similar investment  in a larger m rket. In p rtfolio theory, risk is considered to be either 
systematic or non-systemati ; systematic risk captures how t e potential investme t moves with the 
market as a whole, while non-systematic risk captures i iosyncratic investment, firm a d location 
factors. In theory, investors can remove non-systematic risk through diversification, leaving only 
systematic risk (Solnik 2000). However, in practice, and in particul r for FDI, opportunities for 
diversificati n are limited and firms routinely includ  non-systematic risk in their evaluation of projects 
(White and Fan 2006). Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return [rE,i] –
the equity cost of capital – for business model i where
                                                 
3 In a survey of financial officers, the profitability index (PI) was found to be a less popular method for evaluating projects
than either NPV or the internal rate of return (IRR) (Graham and Harvey 2001). However, since NPV scales directly 
with the initial investment [I] – under the model assumption that output scales directly with input (Leontief production 
functions) – if two projects have equal initial investments, then NPV and PI will give equivalent rankings, because PI is 
simply NPV/I + 1. Thus, within the model, NPV and PI are equivalent. IRR may give a different ranking than PI or 
NPV, but IRR and PI lead to identical go/no-go decisions for an individual investment: if the PI is positive at a discount 
rate [r], then the IRR will be higher than r. A drawback of IRR compared to PI is that it has units of 1/time, whereas PI is 
dimensionless. The use of a dimensionless indicator simplifies the model for estimating financial flows that is developed 
in Section 3.4.
,
𝑛𝑛0 = 𝑅𝑅expect ∑
𝑡𝑡=𝐷𝐷+1
𝑇𝑇 1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 − 𝑋𝑋up-front, (10)
𝑛𝑛 = (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑅𝑅expect ∑
𝑡𝑡=𝐷𝐷+1
𝑇𝑇 1(1 𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏 ∑𝑡𝑡=1𝑇𝑇 (1−𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 + 1−𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆 − 𝑋𝑋up-front. (11)
𝑆𝑆 = � (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇𝜏𝜏 for biofuel operations
�(1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝜏𝜏 for feedstock operations
�. (12)
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥) ≡ ∑
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑇𝑇
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 𝑥𝑥 1−𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇
1−𝑥𝑥
. 3)
𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼
= (1 − 𝜏𝜏) 𝑅𝑅expect
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1
1+𝑟𝑟
��+ 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �1−𝛿𝛿1+𝑟𝑟�+ 1−𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 − 𝑋𝑋expect𝐼𝐼 , (14a)
where
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(1 + 𝑟𝑟) = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−1𝑟𝑟(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 , (14b)
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �
1−𝛿𝛿
1+𝑟𝑟
� = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−(1−𝛿𝛿)𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟+𝛿𝛿)(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 . (14c)
𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼
≡ 𝛷𝛷model(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏), (15)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟curr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micr ,𝑖𝑖 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖. (16)
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏). (17)
   (15)
where the subscript ‘model’ indicates that the 
factor is dependent on the business model. As 
indicated by the notation, it also depends n the 
tax and depreci ion rat s. Also as indicated, does 
not depe d on the initial investme t [I] bec use 
 equatio s 5, 8, and 12, Rexpect, S, and Xup-front 
are proportional to I. This convenient result is a 
consequence of using Leontief production functions.
3  In a survey of financial officers, the profitability index (PI) 
was found to be a less popular method for evaluating projects 
than either NPV or the internal rate of return (IRR) (Graham 
and Harvey 2001). However, since NPV scales directly with the 
initial investment [I] – under the model assumption that output 
scales directly with input (Leontief production functions) – if 
two projects have equal initial investments, then NPV and PI 
w ll give equivale t anki gs, b cause PI is si ply NPV/I + 1. 
Thus, within the model, NPV and PI are equivalent. IRR may 
give a different ranking than PI or NPV, but IRR and PI lead to 
identical go/no-go decisions for an individual investment: if the 
PI is positive at a discount rate [r], then the IRR will be higher 
than r. A drawback of IRR compared to PI is that it has units of 
1/time, whereas PI is dimensionless. The use of a dimensionless 
indicator simplifies the model for estimating financial flows that 
is developed in Section 3.4.
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Equations 14a–c are also used in the model to 
calculate a threshold producer price above which 
the investment is attractive and below which it is 
not attractive. This is determined by setting n = 0, 
substituting for Rexpect using Equation 8, and then 
solving for the producer price.
3.3 Investor discount rate: the equity 
cost of capital
The investor decision making submodel is based 
on financial portfolio theory, and considers both 
domestic and international investors to be comparing 
an investment in biofuel feedstock production or 
processing to similar investments in a larger market. 
In portfolio theory, risk is considered to be either 
systematic or non-systematic; systematic risk captures 
how the potential investment moves with the market 
as a whole, while non-systematic risk captures 
idiosyncratic investment, firm and location factors. 
In theory, investors can remove non-systematic risk 
through diversification, leaving only systematic risk 
(Solnik 2000). However, in practice, and in particular 
for FDI, opportunities for diversification are limited 
and firms routinely include non-systematic risk in 
their evaluation of projects (White and Fan 2006). 
Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-
adjusted rate of return [rE,i] – the equity cost of 
capital – for business model i where
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𝑆𝑆 = � (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇𝜏𝜏 for biofuel operations
�(1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝜏𝜏 for feedstock operations
�. (12)
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥) ≡ ∑
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑇𝑇
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 𝑥𝑥 1−𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇
1−𝑥𝑥
. (13)
𝑛𝑛
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= (1 − 𝜏𝜏) 𝑅𝑅expect
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where
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𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �
1−𝛿𝛿
1+𝑟𝑟
� = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−(1−𝛿𝛿)𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟+𝛿𝛿)(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 . (14c)
𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼
≡ 𝛷𝛷model(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏), (15)
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𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏). (17)
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In Equation 16, the first three terms are the 
international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), 
which captures systematic risk (Solnik 2000): 
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evaluation of projects [21]. Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, the first three terms are the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), which 
captures systematic risk [28]: rrf is the risk-free return (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
the average market return, and rcurr is the currency risk premium for international investors. The 
parameter β is the risk factor, and γ is the sensitivity of the international investment to currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the first two apply both to international and domestic investment, and each of the 
parameters can differ between international and domestic markets. The third term only applies to 
international investors. Of the remaining four terms, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, are country risk 
factors – that is, factors that are in at least partial control of the government – and apply only to 
international investors. Macropolitical and macroeconomic risk factors are those that are shared by all 
international investors in the country, and are reported in international tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global Insight. Micropolitical and microeconomic risk factors are those that are specific to an industry 
within the country [22] The term, θ, which can be either positive or negative, captures irrational 
deviations from ideal investment behavior [30]. Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” parameters carry an i index. This is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that are specific to a particular business model.
In general, all of the terms in Equation (16) following the first term capture expectations of risk. The 
higher the risk, the higher the return that an investor will expect. This can be understood in terms of a 
change in the discount rate; future risks make future returns less valuable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
a very specific interpretation and represent a specific kind of risk. The factor β indicates how closely 
aligned the returns from the investment and the market as a whole are expected to be. The factor γ 
represents how correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. Thus, to the 
extent that the investment simply tracks the market as a whole, it fails to reduce risk through 
diversification. Both β and γ can be greater than one, meaning that they can magnify swings in the 
market; they can also be negative, if they tend to move counter to the market. For small economies, 
whether γ is large or not depends on whether the currency is pegged to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is expected to be close to one; if not, it may be less than one, and even negative. In the model, the β’s 
are assigned a range of values based on the available literature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
uncertainty”, on page 27, the model is run in sensitivity mode in which uncertain parameters, including 
the investment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investments in the model flow to different feedstock or biofuel business models depending on the 
returns provided by each business model. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofuel investments. If no biofuel investment opportunities are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very little biofuel investment occurs within the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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evaluation of projects [21]. Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, the first three terms are the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), which 
captures systematic risk [28]: rrf is the risk-free return (for example, the rate for a trea ), rave is 
the average market return, and rcurr is the currency risk premium for international investors. The 
parameter β is the risk factor, and γ is the sensitivity of the international investment to currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the first two apply both to international and domestic investment, and each of the 
parameters can differ between international and domestic markets. The third term only applies to 
international investors. Of the remaining four terms, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, are country risk 
factors – that is, factors that are in at least partial control of the government – and apply only to 
international investors. Macropolitical and macroeconomic risk factors are those that are shared by all 
international investors in the country, and are reported in international tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global Insight. Micropolitical and microeconomic risk factors are those that are specific to an industry 
within the country [22] The term, θ, which can be either positive or negative, captures irrational 
deviations from ideal investment behavior [30]. Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” parameters carry an i index. This is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that are specific to a particular business model.
In general, all of the terms in Equation (16) following the first term capture expectations of risk. The 
higher the risk, the higher the return that an investor will expect. This can be understood in terms of a 
change in the discount rate; future risks make future returns less valuable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
a very specific interpretation and represent a specific kind of risk. The factor β indicates how closely 
aligned the returns from the investment and the market as a whole are expected to be. The factor γ 
represents how correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. Thus, to the 
extent that the investment simply tracks the market as a whole, it fails to reduce risk through 
diversification. Both β and γ can be greater than one, meaning that they can magnify swings in the 
market; they can also be negative, if they tend to move counter to the market. For small economies, 
whether γ is large or not depends on whether the currency is pegged to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is expected to be close to one; if not, it may be less than one, and even negative. In the model, the β’s 
are assigned a range of values based on the available literature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
uncertainty”, on page 27, the model is run in sensitivity mode in which uncertain parameters, including 
the investment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investments in the model flow to different feedstock or biofuel business models depending on the 
returns provided by each business model. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofuel investments. If no biofuel investment opportunities are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very little biofuel investment occurs within the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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evaluation of projects [21]. Accor ingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, the first three terms are th  inter ational ca ital asset pricing mod l (ICAPM), which 
captures systematic risk [28]: r f is the risk-free return (for example, he rate for a tr a ury bond), rave is 
the average market return, nd rcurr is the currency risk pr ium for international invest rs. The 
parameter β is the risk factor, and γ is the sensitivity of the international i vestment to currency ri k. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the first two apply bot  to international and domestic investme t, and each of the 
parameters can differ between international and domestic markets. T e third term only pplies to 
international investors. Of the remaini g four terms, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, re country risk 
factors – that is, factors that are in at least partial control of the government – and apply only to 
international investors. Macropolitical and macroeconomic risk factors are those that are shared by all 
international investors in the country, and are reported in i ternational tables, such Euromon y or IHS 
Glob l Insight. Micropolitical and microeconomic ri k factors re tho e that are specific to an industry 
within the country [22] The term, θ, which can be either positive or negative, captures irrational 
devi tions from ideal investment behavior [30]. Note that both the micro isk factors and the “irrational 
xpectations” parameters carry an i index. This is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that are specific to a particular business model.
In general, all of the terms in Equation (16) following the first term capture expectations of risk. The 
higher the risk, the high r the return that an investor will expect. This can be und rstood in terms of a 
change in the discount rate; future risks make futur  r turns less valuable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
a very specific int rpretation and r present a sp cific kind of risk. The factor β indicates h w closely 
aligned the returns from the investment nd the market as a whole are expected to be. The factor γ 
repr sents h w correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currenci s. Thus, to th  
extent that the investm nt simply tracks the arket as a whole, it fails to reduce risk through 
diversification. Both β and γ can be greater t an one, meaning that they can magnify swings in the 
market; they can also b  negative, if they tend to move counter to the market. For s ll economies, 
whether γ is large or not depends on whether t  currency is pegged to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is expected to be close to one; if not, it may be less than one, nd even negative. In the model, the β’s 
are assign d a range of values based  the available lit rature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
uncertainty”, on page 27, the model is run i  sensitivity mode in which uncertain parameters, including 
the inv stment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investments in th  model flow to different fe dstock or biofuel business models depending on the 
r turns provided by each business model. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofu l invest ents. If no biofuel investm nt opportunities are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very little biofuel investment occurs within the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investme t-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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evaluation of projects [21]. Accordingly, in th model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
I  this equation, the fir t hree terms are the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), which 
captures systematic ris [28]: rrf is the isk-f ee return (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
t e average arket retur , and rcurr is the curre cy risk premium for international i vestors. The 
t r β is the risk factor, a d γ is the sensitivity of the international investment to currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the first two apply both to international and domestic investment, and each of the 
parameter  can diff r between int rnational and domestic markets. The third term only applies to 
i ati al est rs. Of the remaining four te ms, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, are country risk 
factors – that is, fact rs that are i  at least partial c ntrol of the government – and apply only to 
international nve tors. Macropolitical nd macro conomic risk factors are those that are shared by all 
int r a ional vestors in the country, and are reported in international tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global Insight. Micropolitical nd micr econ mic risk fact rs are those that are specific to an industry 
within the country [22] The term, θ, which can be either positive or negative, captures irrational 
deviations from ideal investment behavior [30]. Note hat both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” parameters arry an i index. This is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that are specific to a particular business model.
In g neral, all of the terms in Equation (16) f llowing the first term capture expectations of risk. T e 
higher the risk, the hig er the retur  tha  an investor will expect. This can be understood in terms of a 
cha ge in the discount rate; future risks make future returns less valuable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
a very specific interpretation and represent a specific kind of risk. The factor β indicates how cl sely 
alig ed the returns from th  investment and the market as a whole are expected to be. The factor γ 
repr sents h w c rrel ted the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. Thus, to the 
extent that the i ves ment simply tracks t e market as a whole, it fails to reduce risk through 
diversification. Bo  β and γ can be greater than one, meaning that they can magnify swings in the 
market; they ca  als  be negative, if they tend to move c unter to the market. For small economies, 
w the  γ is large or not depends on wh ther the currency is pegged to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is expected t  be clos  to o ; if not, it may be l ss than one, a d even negative. In the model, the β’s 
re assigned a range of values based on the available literature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
uncertaint ”, on page 27, the model is run in sensitivity mode in which uncertain parameters, including 
the investment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investments in th  model flow to different feedst ck or biofuel business models dependi g on the 
returns provided by each business mod l. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
bi fuel investments. If no biofuel investment opportunities are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very little biofuel investment occurs within the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), the et present v ue of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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evaluation of projects [21]. Ac ordingly, in the mod l, i vestors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for busines  model i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this quation, the fir t thre  terms are the international capital as et pricing model (ICAPM), which 
captures system tic risk [28]: r f is the risk-fre  return (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
th  ave age market retu n, and rcurr is the currency risk premium f r international investors. T e 
para eter β is the risk f ,  γ is the sensitivit of he international inves ment to currency risk. Of 
he ICAPM terms, he first wo ap ly both to international and d mestic i vest ent, and each of the 
p rameters can differ betw n internati al nd domestic markets. The third term only ap lies to 
international investors. Of the remaining four te ms, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, are country risk 
f ctors – th t s, factors that are in t le st partia  control of he government – and ap ly only to 
intern ti al investo s. Macropolitical and macroeconomi risk fac ors are thos that are shared by all 
international investors i  t  country, and are reported in internati nal tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Gl b l I ight. Micropolitical a d microeconomic risk f ctors are those that are specific to an ndustry 
within the country [2 ] Th  term, θ, which can be either positive or negative, captures irrati al 
deviati ns from ide l investment behavior [30]  Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” paramet rs carry an i index. This is becau e they are each affected by local conditions 
that are specific to a particular busines  model.
In gen ral, all of the terms in Equation (16) following t first term capture expectations of risk. The 
high r the r sk, th  higher the retu n that an investor will expect. This can be understo d in terms of a 
change in the di count rate; future risks make future r urns les  valuable [2 ]. The factors β and γ have 
 very specific interpre ation and represen  a specifi  kind of risk. The fact r β indicat  how closely
aligned th retur s from the investment and the market as a whole re expected to be. The factor γ 
repr sents how correlated th  value of the natio al currency is to  basket of currencies. Thus, to the 
extent h t the inv stment simply track  the market as a whole, i  fails to reduce risk through 
diversification. Both β an  γ be reater than o e, mean ng that they can magnify swings in the 
arket; they can als  be neg tive, if they tend t  mov  counter to the marke . For small economi s, 
whether γ is l rge or not dep nds n whet r the currency is p g ed to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is xpected to b close to on ; if not, it may be le an one, and even negative. In the odel the β’s 
are as igned a range of values based on the available lit rature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
uncertainty”, on page 27, t e model is run in s n it vity mode in which uncertain parameters, including 
the investment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINES  MODELS
Investme ts in the model flow t  different fe dst ck or biofuel busines  models depending on the 
returns prov d d by each busines  model. As explain d below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofuel investments. If no b ofuel investment op ortunities are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very littl  biofuel investment oc urs within the model.
As shown in Eq ation  (14, a-c), e net pres nt value of busines  model i is given by the initial 
investmen  multipli d by an investment-specific func ion of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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evaluation of projects [21]. Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i of rE,i, where
r E , i= rfi  rave− rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, the first three terms are the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), which 
captures systematic risk [28]: rrf is the risk-free return (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
the average market return, and rcurr is the currency risk premium for international investors. The 
parameter β is the risk factor, and γ is the sensitivity of the international investment to currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the first tw  apply both to intern tional and domestic investment, and each of the 
parameters can differ between international and domestic markets. The third term only applies to 
internation l inv stors. Of the remaining four t rms, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, ar  country risk 
factors – that is, factors that r  in at least partial control of th  government – and apply only to 
international investors. Macropolitical and macroeconomic risk factors are those that are shar d by all 
i ternati nal inv stors in the country, and are reported in int rnational t bl s, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global Insight. Micropolitical and microeco omic risk factors are those that are specific to n industry 
within e country [22] The term, θ, which can be either positive or negative, c ptures irrational 
deviations fro  ideal invest ent behavior [30]. Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” p rameters carry an i ndex. This is bec use they are each affected by local condition  
that are sp cific to  particular busin ss model.
In general, all of the terms in Equation (16) following the first term capture expectations of risk. The 
higher the risk, the higher the return that an investor will expect. This can be understood in terms of a 
change in the discount rate; future risks make future returns less valuable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
a very specific interpretation and represe t a specific kind of risk. The factor β i dicate  how closely 
aligned the returns from the investment and the market as a whole are xpected to be. The factor γ 
represents how c rrelated the value of the national curr cy is to a basket of currencie . Thus, to the 
extent that the investment simply tracks the market as a hol , it fails to reduce risk through 
diversification. Both β and γ ca  be greater than o e, eaning that they ca  magnify swings in the 
market; they can also be negative, if they tend to m ve counter to the market. For small economies, 
whether γ is large or not depends on whether the currency is pegged to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is expected to be close to one; if not, it may be less than one, and even negative. In the model, the β’s 
are assigned a range of values based on the available literature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
uncertainty”, on page 27, the model is run in sensitivity mode in which uncertain parameters, including 
the investment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investments in the model flow to different feedstock or biofuel business models depending on the 
returns provided by each business model. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofuel investments. If no biofuel investment opportunities are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very little biofuel investment occurs within the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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ev luati n of projects [21]. Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r urrmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, the first three terms are the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), w ich 
captures systematic risk [28]: rrf is the risk-free return (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
the average mark t return, and rcurr is the currency risk premium for international investors. The 
parameter β is the risk factor, and γ is th  sensitivity of the international investment to currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, th  first two apply both to international and dom stic i vestment, and each of the 
parameter differ betwee  i t at n l and domestic markets. The third term only appl es to 
int rnation l investors. O  the em ining fou  terms, the first two, ρm cro and  ρmicro, are count y ri k 
factors – hat is, factors h t ar  in at least p rtial co tr l of  government – and a ply nly to 
int rnatio al investors. Macropolitical a d macro conomic risk factor  ar  those at are shared by al  
international inv sto s i  th  country, and are reported in int rnation  tables, such E r mon y or IHS
G obal I sight. Mi ropolitic l and microeconomic risk factors are those hat are spe ific to  industry 
within the country [22] The term, θ, i h can b  either positive or egativ , captures irrational 
deviatio s from ideal in stm nt behavi r [30]. Note hat oth the mic o ri k factors and the “irrational 
ex ct tions” paramete s carry an i index. This is because they ar  each aff cted by lo al conditions 
hat are spe ific t   particular busine s model.
In gener , all of the terms in Equation (16) f llowing the first term capture expectations of risk. The 
igher the risk, t e igher the return hat an investor will expect. This can be understood in terms of a 
change in the discount rate; future risks make future returns less v luable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
a very spe ific interpretatio  and pres nt a spe ific kind of risk. The factor β ndicates h w clos ly 
aligned the returns from the investment a d the market s  whole are exp cted to be. The factor γ 
presents how correlated the value of the national currency is to  basket of currencies. Thus, to the 
x ent hat the investment si ply tracks the market s a whole, it fails to reduce risk through 
diversification. Both β and γ can be gr ater than one, meaning hat they can agnify swings in the 
market; they c n also b  negative, if they tend to move counter to the market. For s all economies, 
w ther γ is large or not depends on w ther the currency is pegged to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is exp cted to be close to one; if not, it may be less tha  one, and even negative. In the model, the β’s 
are assigned a range of values based on the avai able literature. As explained in th  section “Parameter 
uncertainty”, on page 27, the model is run in sensitivity mode in w ich uncertain parameters, including 
the investment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investments in the model flow to different feedstock or biofuel business models depe ding on the 
returns provided by each business model. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofuel investments. If no biofuel investment opportunities are competitive wit  the alternatives, then 
very ittle biofuel investment occurs within the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), th  net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-spe ific functi n of the rate of retur . In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so hat
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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evaluation of projects [21]. Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, the first three terms are the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), which 
captures systematic risk [28]: rrf is the risk-free return (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
the average market return, and rcurr is the currency risk premium for international investors. The 
parameter β is the risk factor, and γ is the sensitivity of the international investment to currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the first two apply both to international and domestic investment, and each of the 
parameters c n differ between international and domestic markets. The third term only applies to 
int rnational investors. Of the remain ng four terms, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, are country risk 
factors – that is, factors that a e in at least parti l control of the government – and apply only to 
internat onal investo s. Macropolitical and macroeconomic risk factors are those that are shared by all 
inter ational investors in th  country, and are repor ed in in ernational tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global I sight. Micropolitical and microeconomi  risk factors re those that are specific to an industry 
within the country [22] The ter , θ, which can be either positive or negative, captures irrational 
deviations from ideal investment behavior [30]. Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” parameters carry an i index. This is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that are specific to a particular business model.
In general, all of the terms in Equation (16) following the first term capture expectations of risk. The 
higher the risk, the higher the return that an investor will expect. This can be understood in terms of a 
change in the discount rate; future risks make future returns less valuable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
a very specific interpretation and represent a specific kind of risk. The factor β indicates how closely 
aligned the returns from the investment and the market as a whole are expected to be. The factor γ 
represents how correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. Thus, to the 
extent that the investment simply tracks the market as a whole, it fails to reduce risk through 
diversification. Both β and γ can be greater than one, meaning that they can magnify swings in the 
market; they can also be negative, if they tend to move counter to the market. For small economies, 
whether γ is large or not depends on whether the currency is pegged to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is expected to be close to one; if not, it may be less than one, and even negative. In the model, the β’s 
are assigned a range of values based on the available literature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
uncertainty”, on page 27, the model is run in sensitivity mode in which uncertain parameters, including 
the investment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investments in the model flow to different feedstock or biofuel business models depending on the 
returns provided by each business model. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofuel investments. If no biofuel investment opportunities are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very little biofuel investment occurs within the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by n investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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e aluation of projects [21]. Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i of rE,i, wh re
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, the first three terms are the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), which 
captures systematic risk [28]: rrf is the risk-free return (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
the average ma ket return, and rcurr is the currency risk premium for international investors. The 
para eter β is the risk factor, and γ is the sensitivity of the international investment to currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the first two apply both to international and domestic investment, and each of the 
parameters can differ between international and domestic markets. The third term only applies to 
international investors. Of the remaining four terms, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, are country risk 
factors – that is, factors that are in at least partial control of the government – and apply only to 
international investors. Macropolitical and macroeconomic risk factors are those that are shared by all 
international investors in the country, and are reported in international tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global Insight. Micropolitical and microeconomic risk factors are those that are specific to an industry 
within the country [22] The term, θ, which can be either positive or negative, captures irrational 
deviations from ideal investment behavior [30]. Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” parameters carry an i index. This is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that are specific to a particular business model.
In general, all of the terms in Equation (16) following the first term capture expectations of risk. The 
highe  the risk, he higher the eturn that an investor will expect. This can be understood in terms of a 
change in the discount rate; future risks make future returns less valuable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
a very pecific inte pretation a d represent a specific kind of risk. The factor β indicates how closely 
aligned the returns from the investment and the market as a whole are expected to be. The factor γ 
represe ts h w correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. Thus, to the 
extent that the investment simply tracks the market as a whole, it fails to reduce risk through 
diversif cati n. Bo h β and γ can be greater than one, meaning that they can magnify swings in the 
m rket; they can also e egative, if they tend to move counter to the market. For small economies, 
whether γ is large or not d pends on whether the currency is pegged to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is xpected to be close to one; if not, it may be less than one, and even negative. In the model, the β’s 
are ssigned a range of values based on the available literature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
u certainty”,  age 27, he model is run in sensitivity mode in which uncertain parameters, including 
the i vest nt β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investments in the model flow to different feedstock or biofuel business models depending on the 
returns provided by each business model. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofuel investments. If no biofuel investment opportunities are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very little biofuel investment occurs within the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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valuation of projects [21]. Accordingly, in the mo el, inves ors exp ct a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business mod l i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In t is equatio , the f rst three terms are he internatio al cap tal asset pricing model (ICAPM), which 
ca tur s systematic risk [28]: rrf is th  risk-free return (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rav  is 
the average ma ket return, and rcurr is the curre cy risk premium for nternational inves o s. The 
parameter β is the risk factor,  γ i  t e sensitivity of the inter ational inves men  to currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the first two a ply both to international and domestic investment, and each of the 
parameters can differ b ween international and domestic markets. The hird term only applies to 
international inves o s. Of the remaining four ter s, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicr , are c u try risk 
fact rs – that is, that are in at least partial co trol of the government – and apply only to 
international inves o s. Macropolitical and macr economic risk factors are those that are shared by ll 
international inves o s in the country, and ar reported i  internati nal tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global Insight. Micropolitical and micr economic risk factors are those that are specific to an industry 
within the country [22] The term, θ, which can be either positive or negative, captu es irrational 
deviations from i eal inve tment b havior [30]. Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irra ion l 
expectations” param ters carry an i ind x. This is because they are ea h affected by lo al conditions
that are specific to a particular business model.
In general, all of the terms in Equation (16) following the first term capture expectations of risk. The 
higher the ri k, t e higher the return that an inv stor will expect. This can be understood in t rms of a 
change in the dis ou t rate; future risks make future returns l ss valuable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
a very specific interp etation and r present a specific kind of risk. The factor β indicat s how closely 
aligned the retur s from investment and the mark t as a w ole e expected to be. The factor γ 
represents how correlated the value of the national currency is to  bask t of currencie . Thus, to the 
extent that the investment simply tracks the arke  as a w ole, it fails to reduce risk thr ugh 
diversification. Both β and γ ca  be greater than on , meaning that they c  magnify swings in the 
market; th y can also be negative, if they tend to move counter the market. For small economies, 
whether γ is larg  or not depends o  whet er the currency is pegged to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is expected to be close to one; if not, it may be less than one, and even egative. In the model, the β’s 
are assigned a range of values b sed on the avail ble literature. As explained in the sectio  “Param ter 
uncertainty”, n pag  27, he model is run in sensitiv ty mode in which uncerta parameters, including 
the investment β’s, t k  on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS M DELS
Investments in the model flow to different feedst ck or biofuel business m dels depending n the 
returns provided by each bus n ss model. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compet  with 
biofuel investments. If no biofuel investment opportunities are competitive with the alternatives, t n 
very little biofuel inves ment occurs within the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the nitial 
investment multiplied by an investm nt-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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evaluation of projects [21]. Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, the fi st thr e terms are the int rnatio al capital sset pricing model (ICAPM), whic  
captures sy tema ic risk [28]: rrf is the risk-free r turn (for ex mple, the r te for a tr asury bond), ave is
th  average ma k  turn and rcurr is th  curre cy risk premium for inter atio al investors. The 
parameter β is the risk facto , and γ is the sen tivity of he international investment to curre cy risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the fir  two apply both to i te national and domestic investment, and e ch of the 
parameters can diffe  between internatio al and dom stic mark ts. The third term only applies to 
i ternat onal investors. Of the remaining four terms, the first two, ρmacro and ρmicro,  country isk 
factors – that is, factors that are in at l ast partial cont ol f the government – and apply only t  
international inve tors acropolitical and acroeconomic risk facto s are those that are shared by ll 
international inv st rs in the country, and are re rted in int rnati nal tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global Insight. Micr politic l and icroeconomic risk factors are those that are spec i  to an industry 
within the coun ry [22] The term, θ, which n be either positive or n g tive, captures irrational 
d v ations from id l nvestment behavior [30]. N t  that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” parameters carry an i index. his is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that are specific to a particular busines model.
In general, all of the terms in Equation (16) following the first t m capture exp ctations of risk. The 
higher th  risk, he h gher th  r tur  that an inv stor will expect. This can be understood in terms f a 
change in the iscou t ate; future risks ma  future returns l ss v luable [22]. Th  factors β and γ have 
a very pecifi  in erpretation nd represent a spe ific ki d of isk. The factor β indicates ow closely 
ligned t  return  from he investment and the market as a whol  ar  expected to be. The factor γ 
represents ow orrelated t e valu  of the national currency is to a basket of curre cies. Thus, to the 
extent th t th  inv stment simply tracks the market as a w l , it fails to reduce risk thr ugh 
d versificatio . Both β and γ c n be gr ater than one, m aning that they can magnify wings in the 
market; t ey can als negativ , if th y tend t  move counter t  the market. For small economies, 
whether γ is lar e or ot depe ds n wheth r the c rency is egg  to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is expected to be close to on ; if n t, it may be less than one, and even egative. In the mo el, the β’s 
are assign d a ra g  of value  based on the vailable lit rature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
uncertainty”, on page 27, the model is run in sensitivity mode in which uncertain parameters, including 
the investment β’s, tak  on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investments in the mod l flow to differ nt fe dstock r biof el busin ss models d pending on the 
returns pro ided by each business model. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofuel investments. If no biofuel investment opportunities are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very little biofuel investment occurs within the model.
As shown in Equat ons (14, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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evaluation of projects [21]. Accordingly, in he mod l, inves ors expect a risk-adjust  rate of return – 
the equity cost o  pital – for business mod l i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, th  first three t rms are the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), which 
captures systematic risk [28]: rrf is the risk-fre  return (for exa ple, he rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
the average market retur , and rcurr is the currency risk premium f r int rnational investors. The 
parameter β is th  risk factor, nd γ is the sensitivity of the international investment to currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the first two apply both to international and domestic investment, and each of the 
parameters can differ between international and domestic markets. The third term only applies to 
international investors. Of the remaining four terms, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, are country risk 
factors – that is, factors that are in at least partial c ntrol of the gover ment – and apply nly to 
international investors. Macropolitical and macroeconomic risk factors are those t at are shared by all 
international investors in the country, and are reported in international tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global sight. Micropolitical and microeco omic risk factors are those that are specific to an industry 
within the country [22] The term, θ, which can be either positive or negative, captures irrational 
deviatio s from ideal investm nt behavior [30]. Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” parameters carry an i index. This is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that are specific to a particular business model.
In general, all of the terms in Equation (16) following the first term capture expectations of risk. The 
higher the risk, the h gher the r turn that a  investo  will expect. This can be understood in terms of a 
change in the discount rate; future risks make future returns less valuable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
a very specific interpretation and represent a specific kind of risk. The factor β indicates how closely 
aligned the returns from the investment and the market as a whole are expected to be. The factor γ 
represents how correlated the value of the national currency is t  a basket of currencies. T us, to the 
extent that the investment simply tracks the market as a wh le, it fails to reduce risk through 
diversification. Both β and γ can be greater than one, meaning that they can magnify swings in the 
market; they can also be negative, if they tend to move counter to the market. For small economies, 
whether γ is large or not depends on whether the currency is pegged to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is expected to b  close to one; if not, it may be less than one, and even negative. In the model, the β’s 
are assigned a range of values based on the available literature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
uncertainty”, on page 27, the model is run in s sitivity mode in which unc rtain parameters, i cl ding 
the investment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausibl  range.
INVESTMENT FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investments i  the model flow to diffe ent feedstock or biofuel busine s models depending on the 
returns p ovided by each busi ess mo el. As explained be ow, non-bio uel inve tments compete with 
biofuel inv stm nts. If no biofuel investment portunities ar  competitive with the a ternatives, then 
ve y little biofu l inve tment occ rs within th mod l.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
n =I iir ; , . (17)
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evaluat on of pr jects [21]. Accordi gly, i th  model, inv stors xpect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of c pita  – fo  b sines model i of E,i, wh re
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, the first three terms ar  the i ter ational capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), which 
captures syste atic ri k [28]: rrf i  t e risk-free return (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
the average arket return, and r urr is the curre cy risk premium for i ternational investors. The 
parameter β is the risk factor, and γ is the sensitivity of the international investment to currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the f rst two apply both to inte national and domestic investment, and each of the 
parameters can iffer b tween international and d estic arkets. The third term only applies to 
nternati nal investors. Of the remaining four terms, the f rst two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, are country risk 
factors – that is, factor  hat a e in  least partial con r l of the government – and apply only to 
international investors. Macropolitical and macroeconom c risk factors are those that are shared by all 
international investors in the country, and are reported in nternational tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global Insight. Micropolitical and microeconomic risk factors are those that are specific to an industry 
within the country [22] The term, θ, which can be either positive or negative, captures irrational 
deviations from ideal investment behavior [30]. Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” parameters carry an i index. This is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that are specific to a particular business model.
In general, all of he terms in Equation (16) following the first term capture expectations of risk. T e 
higher the risk, the higher the return that an i vestor will expect. This can be understood in terms of a 
change in th  di count rate; future risks make future returns less valuable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
a very specific i terpretation and represent a specific kind of risk. T e factor β indicates how closely 
aligned the returns from the investment an  the market as a whole are expected to be. The factor γ 
represen s how correlated th  value of the natio al currency is to a basket of currencies. Thus, to the 
extent that the investment simply tracks the market as a w ole, it fails to reduce risk through 
diversification. Both β and γ can be greater than one, me ning hat they can magnify swings in the 
market; they can also b  negative, if they tend to ove count r to the market. For small economies, 
wh the  γ is large or not depen s on whet er the currency is pegged to a maj r currency: if it is, then γ 
is expected to be cl se to n ; if not, it may e less tha  one, and even egative. In the mo l, the β’s 
are assign d a rang  of values based on t e available lit rature. As xplai ed in the section “Parameter 
uncertainty”, on page 27, the model is run in sensitivity mode i  which uncertain parameters, including 
the i vestment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investment in the model flow to different feedstock or biofuel business models depending on the 
eturn provid d by ach busine s mod l. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofu l investment . If n  biofuel investme t pportunities are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very little biofuel investment ccurs within the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
10
 and 
The National Bioenergy Inves ment Model NBIM: Technical Documenta ion DRAFT
evaluation of projects [21]. Accordingly, in the mo el, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i of rE,i, where
E , i=rrfi  rave− rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, the first thr e terms are the int rnational capital sset pricing model (ICAPM), which 
captur s syst matic risk [28]: rrf is the ris -free return (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rav  is 
the average rket return, and rcur  is the currency risk pre ium for international investors. The 
parameter β is the risk factor,  γ is the sensitivity of the international investment to currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the first two apply both to intern ti al and domestic i vestment, and each of the 
parameters can differ between inter ati nal and domestic markets. T e third term only applies to 
international invest rs. Of the remaining four ter s, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicr , are cou try risk 
factors – that is, fact rs that ar  in at least partial control of the government – and apply only to 
international investors. Macropolitical and macr economic risk f ctors are those that are shared by all 
international investors in the country, and are r ported i  internati nal tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global I sight. Micropolitical and micr economic risk factors are those that are specific to an industry 
within the country [22] Th  term, θ, wh ch can be either positive or negative, captures irrational 
deviations from i eal investment behavior [30]. Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” parameters carry an i index. This is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that are specific to a p rticular business model.
In gen ral, all of the terms in Equation (16) following th  first t rm capture expectations of risk. The 
higher the risk, t e igher the return that an investor will exp ct. This can be understood in terms of a 
cha ge in the discou t rate; future risks make future r turns less valuable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
a very specific int rpretation and represent a specifi  kind of risk. The factor β indicates how closely 
aligned the returns from t e investment and the market as a w ole are expected to be. The factor γ 
represents how corr lated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. Thus, to the 
extent that the investment simply tracks the arket as  w ole, it fails to reduce risk thr ugh 
diversification. Both β nd γ can be great r than one, mea ing that they c  agnify swings in the 
market; they can also be negat e, if they t d to move cou t r t  the ma ket. For small economies, 
whether γ is large or not depen s on whet er the currency is pegged to a maj r currency: if it is, the  γ 
is expected to be cl se to on ; if not, it may  less than o e, and ve  egative. In the mod l, the β’s
re assign d a ang  of value  based on the availab e lit rature. As exp ained  the sectio  “Parameter 
uncertainty”, n page 27, the model is run i  ensitivity mode in which uncertai  param ters, including 
th  inv stment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS M DELS
Inv stme ts in the model flow to different feedst k or biofuel business m dels depending n the 
returns provided by e ch busin ss model. As xplained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
bi fuel i vestme ts. If no biofuel investment opportunities are competitive with the alternatives, t en 
very littl  biofu l investment occurs within the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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evaluation of projects [21]. Acc rdingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of ital – for business model i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, the first thr e ter s ar  the int rn tional capital asset pricing mo el (ICAPM), which 
captures syst matic risk [28]: rrf is the isk-fr  return (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
the avera e market r t rn, a d rcurr i  the currency risk premium for internat onal invest rs. The 
parameter β is the risk factor, and γ is he se sitivity of the inte n tional investm nt to curr cy risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, th  first two apply both to international and dom stic investment, and each of the 
arameters can differ between international and domestic markets. T  third term only appli s to 
int rnational investors. Of the re aining four terms, the first tw , ρmacro and  ρmicr , are c un ry risk
factors – t at is, factor  that are i  at least partial control of the gov rnm nt – and apply only to
international investors. Macropolit cal and macroeconomic isk fact rs are hose t at are shared by all 
international investors in the count y, and are reported in international tables, such Euromoney or IHS
G obal Insight. Micropoli ical and m croe ono ic risk fa tors are those that are spe ific to an industry 
within th  co nt y [22] The t rm, θ, which can be it r positive or negative, captur s irrational 
d viations from de l i stm nt behavior [30]. N te that both the micr  isk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” parameters carry a  i index. This is because th y ar  each aff cted by local conditions 
that ar  specif c a par icular busi ess model.
In general, all of the terms in Eq ation (16) f llowing the first term capture expectations of risk. The 
igher the risk, the higher the return that an investor will expec . This can be understood in terms of a 
cha g  in the discount ra e; f tu e risks make future eturns less aluable [22]. The ctors β and γ have 
a v ry specific interpretation and represent a specific kind of risk. Th  factor β indica es how closely 
aligned the returns from the invest ent a d the mark t as a wh le are expected to be. The factor γ 
represents how correlated the v lu  f the natio al currency is to a basket of curr cies. Thus, to the 
extent tha  th  inve tment simply track  the marke  as a whole, t ails o reduce risk th ough 
diversification. Both β and γ can be reater than o , meaning th t they ca  agnify swings in th  
mark t; they can also be negati , if th y t nd to move co ter to the market. For small ec nomies, 
wheth r γ is large or ot dep ds on wheth  the curr ncy is pegg d to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
s exp cted t  b  close to e; i  n t, it may be l ss th n n , and even egative. In the model, the β’s 
ar  assigned a range of values based on th  available liter ture. As xplained in the s ction “Parameter 
uncertain y”, on page 27, the model is r n in s nsitivity mode in which uncert in par m ters, including 
th  inv stme t β’s, tak  o  v lu s samp e from a plausibl  range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investments in the model flow to different feedstock or biofuel business model  depending on the 
returns provided by each business model. As explain d b low, non-biofuel i vestments compete with 
bi fuel invest ents. If o biofuel investment opportunities are competitive with t e alternatives, then 
very little biofuel invest ent occurs withi  the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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evaluation of projects [21]. Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i f rE,i, wher
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, th  f rst three t r s are the int rnatio al capital ass t pricing model (ICAPM), whic  
captures systematic risk [28]: rrf is the risk-free return (for example, the rate for a tr asury bond), ave is 
the averag  market return, and rcurr is the curr ncy risk premium for international i stors. The 
parameter β is the risk factor, a d γ is the se sitivity of the internati al investme t to curre cy risk. Of 
the ICAPM erms, the f rst two apply both to i terna i nal and domesti  inv stment, and e ch of the 
parameters can differ between i tern tio al and dom stic markets. T  third term only appli s to 
international investors. Of the remaini g four terms, the fir t two, ρmacro an   ρmicro, re country risk 
factors – that , factors that are n at l ast partial control f the gov r men  – and apply only to 
international inve tors. a r liti l acro onomic r sk fa t rs re tho e that are s ared by ll 
international nv s s i the country, and are rep t d in internat nal tables, ch Euromon y or IHS 
Global In ig . Micr p litical and micro conomic r sk factor  a e th e tha  are spe ific t  an i dustry 
within country [22] Th t rm, θ, wh ch can be ith r positive or g tiv , aptures ir ational
deviat on  from id al  behavio  [30]. N te at both the micro risk fact rs nd “irrational 
xpe tations” paramete s ca ry  i index. Thi  s because they are each affected by local con itions 
th t are pecif c to a particular business model.
In general, all f the t rms in Equation (16) f ll wing the first term capture expectations of risk. The 
higher the risk, the higher the return that an investor will expect. This can be understood in terms f a 
change in the iscount rate; future risks mak  future retur s less v luable [22]. Th  factors β and γ have 
a very sp cific interpretation nd represent a specific ki  of risk. T e factor β indicates how cl sely 
aligned the returns from the invest ent and the market as a whole are expected to be. The factor γ 
represents h w correlated t e v lue of the national currency is t  a basket of currencies. Thus, to the 
extent tha  the inv stme t simply tracks the mark t as a wh le, i  fails to reduce risk thr ug  
diver ification. Both β and γ can b  greater than on , m aning that they can magn fy wi s in the 
mark t; th y can als b n gati e, f they te d o mov  counter  th  mark t. For mall economies, 
wheth r γ is lar e or not epe d   wh her he curr n y is p gged to a maj r currency: if i  is, then γ
s expected to be clos to on ; if ot, it may be less than one, nd even egative. In the model, the β’s 
ar assig d a range f values based on the a able literatur . As explai ed n t  se ti n “Parameter 
unce ta ty”, n page 27, he model is run in s itivity mod  in w ich u certain par meters, cl ding 
the investm nt β’s, take on val es sampled fr  a plau ibl  r ng .
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Investments in the mod l flow to different feedstock or bi fuel bu iness mod ls d pending on the 
returns provided by each business model. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofuel investments. If no biofuel investment opportunities are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very little biofuel investment occurs within the model.
As shown i  Equations (14, -c), the net present va ue of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I ir ; , . (17)
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evaluation of projec s [21]. Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
I  this qu i n, the first th ee t rms re the i ter ati nal ca ital asset pricing model (ICAPM), which 
aptures syste ati  risk [28]: rrf is the risk-free retu n (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
the av rage ma ke  etur , nd rcurr is the currency risk premi m f r international investors. The 
parameter β is the ri k factor, and γ i  the sensitivity of the internatio al investment to currency risk. Of 
t e ICAPM t ms, the first two apply both to nternational and domestic investment, and each of the 
p ameters c n differ between international domestic markets. The third term only applies to 
international investors. Of the remaining four terms, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, are country risk 
facto s – that is, f ctors that are in at lea  partial control of the government – and apply only to 
intern tional in st rs. Mac opolitical and macroeconomic risk factors are those that are shared by all 
international investors in the country, and re reported in international tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global Insight. Mi ropoliti l and m croeconomic risk factors are those that are specific to an industry 
within the country [22] The term, θ, which can be either positive or negative, captures irrational 
eviati s from id al investme t behavior [30]. Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expe tations” parameters carry an i index. This is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that are s ecific to a particular business model.
In ge eral, all of the terms i Equati n (16) following t  first term capture expectations of risk. The 
higher the r sk, th higher th  retur  that an inv stor wi l ex ct. This can be u erst od in terms of a 
chang  in th  iscount rat ; future risks make future returns less va uable [22]. The factors β and γ have 
 v ry sp cific int rp etati n an  repr se t a spec fic kind of risk. The fac or β indicates how closely 
a ig ed  re u n  from the vestmen  and the market as a whole ar  expected o be. The factor γ 
r presents how c rr lated the valu  of the n tional currency is to a basket of currencies. Thus, to the 
ext t that the nvestme t simply tracks the market as a whole, it fails to reduce risk through 
diversificati n. Both β a d γ can be greater than one, meaning that they can magnify swings in the 
market; they ca also be negati e, if they tend to move counter to the market. For small economies, 
whether γ is la g  or ot dep nds on whether the currency is pegged to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is expected to be close to one; if not, it may be less than one, and even negative. In the model, the β’s 
are assigned a range of values based o  the available literature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
un e tai ty”, on page 27, the model is run in sensitivity mode in which uncertain parameters, including 
the investment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
In stments in the model flow to different feedstock or biofuel business models depending on the 
returns provided by each business model. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofuel investments. If no biofuel investment opportunities are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very little biofuel investment occurs within the model.
As show  in Equations ( 4, a-c), the net present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multiplied by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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evaluati n of projects [21]. Accordingly, n the odel, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of retur  – 
the equity cost of capital – for busi ess model i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this q a io , th  f rst three ter s r  the nt rnati nal apital s et pricing mo el (ICAPM), which 
captures system tic risk [28]: rrf is the ri k-free r turn (for exa pl , the rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
th  aver ge m rket eturn, and r urr i th curr ncy risk pr mium for i t r ational invest rs. T  
pa e  β is t  risk factor, a d γ is th  s nsiti ity f the nternational i vestment t  currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM te ms, the fi st two pply both to int rnational  domestic investment, and each of the 
pa ameters can d ff  between t rnational nd domest c m rkets. The third ter  only applies to 
i ter ational i ve tors. Of the re ain g four t rms, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, are country risk 
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ter ational inve ors. Ma ropolitical and macroecono ic risk factors are those that are shar d by all 
int r ti al ves ors in the country, and are repor ed in international tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global Insight. icropoli ical and microeconomic isk fac ors are those that are specific to an industry 
within th  cou try [22] The erm, θ, which can be either positive or negative, captures irrational 
deviations from ideal investm nt beh vi  [30]. Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” aramet rs c rry an i in ex. Th s is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that ar specific t  a particula  bu iness model.
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v ry p ific inter re at on d r pre nt a pecifi  kind of risk. The factor β indicates how closely 
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r pres nts how o elated the value f the national urr ncy is to a basket of curr ncies. Thus, to the 
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is exp cted to be close to one; if not, it may be less than one, and even negative. In the model, the β’s 
are assign d a nge of values based on th  ava lable literature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
unc rtain y”, on page 27, the mod l is run in s nsitivity mode in which uncertain parameters, including 
the i vestment β’s, take on values sampl d from a pl usibl  ange.
INVESTMENT  FLOWS TO BUSINESS MODELS
Inv stments in the model flow to different feedstock or biofuel business models depending on the 
returns provided by each usin ss model. As explained below, non-biofuel investments compete with 
biofuel investments. If no biofuel investm  opp rtuni ies are competitive with the alternatives, then 
very little biofu  investment occurs wi hi  the od l.
As shown in Equation  (14, a-c), the n t present value of business model i is given by the initial 
investme t multiplied by an investme t-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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As shown in equations 14a–c, the net present value of 
a business model [i] is given as the initial investment 
multiplied by an investment-specific function of the 
rate of return. In Equation 15, the factor is written 
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evaluation of projects [21]. Accordingly, in the model, investors expect a risk-adjusted rate of return – 
the equity cost of capital – for business model i of rE,i, where
r E , i=rrfi  rave−r rf  r currmacromicro ,i−i . (16)
In this equation, the first three terms are the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), which 
captures systematic risk [28]: rrf is the risk-free return (for example, the rate for a treasury bond), rave is 
the average market return, and rcurr is the currency risk premium for international investors. The 
parameter β is the risk factor, and γ is the sensitivity of the international investment to currency risk. Of 
the ICAPM terms, the first two apply both to international and domestic investment, and each of the 
parameters can differ between international and domestic markets. The third term only applies to 
international investors. Of the remaining four terms, the first two, ρmacro and  ρmicro, are country risk 
factors – that is, factors that are in at least partial control of the government – and apply only to 
international investors. Macropolitical and macroeconomic risk factors are those that are shared by all 
international investors in the country, and are reported in international tables, such Euromoney or IHS 
Global Insight. Micropolitical and microeconomic risk factors are those that are specific to an industry 
within the country [22] The term, θ, which can be either positive or negative, captures irrational 
deviations from ideal investment behavior [30]. Note that both the micro risk factors and the “irrational 
expectations” parameters carry an i index. This is because they are each affected by local conditions 
that are specific to a particular business model.
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a very specific interpretation and represent a specific kind of risk. The factor β indicates how closely 
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represents how correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. Thus, to the 
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diversification. Both β and γ can be greater than one, meaning that they can magnify swings in the 
market; they can also be negative, if they tend to move counter to the market. For small economies, 
whether γ is large or not depends on whether the currency is pegged to a major currency: if it is, then γ 
is expected to be close to one; if not, it may be less than one, and even negative. In the model, the β’s 
are assigned a range of values based on the available literature. As explained in the section “Parameter 
uncertainty”, on page 27, the model is run in sensitivity mode in which uncertain parameters, including 
the investment β’s, take on values sampled from a plausible range.
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very little biofuel investment occurs within the model.
As shown in Equations (14, a-c), th  net pre ent val e of business model i is given by the initial 
investment multipli d by an investment-specific function of the rate of return. In Equation (15), the 
factor is written i r ; , , so that
ni=I iir ; , . (17)
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, so that
𝑛𝑛0 = 𝑅𝑅expect ∑
𝑡𝑡=𝐷𝐷+1
𝑇𝑇 1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 − 𝑋𝑋up-front, (10)
𝑛𝑛 = (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑅𝑅expect ∑
𝑡𝑡=𝐷𝐷+1
𝑇𝑇 1(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏 ∑𝑡𝑡=1𝑇𝑇 (1−𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 + 1−𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆 − 𝑋𝑋up-front. (11)
𝑆𝑆 = � (1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇𝜏𝜏 for biofuel operations
�(1− 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇 + 𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁� 𝜏𝜏 for feedstock operati s
�. (12)
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥) ≡ ∑
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑇𝑇
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 𝑥𝑥 1−𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇
1−𝑥𝑥
. (13)
𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼
= (1 − 𝜏𝜏) 𝑅𝑅expect
𝐼𝐼
�𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �
1
1+𝑟𝑟
� − 𝛴𝛴𝐷𝐷 �
1
1+𝑟𝑟
��+ 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �1−𝛿𝛿1+𝑟𝑟�+ 1−𝜏𝜏(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 − 𝑋𝑋expect𝐼𝐼 , (14a)
where
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇(1 + 𝑟𝑟) = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−1𝑟𝑟(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 , (14b)
𝛴𝛴𝑇𝑇 �
1−𝛿𝛿
1+𝑟𝑟
� = (1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇−(1−𝛿𝛿)𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟+𝛿𝛿)(1+𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 . (14c)
𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼
≡ 𝛷𝛷model(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏), (15)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟curr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micro,𝑖𝑖 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖. (16)
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟; 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏). (17)    (17)
Unlike Equation 15, Equation 17 is concerned with 
flows of investment to different business models, and 
we add a label i to both the net present value and the 
investment. Given the function 
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Unl k  in Equatio  (15), here, where we are concerned with flows of investment to different business 
models, we add a label i to both the net present value and the investment. Given the function 
i r ; ,  and the risk-adjusted discount rate r E , i  defined in Equation (16), a simple “go/no-go” 
criterion for the investor is
i r E ,i ; ,0 . (18)
If the model were strictly true, and all investors used the profit index to decide between investments, all 
investment would flow to the business model with the highest profitability index, or at least as much 
investment as it could absorb. However, there are several reasons why this theoretical case is 
unrealistic: not every investor will use this approach to determine whether to invest; there are factors 
(in particular, firm and location-specific factors) that are not captured in Equation (11); and all of the 
parameters are uncertain. Accordingly, in the model, rather than simply profit, a weighted sum of the 
the average of the log profit index and an “entropy” term is maximized, using the objective function
Z=1−∑
i=1
N
wi ui−∑
i=1
N
wi ln wi , (19)
where
ui≡{ln i r E ,i ; ,1 , ir E , i ; ,1ln  , otherwise . (20)
In equation (19), the wi are the fractions of total investment flowing to each business model. That is,
wi= I i∑ j=1N I j . (21)
The second term is the entropy of the distribution of investment flows – an interpretation of this term is 
given below. The parameter  , which lies between zero and one (and is never exactly zero or one), 
expresses the relative importance of the profit-maximizing and entropy terms.
Equation (20) defines ui, the quantity to be maximized, as the natural logarithm of the profit index, 
unless the profit index is negative, in which case the logarithm of a very small number is substituted: 
note that the profit index becomes negative only when the revenue stream itself is negative. When the 
profit index equals one, ui is equal to zero. By using the logarithm of the profit index, rather than the 
profit index itself, projects are compared based on their relative performance, rather than their absolute 
performance: if one project is expected to make twice as much profit as an alternative project, then the 
difference of the ui’s between the two projects is ln(2), regardless of the level of profit of the two 
projects.
Interpretation of the objective function
The objective function can be given an information-theoretic interpretation. The first term in the 
objective function [Equation (19)] is the average profit. In the limit 0  this becomes the dominant 
term and, as shown below, in this limit all investments flow to the business model with the highest 
profit index. In this case an outside observer viewing the flow of investments would be able to learn 
which project yields the highest expected profit. As discussed earlier, several factors interfere with this 
ideal situation, so that the observed flow of investments does not provide perfect information about the 
ranking of excess returns. The second term captures this reality. In the limit 1 , each business 
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The second term is the entropy of the distribution of investment flows – an interpretation of this term is 
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∑
𝑖𝑖=1
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𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 1. (22)
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    (21)
The second term of Equation 19 is the entropy of the 
distribution of investment flows – an interpretation of 
this term is given below. The parameter 
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the risk-adjusted discount rate 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖defin d n Equation 16, a simple ‘go/no-go’ criterion for the investor 
is
𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ; 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏) ≥ 0. (18)
If the model were strictly true, and all investors used the profit index to decide between investments, all 
investment would flow to the business model with the highest profitability index, or at least as much 
investment as it could absorb. However, this theoretical case is unrealistic for several reasons: not every 
investor will use this approach to determine whether to invest; there are factors (in particular, firm and 
location-specific factors) that are not captured in Equation 11; and all of the parameters are uncertain. 
Accordingly, rather than simply maximize profit, the model maximizes a weighted sum of the average 
of the log profit index and an ‘entropy’ term, using the objective function
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 = (1− 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑) ∑
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ln�𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ; 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏) + 1� , 𝛷𝛷𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ; 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏) + 1 > ɛlnɛ , otherwise . (20)
In Equation 19, the wi are the fractions of total investment flowing to each business model. That is,
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . (21)
The second term of Equation 19 is the entropy of the distribution of investment flows – an 
interpret tion of this term is given below. The par  𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑, which lies between zero and one (and is 
never xactly zero or one), expresses the relative importance of the profit-maximizing and entropy 
t rms.
Equation 20 defines ui, the quantity to be maximized, as the natural logarithm of the profit index, 
unless the profit index is negative, in which case the logarithm of a very small number is substituted.
The profit index becomes negative only when the revenue stream itself is negative. When the profit 
index equals one, ui is equal to zero. By using the logarithm of the profit index, rather than the profit 
index itself, projects are compared based on their relative performance, rather than their absolute 
performance. If one project is expected to make twice as much profit as an alternative project, then the 
difference of the uis between the two projects is the natural logarithm of two, ln(2), regardless of the 
level of profit of the two projects.
3.4.1. Interpretation of the objective function
The objective function can be given an information-theoretic interpretation. The first term in the 
objective function (Equation 19) is the average profit. In the limit 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 → 0 this becomes the dominant 
term and, as shown below, in this limit all investments flow to the business model with the highest 
profit index. In this case, an outside observer viewing the flow of investments would be able to learn 
which project yields the highest expected profit. As discussed earlier, several factors interfere with this 
ideal situation, so that the observed flow of investments does not provide perfect information about the 
ranking of excess returns. The second term captures this reality. In the limit 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 → 1, each business 
model receives the same level of investment. In this case, the objective function is the entropy, and so 
maximizing Z means minimizing the amount of information contained in the investment allocation. In
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this no-information limit the distribution of inves m nt flows provid s o g idance to the relative 
merits of the different business models. For intermediate value 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑, business models with high 
expected profits get the highest weights, but investments also flow to business models with lower 
expected profits, so that the information provided by the investment flows is ambiguous.
3.4.2. Optimal distribution of investment flows
The distribution of investment flows in the model is solved by maximizing the objective function 
(Equation 19) subject to the constraint that the weights sum to one,
∑
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1. (22)
Using equations 19 and 22, the objective function S for the problem can be written
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = (1 − 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 ∑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆 �1 − ∑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�, (23)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. Varying S with respect to the weights and setting them equal to zero 
(the optimal condition) gives (1 − 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑)𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑(1 + ln𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆 = 0. (24)
Rearranging this equation to get the weight on one side and collecting the constant terms into an overall 
constant ln𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ≡ −1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆/𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 gives ln𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ln𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (25)
Exponentiating both sides of Equation 25 gives the expression for the weights,
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�. (26)
The value of A is then determined by the normalizing constraint in Equation 22. Requiring that the 
weights sum to one gives
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�∑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 �. (27)
3.4.3. Introducing non-biofuel investments
Biofuel investment opportunities will be competing with non-biofuel opportunities that may have 
higher expected profits. Rather than defining these explicitly, we assume that there are biofuel
investments [m] and total investments [N], so there are N-m non-biofuel investments. As described 
above, all investments in the model are characterized by their log profitability [ui]. We make the 
assumption that log profitability among non-biofuel investments is distributed according to some 
probability distribution with a probability density [f(u)] The expected value of the non-normalized 
weights can then be calculated, using the probability density as
〈𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤〉 = � 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢)exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑
𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢�
+∞
−∞
. (28)
i ess models with 
high expected profits get the highest weights, but
investments also flow to business models with lower 
expected profits, so that the information provided by 
the investment flows is ambiguous.
other ise
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3.4.2 Optimal distribution of investment flows
The distribution of investment flows in the model 
is solved by maximising the objective function 
(Equation 19) subject to the constraint that the weights 
sum to one,
𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) ≥ 0. (18)
𝑍𝑍 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, (19)
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ≡ �
ln�𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1� , 𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1 > ɛlnɛ , otherwise �. (20)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗. (21)
∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 1. (22)
𝑆𝑆 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆 �1 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�, (23)
(1− 𝜑𝜑)𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑(1 + ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) − 𝜆𝜆 = 0. (24)
ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = ln𝐴𝐴 + 1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. (25)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�. (26)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�. (27)
     (22)
Using equations 19 and 22, the objective function S for 
the problem can be written
𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) ≥ 0. (18)
𝑍𝑍 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, (19)
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ≡ �
ln�𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1� , 𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1 > ɛlnɛ , otherwise �. (20)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗. (21)
∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 1. (22)
𝑆𝑆 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆 �1 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�, (23)
(1− 𝜑𝜑)𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑(1 + ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) − 𝜆𝜆 = 0. (24)
ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = ln𝐴𝐴 + 1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. (25)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�. (26)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�. (27)
 
       
𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) ≥ 0. (18)
𝑍𝑍 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, (19)
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ≡ �
ln�𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1� , 𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1 > ɛlnɛ , otherwise �. (20)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗. (21)
∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 1. (22)
𝑆𝑆 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆 �1 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�, (23)
(1− 𝜑𝜑)𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑(1 + ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) − 𝜆𝜆 = 0. (24)
ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = ln𝐴𝐴 + 1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. (25)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�. (26)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�. (27)
      (23)
where m  is a Lagrange multiplier. Varying S with respect 
to the weights and setting them equal to zero (the 
optimal condition) gives
𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) ≥ 0. (18)
𝑍𝑍 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, (19)
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ≡ �
ln�𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1� , 𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1 > ɛlnɛ , otherwise �. (20)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗. (21)
∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 1. (22)
𝑆𝑆 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆 �1 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�, (23)
(1− 𝜑𝜑)𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 𝜑𝜑(1 + ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) − 𝜆𝜆 = 0. (24)
ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = ln𝐴𝐴 + 1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. (25)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�. (26)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�. (27)
 (24)
Rearranging this equation to get the weight on one 
side and collecting the constant terms into an overall 
constant 
14
this no-i formation limit the distribution of investment flows provides no guidance to the relative 
merits of the different business models. For intermediate values of 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑, business models with high 
expected profits get the highest weights, but investments also flow to business models with lower 
expected profits, so that the information provided by the investment flows is ambiguous.
3.4.2. Optimal distribution of investment flows
The distribution of investment flows in the model is solved by maximizing the objective function 
(Equation 19) subject to the constraint that the weights sum to one,
∑
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1. (22)
Using equations 19 and 22, the objective function S for the problem can be written
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = (1 − 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 ∑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆 �1 − ∑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�, (23)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. Varying S with respect to the weights and setting them equal to zero 
(the optimal condition) gives (1 − 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑)𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑(1 + ln𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆 = 0. (24)
Rearranging this equation to get the weight on one side and collecting the constant terms into an overall 
c t t ln𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ≡ −1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆/𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 gives ln𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ln𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (25)
Exponentiating both sides of Equation 25 gives the expression for the weights,
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�. (26)
The value of A is then determined by the normalizing constraint in Equation 22. Requiring that the 
weights sum to one gives
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�∑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 �. (27)
3.4.3. Introducing non-biofuel investments
Biofuel investment opportunities will be competing with non-biofuel opportunities that may have 
higher expected profits. Rather than defining these explicitly, we assume that there are biofuel
investments [m] and total investments [N], so there are N-m non-biofuel investments. As described 
above, all investments in the model are characterized by their log profitability [ui]. We make the 
assumption that log profitability among non-biofuel investments is distributed according to some 
probability distribution with a probability density [f(u)] The expected value of the non-normalized 
weights can then be calculated, using the probability density as
〈𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤〉 = � 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢)exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑
𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢�
+∞
−∞
. (28)
 i es
𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) ≥ 0. (18)
𝑍𝑍 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, (19)
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ≡ �
ln�𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1� , 𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1 > ɛlnɛ , otherwise �. (20)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗. (21)
∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 1. (22)
𝑆𝑆 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆 �1 − ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�, (23)
(1− 𝜑𝜑)𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑(1 + ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) − 𝜆𝜆 = 0. (24)
ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = ln𝐴𝐴 + 1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. (25)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�. (26)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�. (27)
   (25)
Exponentiating both sides of Equation 25 gives the 
expression for the weights,
𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) ≥ 0. (18)
𝑍𝑍 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, (19)
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ≡ �
ln�𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1� , 𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1 > ɛlnɛ , otherwise �. (20)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗. (21)
∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 1. (22)
𝑆𝑆 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
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𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�, (23)
(1− 𝜑𝜑)𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑(1 + ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) − 𝜆𝜆 = 0. (24)
ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = ln𝐴𝐴 + 1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. (25)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�. (26)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�. (27)
    (26)
The value of A is then determined by the normalising 
constraint in Equation 22. Requiring that the weights 
sum to one gives
𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) ≥ 0. (18)
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𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, (19)
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ≡ �
ln�𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1� , 𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸,𝑖𝑖; 𝜏𝜏, 𝛿𝛿) + 1 > ɛlnɛ , otherwise �. (20)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗. (21)
∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 1. (22)
𝑆𝑆 = (1− 𝜑𝜑) ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑 ∑
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
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𝑖𝑖=1
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𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�, (23)
(1− 𝜑𝜑)𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜑𝜑(1 + ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) − 𝜆𝜆 = 0. (24)
ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = ln𝐴𝐴 + 1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. (25)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴exp �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�. (26)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁 exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�. (27)   (27)
3.4.3  Introducing non-biofuel investments
Biofuel investment opportunities will be competing 
ith non-biofuel opportunities that may have higher 
expected profits. Rather than defining these explicitly, 
we assume that there are [m] biofuel investments and 
[N] total investments, so there are N-m non-biofuel 
investments. As described above, all investments in the 
model are characterised by their log profitability [ui]. 
We make the assumption that log profitability among 
non-biofuel investments is distributed according to some 
probability distribution with a probability density [f(u)] 
The expected value of the non-normalised weights can 
then be calculated, using the probability density as
〈𝑤𝑤〉 = � 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑓𝑓(𝑑𝑑)exp �1−𝜑𝜑
𝜑𝜑
𝑑𝑑�
+∞
−∞
. (28)
〈𝑤𝑤〉 = 𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 �. (29)
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norm,𝜑𝜑=1/2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
∑𝑗𝑗=1
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. (33)
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦), (34)
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦). (35)
  (28)
This integral is equal to the moment-generating function 
Mf(·) for the probability density. The practical benefit 
of this is that moment-generating functions have been 
calculated for many probability distributions. Thus, the 
result for the average weight can be written
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〈𝑤𝑤〉 = 𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 �. (29)
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norm,𝜑𝜑=1/2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
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. (33)
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦), (34)
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦). (35)
    (29)
This expected value for non-bioenergy weights can 
be used to rewrite the expression for the weights in 
Equation 27 as
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. (33)
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦), (34)
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦). (35)
  (30)
For the model, e assume that the log profitability of 
non-biofuel investments is distributed normally with 
a mean of zero – that is, it is equally likely that an 
investment has a positive log profitability as it has a 
negative profitability. In this case,
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𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦), (34)
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦). (35)
  (31)
While the assumption of a normal distribution is 
convenient for the model development, it is not essential. 
The moment-generating function can be computed 
explicitly for many distributions.
3.4.4 Properties of the weights
The weights in Equation 31 have some properties that 
are worth remarking on. Because the denominator is 
the same for any investment, the business model with 
the highest value for ui receives the highest weight. In 
the limit 0"{ , the ratio (1 )/{ {-  diverges, and 
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the non-biofuel term dominates any of the biofuel 
business models. This is a consequence of assuming 
a normally-distributed set of non-biofuel options. 
Under this assumption there will always be some 
non-biofuel investment with a higher return than 
the biofuel investments, and in the limit 0"{  it 
will receive all of the investment flows. In contrast, 
in the limit 1"{ , the ratio (1 )/{ {-  approaches 
zero, and all of the weights take the same value, equal 
to 1/N. At values of {  intermediate between zero 
and one, the most profitable investment receives the 
highest weight, but other, less profitable investments 
are also given some weight. The weights can become 
very small, suggesting implausibly low levels of 
investment. For this reason, a minimum investment 
threshold is set by the user for different types of 
investors. If the investment allocation is less than 
the minimum, then the investment is set to zero in 
the model.
The parameter {  is a tuning parameter of the model, 
which has no obvious default value. For illustration, 
at 1/2={ , the weights become
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In this case, it can be seen that biofuel investments 
with negative excess profits receive low weights, 
because they cannot outperform the positive excess 
return from non-biofuel investments. The investment 
flows for business models with negative expected 
profit will ordinarily fall below the minimum 
investment threshold, so no investment will flow to 
them. Also, if the total number of investments N is 
much larger than the number of biofuel investments 
m, then biofuel investments must strongly 
outperform the average non-biofuel portfolio to gain 
a substantial share. As the variance 2fv  of non-biofuel 
investments increases, potential competition from 
non-bioenergy investments also increases. When 
{  is close to zero, high-performing investments 
receive high weights, and when {  is close to one, 
even poorly-performing investments may receive a 
substantial weight.
3.4.5 Implementing a minimum level of 
domestic investment
One of the policy instruments that the model 
simulates is a minimum level of domestic investment. 
The model simulates a policy in which applications 
for permits from foreign investors are suspended 
whenever the previous quarter’s statistics indicate 
that domestic investment is below the target. This 
policy characteristically leads to a ‘saw tooth’ pattern 
in foreign investment when averaged over the year. 
The saw tooth pattern can look odd, but it is not an 
unreasonable outcome, since it follows directly from 
the simulated policy.
4. Domestic energy demand
quantities into their energy equivalents. The 
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strongly outperform the average non-biofuel portfolio to gain a substantial share. As the variance 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2of 
non-biofuel investments increases, potential competition from non-bioenergy investments also 
increases. When 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 is close to zero, high-performing investments receive high weights, and when 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 is 
close to one, even poorly-performing investments may receive a substantial weight.
3.4.5. Implementing a minimum level of domestic investment
One of the policy instruments that the model simulates is a minimum level of domestic investment. The 
model simulates a policy in which applications for permits from foreign investors are suspended 
whenever the previous quarter’s statistics indicate that domestic investment is below the target. This 
policy characteristically leads to a ‘saw tooth’ pattern in foreign investment when averaged over the 
year. The saw tooth pattern can look odd, but it is not an unreasonable outcome, since it follows 
directly from the simulated policy.
4. Domestic energy demand
Domestic energy demand in the model comes from the household and transport sectors, where per 
capita energy demand is determined by incomes and fuel prices, subject to the possible constraint 
placed by a mandatory blend ratio. International demand is assumed to be so large that national 
production has no effect on prices (fuel prices, both domestic and international, are discussed in 
Section 5). Rural and urban populations can have different demand parameters, as well as different 
income levels and fuel prices.
Population growth in rural and urban areas, and economic growth, are given exogenously. From these, 
average income (as gross domestic product per capita) is calculated. Rural and urban incomes are then 
determined from an exogenous rural-to-urban income ratio.
4.1. Constant elasticity of substitution utility function
It is expected that biofuels and fossil fuels will coexist and be used for similar purposes for a 
substantial time, while ethanol can be used as an additive to petrol. That is, they do not act as perfect 
substitutes. However, they do not act as perfect complements – the precise mix of fossil fuels and 
biofuels can vary depending on relative price, technology, convenience, policy, fashion and other 
factors. This suggests that demands should be represented by a functional form that is intermediate 
between that of a perfect substitute and of a perfect complement: the constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) demand function has this property. Accordingly, we assume the following CES utility function 
for the model:
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
. (33)
In this function, the xi are the quantities of fuel consumed in physical terms (litres or kilograms), the 
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are conversion efficiencies (for instance, conversion of combustible fuels into heat in a stove), while 
the ηi are energy density factors that convert physical quantities into their energy equivalents. The 
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) are coefficients within the utility function that express the degree of preference for one fuel over  
are coefficients within the utility function that express 
the degree of preference for one fuel over another – 
an interpretation for these parameters will emerge in 
Section 4.3 that justifies the choice of notation. The 
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strongly outperform the average non-biofuel portfolio to gain a substantial share. As the variance 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2of 
non-biofuel investments increases, potential competition from non-bioenergy investments also 
increases. When 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 is close to zero, high-performing investments receive high weights, and when 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 is 
close to one, even poorly-performing investments may receive a substantial weight.
3.4.5. Implementing a minimum level of domestic investment
One of the policy instruments that the mod l simulates is a inimum level of domestic investment. The 
model simulates a policy in which applications for permits from foreign investors are suspended 
whenever the previous quarter’s statistics indicate that domestic investment is below the target. This 
policy characteristically leads to a ‘saw tooth’ pattern in foreign investment when averaged over the 
year. The saw tooth pattern can look odd, but it is not an unreasonable outcome, since it follows 
directly from the simulated policy.
4. Domestic energy demand
Domestic energy demand in the model comes from the household and transport sectors, where per 
capita energy demand is determined by incomes and fuel prices, subject to the possible constraint 
placed by a mandatory blend ratio. International demand is assumed to be so large that national 
production has no effect on prices (fuel prices, both domestic and international, are discussed in 
Section 5). Rural and urban populations can have different demand parameters, as well as different 
income levels and fuel prices.
Population growth in rural and urban areas, and economic growth, are given exogenously. From these, 
average income (as gross domestic product per capita) is calculated. Rural and urban incomes are then 
determined from an exogenous rural-to-urban income ratio.
4.1. Constant elasticity of substitution utility function
It is expected that biofuels and fossil fuels ill coexist and be used for similar purpos s for a 
substantial time, while ethanol can be used as an additive to petrol. T at is, they do not act as perfect 
substitutes. However, they do not act as perfect c mplements – the precise mix of fossil fuels and 
biofuels can vary depending on relative price, technology, convenience, policy, fashion and other 
factors. This suggests that demands should be represented by a functional form that is intermediate 
between that of a perfect substitute and of a perfect complement: the constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) demand function has this property. Accordingly, we assume the following CES utility function 
for the model:
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
. (33)
In this function, the xi a e the quantities of fuel consumed in physical terms (litres or kilograms), the 
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are conversion efficiencies (for instance, conversion of combustible fuels into heat in a stove), while 
the ηi are energy den ity factors that convert physical quantities into their energy equivalents. The 
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) are coefficients within the utility function that express the degree of preference for one fuel over  potentially d pend on a vector of parameters 
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another – an interpretation for these parameters will emerge in Section 4.3 that justifi the choic of 
notation. The ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) potentially depend on a vector of parameters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] that is currently unspecified. The 
parameter α is characteristic of CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-complement (α = 0) 
and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
4.2. Finding the optimal allocation
Consumers whose utility is described by Equation 33 are assumed to face an energy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], which grows with average income, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
where pi are fuel prices in volumetric terms (e.g., dollars per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly increasing in energy consumption, it can be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (Equation 34) can be replaced with an equality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, so the objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
The most complex factor in this expression – the one in brackets – is independent of i. Combining all i-
independent factors into an overall coefficient [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equation 37 can be rearranged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, the energy-content corrected consumption of fuels [ηixi] declines as the price [pi] increases, and 
rises as the coefficient [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increases.
4.3. Reference prices
The expression on the right-hand side of Equation 38 suggests an interpretation of the utility 
coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. They can be thought of as the threshold prices at which a consumer finds each fuel 
desirable. When the price [pi] of a fuel exceeds the coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses in 
Equation 38 is less than one, reflecting its lower desirability; when the price falls below the coefficient 
value, then the ratio in parentheses is greater than one, reflecting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be referred to as ‘reference prices’ in the rest of this document.
The reference prices can be formulated in a convenient way. If all that a consumer wanted from a fuel 
was the energy services it provided, then they would set their reference prices to scale with the product 
 t t is currently unspecified. The parameter 
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U=[∑i=1M piv ii ii xi ]1 . (33)
In this function, the xi are the quantities of fuel consumed in physical terms (litres or kilograms), the i  
are conversion efficiencies (for instance, conversion of combustible fuels into heat in a stove), while 
the ηi are energy density factors that convert physical quantities into their energy equivalents. The 
piv   are coefficients within the utility function that express the degree of preference for one fuel over 
another – an interpretation for these parameters will emerge later in the nalysis that justifies the choice 
of notation. The piv   potentially d pend on a v ctor of parameters v  that is curre tly unspecified. 
The parameter α is charact ristic f CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-com l ment (α 
= 0) and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
FINDING THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION
Consumers with utility described by Equation (33) are assumed to face an energy budget constraint 
B y  , which grows with average income, so that
∑
i=1
M
pi xiB y  , (34)
where the pi are fuel prices in volumetric terms (e.g., USD per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly increasing in energy consu ption, it can be assum d that the entire budget will be pent, and so 
the in quality (34) can be replaced with an equality,
∑
i=1
M
pi xi=B y  . (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to his or her budget constraint, so the objective 
function is
S=[∑i=1M pi v ii ii xi ]1B y −∑i=1M pi xi , (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
∂ S
∂ xi =
piv 
ii iiii xi
−1[∑j=1M p j v  j j  j j x j ]1−1− pi = 0 . (37)
The most complex factor in this expression – the one in brackets – is independent of i. Combining all i-
independent factors into an overall coefficient C v   that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
v , Equation (37) can be rearranged to show that
ii xi=C v  piv pi  11− . (38)
That is, the energy-content corrected consumption of fuels ηixi declines as the price pi increases and 
rises as the coefficient piv   increases.
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another – n i t rpretation f r these parameters will emerge in Section 4.3 that justifi s the choic  of
notation. The ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) potentially depend on a vec or of parameters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] that is currently unspecified. The 
parameter α is characteristic of CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-co pl t (α = 0) 
and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
4.2. Finding the optimal allocation
Consumers whose utility i  described by Equation 33 are assumed to face an energy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], which grows with average income, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
where pi are fuel prices in volumetric ter s ( .g., dollars per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly increasing in energy consumption, it can be assumed th t he entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (Equation 34) can be replaced with an equality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, so the objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
The most complex f t r in this expr ssion – the o e in brackets – is independ nt of i. Combining all i-
independent factors into  overall coefficient [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equation 37 can be rearranged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, the energy-content corrected consumption of fuels [ηixi] declines as the price [pi] increases, and 
rises as the coefficient [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increases.
4.3. Reference prices
The expr ssion on the right-hand side of Equation 38 suggest  an interpretation of the utility 
coeffici nts [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. They can be thought of as th  threshold pr es at which a consumer f ds each fu l 
desirable. When the price [pi] of a fu l xceeds the coefficient value, t  t  ratio in parentheses in 
Equation 38 is less than one, refl cting its low r desir bility; when the price falls below the coefficient 
value, then the ratio in parentheses is great r than on , reflecting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be referred to as ‘reference prices’ in the rest of this document.
The referenc  prices can be formulate  in a convenient way. If all that a consumer wanted from a fu l 
was the energy services it provided, then they would set their reference prices to scale with the product 
 and pure-
substitution 
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another – an i t r retation for th se paramete s will emerge in Section 4.3 that justifies the choice of 
notation. T e ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) pote tially d pend on a vector of parameters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] that is currently unspecified. The 
ar meter α is characteristic of CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-complement (α = 0) 
and pure-su (α = 1) utility functions.
4.2. Finding the optimal allocation
Consumers whose utility is described by Equation 33 are assumed to face an energy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], which grows with average income, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
where pi re fuel prices in volumetric terms (e.g., dollars per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly i cr asing in energy consumption, it can be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (Equation 34) can be replaced with an equality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, so the objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
The most complex factor in this express on – the one in brackets – is independent of i. Combining all i-
i epe dent factors into an overall coefficient [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equation 37 can be rearranged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, the energy-content cor cted consumption of fuels [ηixi] declines as the price [pi] increases, and 
rises as the coefficient [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increases.
4.3. Reference prices
The exp ession on the right-hand side of Equation 38 suggests an interpretation of the utility 
coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. They ca  be thought of as the threshold prices at which a consumer finds each fuel 
desirable. W en the price [pi] of a fuel exceeds the coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses in 
Equation 38 is less than one, refl cting i s lower desirability; when the price falls below the coefficient 
valu , the  the ratio in parentheses is greater than one, reflecting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be referred to as ‘reference prices’ in the rest of this document.
T e reference pric s can be formulated in a convenient way. If all that a consumer wanted from a fuel 
was the nergy services it provided, then they would set their reference prices to scale with the product 
  functions.
4.2 Finding the optimal allocation
Consumers whose utility is described by Equation 
33 are ass med to fac  an energy budget c straint 
17
other – an interpretation for th s  param ters will emerge in Section 4.3 that justifies the choice of 
notation. The ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) potentially dep nd on a vector of parameters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] that is curr ntly unspecified. The 
parameter α is characteristic of CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-complement (α = 0) 
and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
4.2. Finding the optimal allocation
Consumers wh e utility is described by Equation 33 are assumed to face an en rgy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], hich grows with average income, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
wher  pi ar  fuel prices in volu etric terms (e.g., dollars p r litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly increasing in energy consumption, it can be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the ine lity (Equation 34) c n be repl ced with an equality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, so th  objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagrang  multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
The most complex factor in this expression – the on  in brackets – is independent of i. Combining all i-
independent factors into an overall coefficient [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that dep nds on the (still unspecifi d) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equ tion 37 can b  rearranged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, the energy-content rrected consumption of fu ls [ηixi] declines as the pric  [pi] increases, and 
r ses as th  coefficient [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increases.
4.3. Reference prices
The expression on the right-hand side of Equation 38 sugg sts an interpretation of the utility 
coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. They can be thought of as the threshold pri es at which a consumer finds each fuel 
desirable. When the price [pi] of a fuel ex e ds the coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses in 
Equation 38 is less than one, reflecting it  lower desirability; when the price falls below the coefficient 
value, then the ratio in parenthes s is great r than one, reflecting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be referr d to as ‘reference prices’ in the rest of this document.
Th  reference prices can b  formulated i  a convenient way. If all that a consumer wanted from a fuel 
was th  energy services it provided, then they would set their reference prices to scale with the product 
, ich grows with average inc me, so that
〈𝑤𝑤〉 = � 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑓𝑓(𝑑𝑑)exp �1−𝜑𝜑
𝜑𝜑
𝑑𝑑�
+∞
−∞
. (28)
〈𝑤𝑤〉 = 𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 �. (29)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ≈
exp�
1−𝜑𝜑
𝜑𝜑
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�
∑𝑗𝑗=1
𝑚𝑚 exp�
1−𝜑𝜑
𝜑𝜑
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�+(𝑁𝑁−𝑚𝑚)𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 �. (30)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
norm = exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�
∑𝑗𝑗=1
𝑚𝑚 exp�
1−𝜑𝜑
𝜑𝜑
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�+(𝑁𝑁−𝑚𝑚)exp�12�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 �2 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓2�. (31)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
norm,𝜑𝜑=1/2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
∑𝑗𝑗=1
𝑚𝑚 𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗+(𝑁𝑁−𝑚𝑚)𝑒𝑒𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓2/2. (32)
𝑈𝑈 = � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
�
1
𝛼𝛼
. (33)
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦), (34)
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦). (35)
    (34)
where 
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another – an interpreta ion for th se parameters will emerge in Section 4.3 that jus ifies the hoice of 
not tio . The ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) poten ally depend  a ve or of param ters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] tha  is currently unsp cified. The 
parameter α i  characteristic of CES tility functions and interpolates between pure-complement (α = 0) 
and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
4.2. Finding the optimal allocation
Consumers hose utility is d scribed by Equation 33 are assumed to face an energy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], which grows with average income, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
 pi are fuel pric s in volumetric terms (e.g., dollars per litre). B cause the utility functi  is 
strictly increasing in energy co sumption, it can be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (Equation 34) can be replaced with an equality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, so the objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
The most complex fac r in this expression – the one in brackets – is ind pendent of i. Combining all i-
independent factors into an overall c efficient [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equation 37 can be rearranged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, en rgy-content co re ted consumption of fuels [ηixi] declines as the price [pi] increases, and 
rises as the coefficient [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increases.
4.3. R fere ce prices
Th  expres ion on the right-hand side of Equation 38 suggests an interpretation of the util ty 
coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. They can be thought of as th  thr shold prices at whic   consumer fi ds each fuel 
desirable. When the price [pi] o  a fuel exceeds the coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses in 
Eq ation 38 is less than one, reflect n  its lower desirability; when the price falls below the coefficient 
value, th n the ratio in parenth ses is grea er than ne, refle ting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be referred to as ‘reference prices’ in the rest of this document.
The reference prices can be formulated in a convenient way. If all that a consumer wante  from a fuel 
was the energy services it provided, then they would set their reference prices to scale with the product 
  fuel prices i  volumetric terms (e.g., 
dollars per litre). Bec use the utility function is 
strictly increasing in energy consumption, it can be 
assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (Equation 34) can be replaced with 
an  quality,
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      (36)
where 
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U=[∑i=1M piv ii ii xi ]1 . (33
In this function, the xi are the quantities of fuel consumed in physical terms (litres or kilograms), the i  
are conversion efficiencies (for instance, conversion of combustible fuels into heat in a stove), while 
the ηi are energy density factors that convert physical quantities into their energy equivalents. The 
piv   are coefficients within the utilit  functi  that express the degree of preference for one fuel over 
anoth r – an nterpretation for these paramete s will emerge la er in the analysis that justifies the choice 
of otation. T e piv   pote ti lly d pend on a vect r of p rameters v  that is currently unspecified. 
The parameter α is charac eristic of CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-complement (α 
= 0) and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
FINDING THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION
Consumers with utility described by Equation (33) are assumed to face an energy budget constraint 
B y  , which grows with average income, so that
∑
i=1
M
pi xiB y  , (34)
where the pi are fuel prices in volumetric terms (e.g., USD per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly increasing in energy consumption, it can be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (34) can be replaced with an equality,
∑
i=1
M
pi xi=B y  . (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to his or her budget constraint, so the objective 
function is
S=[∑i=1M pi v ii ii xi ]1B y −∑i=1M pi xi , (36)
r  λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
∂ S
∂ xi =
piv 
ii iiii xi
−1[∑j=1M p j v  j j  j j x j ]1−1− pi = 0 . (37)
The most complex factor in this expression – the one in brackets – is independent of i. Combining all i-
independent factors into an overall coefficient C v   that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
v , Equation (37) can be rearranged to show that
ii xi=C v  piv pi  11− . (38)
That is, the energy-content corrected consumption of fuels ηixi declines as the price pi increases and 
rises as the coefficient piv   increases.
15
 is a a ra e lti lier. In addition to the 
budget constraint, the optimum conditions are that
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𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
�
1
𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
= ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼−1 � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣) �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ � )𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼. (38)
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖ln?¯?𝑦, (40)
𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦, 𝑡𝑡) �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
, (41)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 � �?ˆ?𝑝𝑗𝑗(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
�
−1
�
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼. (42)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖. (43)
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
� 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
, (44)
 
            
𝑆𝑆 = � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
�
1
𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
= ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼−1 � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣) �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ � )𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼. (38)
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖ln?¯?𝑦, (40)
𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦, 𝑡𝑡)� �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
, (41)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 � �?ˆ?𝑝𝑗𝑗(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
�
−1
�
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼. (42)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖. (43)
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
� 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
, (44)
  (37)
The most complex factor in this expression – the 
one in brackets – i  ind pendent of i. Combining 
Domestic energy demand in the model comes from 
the household and transport sectors, where per 
capita energy demand is determined by incomes and 
fuel prices, subject to the possible constraint placed 
by a mandatory blend ratio. International d mand 
is assumed to be so large that national production 
has no effect on prices (fuel prices, both dom stic 
and international, are discussed in Section 5). Rural 
and urban populations can have different demand 
parameters, as well as different income levels and 
fuel prices.
Population growth n rural nd urban areas, and 
economic growth, are given exogenously. From 
these, average income (as gross domestic product per 
capita) is calculated. Rural and urban incomes are 
then determined from an exogenous rural-to-urban 
income ratio.
4.1 Constant elasticity of substitution 
utility function
It is expected that biofuels and fossil fuels will coexist 
and be used for similar purposes for a substantial time, 
while ethanol can be used as an additive to petrol. That 
is, they do not act as perfect substitutes. However, 
they do not act as perfect complements – the precise 
mix of fossil fuels and biofuels can vary depending 
on relative price, technology, convenience, policy, 
fashion and other factors. This suggests that demands 
should be represented by a functional form that is 
intermediate between that of a perfect substitute and 
of a perfect complement: the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) demand function has this property. 
Accordingly, we assume the following CES utility 
f nction for the model:
〈𝑤𝑤〉 = � 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑓𝑓(𝑑𝑑)exp �1−𝜑𝜑
𝜑𝜑
𝑑𝑑�
+∞
−∞
. (28)
〈𝑤𝑤〉 = 𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 �1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 �. (29)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ≈
exp�
1−𝜑𝜑
𝜑𝜑
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�
∑𝑗𝑗=1
𝑚𝑚 exp�
1−𝜑𝜑
𝜑𝜑
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�+(𝑁𝑁−𝑚𝑚)𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 �. (30)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
norm = exp�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�
∑𝑗𝑗=1
𝑚𝑚 exp�
1−𝜑𝜑
𝜑𝜑
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�+(𝑁𝑁−𝑚𝑚)exp�12�1−𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 �2 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓2�. (31)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
norm,𝜑𝜑=1/2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
∑𝑗𝑗=1
𝑚𝑚 𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗+(𝑁𝑁−𝑚𝑚)𝑒𝑒𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓2/2. (32)
𝑈𝑈 = � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
�
1
𝛼𝛼
. (33)
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦), (34)
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦). (35)
  (33)
In this function, the 
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strongly outperform the average non-biofuel portfolio to gain a substantial share. As the variance 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2of 
non-biofuel investments increases, potential competition from non-bioenergy investments also 
increases. W n 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 is close to zero, high-performing investments r ceive high weights, and w n 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 is 
close to one, even poorly-performing investments may receive a substantial weight.
3.4.5. Impl menti g a minimum leve of domestic investme t
One of the policy instruments that the model simulates is a minimum level of domestic investment. The 
model simulates a policy in which applications for permits from foreign investors are suspended 
whenever the previous quarter’s statistics indicate that domestic investment is below the target. This 
policy characteristically leads to a ‘saw tooth’ pattern in foreign investment when averaged over the 
year. The saw tooth pattern can look odd, but it is not an unreasonable outcome, since it follows 
directly from the simulated policy.
4. Domestic energy de and
Domestic energy de and in the model comes from the household and transport sectors, where per 
capita energy demand is determined by incomes and fuel prices, subject to the possible constraint 
placed by a mandatory blend ratio. International demand is assumed to be so large that national 
production has no effect on prices (fuel prices, both domestic and international, are discussed in 
Section 5). Rural and urban populations can have different demand parameters, as well as different 
income levels and fuel prices.
Population growth in rural and rban areas, and economic growth, ar giv n exoge ously. From these, 
average income (as gross domestic prod ct per capit ) is calculated. Rural a d urban incomes are then 
determined from an exogenous rural-to-urban income ratio.
4.1. Constant elasticity of substitution utility function
It is expected that biofuels and fossil fuels will coexist and be used for similar purposes for a 
substantial time, while ethanol can be used as an additive to petrol. That is, they do not act as perfect 
substitutes. However, they do not act as perfect complements – the precise mix of fossil fuels and 
biofuels can vary depending on relative price, techn logy, convenience, poli y, fashion and other 
factors. This suggests that demands shoul  be repr sente  by a fu ctio al o m that is interm d at  
between that of a perfect substitute and of a perfect compl ment: th  consta t el sticity of substitution 
(CES) demand function has this property. Accordingly, we ass me the following CES utili y function 
for the model:
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
. (33)
In this functi  xi are the quantities of fuel consumed in physical terms (litres or kilograms), the 
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are conversion efficiencies (for instance, conversion of combustible fuels into heat in a stove), while 
the ηi are energy density factors that convert physical quantiti s into their energy equivalents. The 
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) are coefficients within the utility function that express the degree of preference for one fuel over 
 t  quantities of fuel 
consumed in physical terms (litres or kilograms), the 
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strongly outperform the average non-biofuel portfolio to gain a substantial share. As the variance 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2of 
non-biofuel investments increases, potential competition from non-bioenergy investments also 
increases. Whe  𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 is close t  zero, high-performing investments receive high weights, and when 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 is 
close to one, even poorly-performing investments may receive a substantial weight.
3.4.5. Implementin  a mi imum level of domestic investm nt
One of the policy instruments that the model simulates is a minimum level of domestic investment. The 
model simulates a policy in which applications for permits from foreign investors are suspended 
whenever the previous quarter’s statistics indicate that domestic investment is below the target. This 
policy characteristically leads to a ‘saw tooth’ pattern in foreign investment when averaged over the 
year. The saw tooth pattern can look odd, but it is not an unreasonable outcome, since it follows 
directly from the simulated policy.
4. Dom stic energy demand
Domestic energy demand in the model comes from the household and transport sectors, where per 
capita energy demand is determined by incomes and fuel prices, subject to the possible constraint 
placed by a mandatory blend ratio. International demand is assumed to be so large that national 
production has no effect on prices (fuel prices, both domestic and international, are discussed in 
Section 5). Rural and urban populations can have different demand parameters, as well as different 
income levels and fuel prices.
Population grow h in rural and urban areas, and econo ic growth, are give  exogenously. From these, 
average i co e (as gross domestic product per capita) is calculated. Rural and urban incomes are then 
determined from an exogenous rural-to-urban income ratio.
4.1. Constant elasticity of substitution utility function
It is expected that biofuels and fossil fuels will coexist and be used for similar purposes for a 
substantial time, while ethanol can be used as an additive to petrol. That is, they do not act as perfect 
substitutes. However, they do not act as perfect comple ents – the r cise mix of fo sil fu l  a d 
biofuels can vary depending on relative price, technology, c nvenience, policy, fas ion and other 
factors. This suggests that demands should be represe ted by a fu ction l form that is intermediate 
between that of a perfect substitute and of a perfect complement: the constant lasticity of substitution 
(CES) demand function has this property. Accordingly, we assume the following CES utility function 
for the model:
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
. (33)
In this function, the xi are the quantities of fuel consumed in physical terms (litres or kilograms), the 
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are conversion efficiencies (for instance, conversion of combustible fuels into heat in a stove), while 
the ηi are energy density factors that convert physical quantities into their en rg  equivalents. The 
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) are coefficients within the utility functi n that express the degree of pr ference for one fuel over are conversion efficiencies (f instan e, conversion of combustibl  fuels into heat in a tove), while the 
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stro gly outp rform the average non-biofuel portfolio to gain a substantial share. As the variance 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2of 
non-biofuel inv stments increases, p tential competition from no -bioenergy nvestment also 
increases. When 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 is cl se to z ro, high-perfor ing investments receive high weights, and when 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑 is 
close to one, even poorly-performing investme ts may receive a substantial weight.
3.4.5. Implementing  minimum le l of domestic i vestme
One of th  policy instr ments that the model simulates is a inimum level of domestic inve tment. The 
model simulates a policy in which pplica ions for p mits from foreign inv stor  are susp nded 
wh never the previous qua ter’s statistics indicate that domestic investment is below the ar et. This 
pol cy characteristically lea s t  a ‘saw t oth’ pattern in foreign investm nt when averaged over the 
year. The saw toot  pattern can l ok odd, but it is not an unreaso able outcome, since it follows 
directly from the simulated policy.
4. Domestic energy demand
Domestic r   in the model comes from the household an  transp rt sector , where per 
ca ita energ  demand is determin d by incom  and fuel prices, subject t  he possible con trai t 
placed by a mand tory blend ratio. Inter atio al d man  is assu ed to b  so la ge that national 
produ ti  has no ef ect on prices (fuel prices, both domestic and international, are discussed in 
Section 5). Rural a  urban populations can have different demand parameters, as well as different 
income levels and fuel prices.
Populatio  growth in rural a  urban areas, and conomic growth, r  given exogenously. From these, 
averag  income (as gross domestic product per capita) is c lculat d. Rural and urban incomes are then 
determined from an exogenous rural-to-urban income ratio.
4.1. Constant elasticity of substitution utility function
It is expected that biofuels an  f ssil fuels will oexist and be used f r similar purpose  f r a 
su tantial time, while tha ol ca  be us d as an additive to petrol. That is, t ey do ot act as p rfect 
substitutes. However, they o not act as perfect compl m nts – the precis  m x f f s il fuels an  
biofuels can vary dep nding on rel tive price, technology, conv ience, p licy, fashi n and other 
factors. This suggests that demands shoul  be rep esented by a f ctional form that i  i termediate 
between that of a perfect substitute and of a perfect complem nt: the constant elasticity of substit tion 
(CES) demand function has this property. Accordingly, we assume the following CES utility function 
for the model:
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
. (33)
In this function, the xi are the quanti ies f fu l sumed in phy ical t rms (litres r kilogram ), t  
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are conversion efficienci s (for inst n e, conversion of combustibl  fu ls into heat in a st v ), w ile 
the ηi are en rgy density factors that convert physical quantities into their nergy equivalents. The 
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) are coefficients within the utility function that express the degree of preference for one fuel over   n rgy density factors tha  convert physical 
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all i-independent factors into an overall coefficient 
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another – an interpretation for these parameters will emerge in Section 4.3 that justifies the choice of 
notation. The ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) potentially depend on a vector of parameters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] that is currently unspecified. The 
parameter α is characteristic of CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-complement (α = 0) 
and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
4.2. Finding the optimal allocation
Consumers whose utility is described by Equation 33 are assumed to face an energy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], which grows with average income, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
where pi are fuel prices in volumetric terms (e.g., dollars per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly increasing in energy consumption, it can be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (Equation 34) can be replaced with an equality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, so the objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
The most complex factor in this expression – the o e in brackets – i  independent of i. Combining all i-
independent factors into an overall coefficient [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equation 37 can be rearranged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, the energy-content corrected consumption of fuels [ηixi] declines as the price [pi] increases, and 
rises as the coefficient [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increases.
4.3. Reference prices
The expression on the right-hand side of Equation 38 suggests an interpretation of the utility 
coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. They can be thought of as the threshold prices at which a consumer finds each fuel 
desirable. When the price [pi] of a fuel exceeds the coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses in 
Equation 38 is less than one, reflecting its lower desirability; when the price falls below the coefficient 
value, then the ratio in parentheses is greater than one, reflecting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be referred to as ‘reference prices’ in the rest of this document.
The reference prices can be formulated in a convenient way. If all that a consumer wanted from a fuel 
was the energy services it provided, then they would set their reference prices to scale with the product 
 pends on the (still unspecified) 
parameters 
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another – an interpretation for t se parameters will emerge in Section 4.3 that justifies the choice of 
nota ion. The ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) potentially depend on a vector of parameters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] that is currently unspecified. The 
parameter α is characteristi  of CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-complement (α = 0) 
and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
4.2. Finding the optimal allocation
Consumers whose utility is described by Equation 33 are assumed to face an energy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], which grows with average income, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
where pi are fuel pric s in volume ric terms (e.g., dollars per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly increasing in en rgy consumption, it can be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (Equation 34) can be replaced with an equality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maxim z utility subject to their budget constraint, so the objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
The most complex factor in this expression – the one in brackets – is independent of i. Combining all i-
independe t factors i to an overall coeffici nt [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equation 37 can be rearranged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, the e ergy-content corrected con umption of fuels [ηixi] declines as the price [pi] increases, and 
rises as the coefficient [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increases.
4.3. Reference prices
The expression on the right-hand side of Equation 38 suggests an interpretation of the utility 
coeffici nts [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. They can be thought of as the threshold prices at which a consumer finds each fuel 
desirable. W e  t e price [pi] of a fuel exceeds the coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses in 
Equation 38 is less than one, reflecting its lower desirability; when the price falls below the coefficient 
value, then the ratio in parenthes s is greater than one, reflecting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be referred to as ‘reference prices’ in the rest of this document.
The reference prices can be formulated in a convenient way. If all that a consumer wanted from a fuel 
was the energy services it provided, then they would set their reference prices to scale with the product 
 uation 37 can be rearr nged to 
show that
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U=[∑i=1M piv ii ii xi ]1 . (33)
In this function, the xi are the quantities of fuel consumed in physical terms (litres or kilograms), the i  
are conversion efficiencies (for instance, conversion of combustible fuels into heat in a stove), while 
the ηi are energy density factors that convert physical quantities into their energy equivalents. The 
piv   are coefficients within the utility function that express the degree of preference for one fuel over 
another – an interpretation for these parameters will emerge later in the analysis that justifies the choice 
of notation. The piv   potentially depend on a vector of parameters v  that is currently unspecified. 
The parameter α is characteristic of CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-complement (α 
= 0) and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
FINDING THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION
Consumers with utility described by Equation (33) are assumed to face an energy budget constraint 
B y  , which grows with average income, so that
∑
i=1
M
pi xiB y  , (34)
where the pi are fuel prices in volumetric terms (e.g., USD per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly increasing in energy consumption, it can be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (34) can be replaced with an equality,
∑
i=1
M
pi xi=B y  . (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to his or her budget constraint, so the objective 
function is
S=[∑i=1M pi v ii ii xi ]1B y −∑i=1M pi xi , (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
∂ S
∂ xi =
piv 
ii iiii xi
−1[∑j=1M p j v  j j  j j x j ]1−1− pi = 0 . (37)
The most complex factor in this expression – the one in brackets – is independent of i. Combining all i-
independent factors into an overall coefficient C v   that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
v , Equation (37) can be rearranged to show that
ii xi=C v  piv pi  11− . (38)
That is, the energy-content corrected consumption of fuels ηixi declines as the price pi increases and 
rises as the coefficient piv   increases.
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another – an interpretation for these parameters will emerge in Section 4.3 that justifies the choice of 
notation. The ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) potentially depend on a vector of parameters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] that is currently unspecified. The 
parameter α is characteristic of CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-complement (α = 0) 
and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
4.2. Finding the optimal allocation
Consumers whose utility is described by Equation 33 are assumed to face an energy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], hich grows with average income, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
where pi are fuel prices in volumetric terms (e.g., dollars per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly increasing in energy consumption, it can be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (Equation 34) can be replaced with an eq ality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, so the objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
The most complex fac or in this expr ssion – the one in brackets – is independent of i. Combining all i-
independent factors into an overall coefficient [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equation 37 can be rearranged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, the energy-content corrected consumption of fuel [ηixi] declines as the price [pi] increases, and 
rises as the coefficient [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increases.
4.3. Reference prices
The expression on the right-hand side of Equation 38 suggests an interpretation of the utility 
coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. They can be thought of as the threshold prices at which a consumer finds each fuel 
desirable. When the price [pi] of a fuel exceeds the coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses in 
Equation 38 is less than one, reflecting its lower desirability; when the price falls below the coefficient 
value, then the ratio in parentheses is greater than one, reflecting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be referred to as ‘reference prices’ in the rest of this document.
The reference prices can be formulated in a convenient way. If all that a consumer wanted from a fuel 
was the energy services it provided, then they would set their reference prices to scale with the product 
 lines as the price 
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another – an i terpretation for thes  parameters will emerge in Section 4.3 that justifies the choice of 
notation. The ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) potentially dep nd on a vector f parameters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] that is currently unspecified. The 
parameter α is characterist c of CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-complement (α = 0) 
and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
4.2  Finding the optimal alloc tion
Consumers whose utility is described by Equation 33 are assumed to face an en rgy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], which grows with average income, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
where pi are fuel prices in volumetric terms (e.g., dollars per litre). Because the utility function is
strictly increasing in en rgy consumption, it can be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (Equati  34) can be r placed with an equality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to heir budget constraint, so the objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
The most complex factor n this expression – the one in brackets – is ndep ndent of i. Combining all i-
indep ndent factors into an overall coefficient [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that dep nds on the (still unspecified) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equation 37 can be r arr nged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, the en rgy-content corrected consumption of fuels [ηixi] declines a  the pri [pi] increases, and 
rises a  the coefficient [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increase .
4.3  Ref r nce prices
The expression on the right- and side of Equation 38 suggests an i terpretation of the utility 
coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. They can be thought of as the threshold prices at which a consumer finds each fuel 
desirable. When the price [pi] of a fuel xceeds the coefficient value, then the ratio n parenthes s in
Equation 38 is less than one, refl cting its lower desirability; when the price falls below the coefficient 
value, then the ratio n parenthes s i greater than one, refl cting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be r ferr d to as ‘reference prices’ in the r st of this document.
The r ference prices can be formulated in a convenient way. If all that  consumer wanted from a fuel 
was the en rgy services it provide , then they would set their reference prices to scale with e product 
 r as s, and rises 
as the coefficient 
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anoth r – an interpretation for these param ters will emerge in Section 4.3 that justifies the choice of 
n tation. The ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣) potentially d pend on a v ctor of parameters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] that is currently unspecified. The 
parameter α is charact ristic of CES utility fu ctions and interpolates between pure-complement (α = 0) 
and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
4.2. Finding the optimal allocation
Consumer  whos u ility is described y Equation 33 are assumed to face an energy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], which gro s with average income, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
where pi a e fu l prices in volumetric terms (e.g., dollars per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly incr asing in energy consumption, it ca be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the i eq ality (Equation 34) can be replaced with an equality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maximiz  utility subject to their budget constraint, so the objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagr nge multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
Th most omplex factor i  this expression – the one in brackets – is independent of i. Combining all i-
independent factor into an overall oef icient [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equation 37 can be rearranged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, the energy-co t nt corr ct d consumption of fuels [ηixi] declines as the price [pi] increases, and 
rises as the coeffici [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increases.
4.3. Reference prices
The expr ssion o the igh -hand side of Equation 38 suggests an interpretation of the utility 
co fficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. T ey n be thought of a  the threshold prices at which a consumer finds each fuel 
desirable. When the pric  [pi] of a fuel exce ds the coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses in 
Equation 38 is less than one, ref ecting its lower des rability; when the price falls below the coefficient 
value, then he ratio in parentheses is great r han one, reflecting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be referred to as ‘reference prices’ in the rest of this document.
Th  r ference prices can be for ulated in a c nvenient way. If all that a consumer wanted from a fuel 
as the energy services it provided, then they w uld se their reference prices to scale with the product 
 reases.
4.3 Reference prices
The expression on the right-hand side of Equation 38 
s ests an interpreta i  f t  utility coefficients 
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another – an interpretation for these parameters will emerge in Section 4.3 that justifies the choice of 
notation. The ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) potentially depend on a vector of parameters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] that is currently unspecified. The 
parameter α is charact ri tic of CES utility fun t ons an  in erp lates b tween pure-complement (α = 0) 
nd pur -substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
4.2. Finding the optimal allocation
Consumers whos u ility is described by Equ tion 33 are assumed to face an energy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], which grows with average income, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
where pi are fuel prices in volumetric terms (e.g., dollars per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly increasing in energy consumption, it can be assu ed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (Equation 34) can be replac  with an equality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, so the objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
The most complex factor in this expression – the one in brackets – is independent of i. Combining all i-
independent factors into an overall coefficient [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equation 37 can be rearranged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, the energy-content c rrected consumption of fuels [ηixi] declines as he pric  [ i] increases, and 
rises as the coefficient [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increases.
4.3. Reference prices
The expression on the right-hand side of Equation 38 suggests an interpretation of the utility 
coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. They can be thought of as the threshold prices at which a consumer finds each fuel 
desirable. When the price [pi] of a fuel exceeds the coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses in 
Equation 38 is less than one, reflecting its lower desirability; when the price falls below the coefficient 
value, then the ratio in parentheses is greater than one, reflecting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be referred to as ‘reference prices’ in the rest of this document.
The reference prices can be formulated in a convenient way. If all that a consumer wanted from a fuel 
was the energy services it provided, then they would set their reference prices to scale with the product 
. They can be t ough  of as the threshold 
prices at which a consumer finds ach fuel desirable. 
When the price 
17
another – an interpretation for these parameters will e erge in Section 4.3 that justi ies t e choice of 
notation. The ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) potentially depend on a vector of parameters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] that is currently unspecified. The 
parameter α is characteristic of CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-complement (α = 0) 
and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functi ns.
4.2. Finding the optimal allocation
Consumers whose utility is d scribed by Equation 33 are assumed to face an en rgy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], which grows with average income, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
where pi are fuel prices in volumetric terms (e.g., dollars per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly increasing in energy consumption, it can be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (Equation 34) can be replaced with an equality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, so the objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
The most complex factor in this expression – the one in brackets – is independent of i. Combining all i-
independent factors into an overall coefficient [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equation 37 can be rearranged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, the energy-content corrected consumption of fuels [ηixi] declines as the pri [pi] incr ases, and 
rises as the coefficient [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increases.
4.3. Reference prices
The expression on the right-hand side of Equation 38 suggest an interpretation of he utility 
coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. They can be thought of as the threshold prices at which a consumer finds each fuel 
desirable. When the price [pi] of a fuel exceeds the co fficient value, th n the ratio in parentheses in
Equation 38 is less than one, reflecting its lower desirability; when the price falls below the coefficient 
value, then the ratio in parentheses is greater than one, reflecting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be referred to as ‘reference prices’ in the rest of this document.
The reference prices can be formulated in a convenient way. If all that a consumer wanted from a fuel 
was the energy services it provided, then they would set their reference prices to scale with the product 
 of a fuel excee s the coefficient 
value, then the ratio in p rentheses in Equation 38 is 
less than one, reflecting its lower desirability; when the 
price falls below the coefficie t value, th n the ratio in 
parenthes s is greater th n on , reflecting desirabili y. 
The coefficients 
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another – an interpretation for these parameters will emerge in Section 4.3 that justifies the choice of 
notation. The ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) potentially depend on a vector of parameters [?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣] that is currently unspecified. The 
parameter α is characteristic of CES utility functions and interpolates between pure-complement (α = 0) 
and pure-substitution (α = 1) utility functions.
4.2. Finding the optimal allocation
Consumers whose utility is described by Equation 33 are assumed to face an energy budget constraint
[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)], which grows with average i come, so that
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦), (34)
where pi are fuel prices in volumetric terms (e.g., dollars per litre). Because the utility function is 
strictly increasing in energy co sumption, it can be assumed that the entire budget will be spent, and so 
the inequality (Equation 34) can be replaced with an equality,
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦). (35)
The consumer seeks to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, so the objective function is
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �
1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimum conditions are that
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
The most complex factor in this expression – the one in brackets – is independent of i. Combining all i-
independent factors into an overall coefficient [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] that depends on the (still unspecified) parameters 
[?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣], Equation 37 can be rearranged to show that
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣→)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (38)
That is, the energy-content corrected consumption of fuels [ηixi] declines as the price [pi] increases, and 
rises as th  coeffi ient [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)] increases.
4.3. Refere ce prices
The expression on the right-hand side of Equation 38 suggests an interpretation of the utility 
coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]. They can be thought of as the threshold prices at which a consumer finds each fuel 
desirable. When the price [pi] of a fuel exceeds the coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses in 
Equation 38 is less than one, reflecting its lower desirability; when the price falls below the coefficient 
value, then the ratio in parentheses is greater than one, reflecting desirability. The coefficients [?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣)]
will be referred to as ‘reference prices’ in the rest of this document.
The reference prices can be formulated in a convenient way. If all that a consumer wanted from a fuel 
was the energy services it provided, then they would set their reference prices to scale with the product 
 will be r ferred to as ‘ref rence 
ices’ in the rest of this document.
The reference prices can be formulated in a convenient 
way. If all that a consumer wanted from a fuel was 
the energy services it provi ed, then they would set 
their reference prices to scale with the product of 
efficiency and energy density 
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of efficiency and energy densit [𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]. That is, pric s n terms of energy s rvices provided should be 
identical. However, pe ple look for many characteristics other than energy servic s in a fuel, su h as
convenienc  and the tast  they impart to foods. Ev n for closely substitu able fuels, such as ethanol and 
petrol, p ople may in some circumstances think ne of them l ss attractive. For example, biofuels may 
be thought less desirable because they have a lower energy density than their fossil equivalents, and so 
require more frequent fill-ups, or because they are not seen as sufficiently ‘modern’. Alternatively, 
consumers may see biofuels as more attractive because they are seen as ‘green’. For this reason, 
references prices are expected to have the following form:
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
where π is a constant that is common to all fuels and 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) reflects a relative preference for the fuel. 
When the preference term is positive, the reference price is higher than expected, and so the fuel will be 
attractive at a higher than expected price. The opposite is true when the preference term is negative.
The preference term 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) can depend on many factors; however, the factors are expected to change 
systematically with income level. To take one example, when roads are poor, modern fuels that must be 
transported from cities to rural areas can be less convenient than traditional fuelwood. To take another 
example, people with low and uncertain incomes may be less able to afford an expensive but efficient 
device, even if it should save them money in the long term. This is consistent with the concept of the 
‘energy ladder’, where households move through a relatively predictable sequence of fuels as their 
incomes increase (Hosier 1993, 2004). Preferences can also be expected to change over time, 
independent of income. Most importantly for this model, preferences for biofuels may change over 
time as perceptions about biofuels change. To capture the change in both income and time, the 
following formulation is used in the model:
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, (40)
The factors γi are income elasticities, which might be either positive (for preferred fuels, such as liquid 
fuels) or negative (for less attractive fuels, such as wood). As average income increases, the reference 
price rises for preferred fuels and declines for undesirable fuels, as households climb the energy ladder. 
From equations 39 and 40 it can be seen that average income [?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦], and time [t] are the parameters ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 that 
determine the reference prices ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) and the coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣), so that ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 = (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡).
4.4. Multinomial logit demand function
The normalisation coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) is determined by calculating the sum in Equation 35,
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)� �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�
11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 , (41)
where the income and time dependence of the reference prices and the normalization coefficient are 
shown explicitly. Solving for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) and substituting into Equation 38 gives an expression for fuel 
consumption,
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �
−1
�
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�
11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (42)
 That is, prices in 
terms f energy s rvic s provided should b  i entical. 
However, people look for many characteristics ther 
than energy services in a fuel, such as conve ience 
and the tast  they impart to foods. Even for closely 
substitutable fuels, such as ethanol and petrol, people 
ay in some circumstances think one of them less 
attractive. For example, biofuels may be thought less 
desirable because they have a lower energy density than 
their fossil equivalents, and so require more frequent 
fill-ups, or because they are not seen as sufficiently 
‘modern’. Alternatively, consumers may see biofuels 
as more attractive because they are seen as ‘green’. For 
this reason, reference prices are expected to have the 
following for :
𝑆𝑆 = � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
�
1
𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
= ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼−1 � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣) �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ � )𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼. (38)
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖ln?¯?𝑦, (40)
𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦, 𝑡𝑡)� �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
, (41)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 � �?ˆ?𝑝𝑗𝑗(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
�
−1
�
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼. (42)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖. (43)
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
� 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
, (44)
    (39)
where π is a constant that is com  to all fuels a d 
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of efficiency and energy density [𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]. That is, prices in terms of energy services provided should be 
identical. However, people look for many characteristics other than energy services in a fuel, such as 
convenience and the taste they impart to foods. Even for closely substitutable fuels, such as ethanol and 
petrol, people may in some circumstances think one of them less attractive. For example, biofuels may 
be thought less desirable because they have a lower energy density than their fossil equivalents, and so 
require more frequent fill-ups, or because they are not see  as sufficiently ‘modern’. Alternatively, 
consumers may see biofuels as more attractive because they are seen as ‘green’. For this reason, 
references prices are expected to have the following form:
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
where π is a constant that is common to all fuels and 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) reflects a relative preference for the fuel. 
When the preference term is positive, the reference price is higher than expected, and so the fuel will be 
attractive at a higher than expected price. The opposite is true when the preference term is negative.
The preference term 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) can depend on many factors; however, the factors are expected to change 
systematically with income level. To take one example, when roads are poor, modern fuels that must be 
transported from cities to rural areas can be less convenient than traditional fuelwood. To take another 
example, people with low and uncertain incomes may be less able to afford an expensive but efficient 
device, even if it should save them money in the long term. This is consistent with the concept of the 
‘energy ladder’, where households move through a relatively predictable sequence of fuels as their 
incomes increase (Hosier 1993, 2004). Preferences can also be expected to change over time, 
independent of income. Most importantly for this model, preferences for biofuels may change over 
time as perceptions about biofuels change. To capture the change in both income and time, the 
following formulation is used in the model:
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, (40)
The factors γi are income elasticities, which might be either positive (for preferred fuels, such as liquid 
fuels) or negative (for less attractive fuels, such as wood). As average income increases, the reference 
price rises for preferred fuels and declines for undesirable fuels, as households climb the energy ladder. 
From equations 39 and 40 it can be seen that average income [?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦], and time [t] are the parameters ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 that 
determine the reference prices ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) and the coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣), so that ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 = (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡).
4.4. Multinomial logit demand function
The normalisation coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) is determined by calculating the sum in Equation 35,
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)� �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�
11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 , (41)
where the income and time dependence of the reference prices and the normalization coefficient are 
shown explicitly. Solving for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) and substituting into Equation 38 gives an expression for fuel 
consumption,
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �
−1
�
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�
11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (42)
 fl cts a relative preferenc  for t e f el. When 
the prefer nce term is positive, the refer ce price is 
higher than expected, and so the fuel will be attractive 
a  a higher than expected price. The opposite is true 
when the preference term is negative.
The preference term 
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of efficiency and energy density [𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]. That is, prices in terms of energy services provided should be 
identical. H wever, people look for many characteristics other than energy services in a fuel, such as 
convenience and the taste they impart to foods. Even for closely substitutable fuels, such as ethanol and 
petrol, people ay in some circumstances think one of them less attractive. For example, biofuels may 
be thought less desirable because they have a lower energy density than their fossil equivalents, and so 
require more frequent fill-up , or because they are not een as sufficiently ‘modern’. Alternatively, 
consumers may se  bi fuels as more attractive because they are seen as ‘green’. For this reason, 
referen es prices are expect  to h ve the following form:
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
where π is a c nstant that is common to all fuels and 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) reflects a relative preference for the fuel. 
When the preference term is positive, the reference price is higher than expected, and so the fuel will be 
attractive at a higher than expected price. The opposite is true when the preference term is negative.
The preference term 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) can depend on many factors; however, the factors are expected to change 
systematically with income level. To take one example, when roads are poor, modern fuels that must be 
transported from cities to rural areas can be less convenient than traditional fuelwood. To take another 
example, people with low and uncertain incomes may be less able to afford an expensive but efficient 
device, even if it should save them money in the long term. This is consistent with the concept of the 
‘energy ladder’, where households move through a relatively predictable sequence of fuels as their 
incomes increase (Hosier 1993, 2004). Preferences can also be expected to change over time, 
independ nt f income. Most importantly for this model, preferences for biofuels may change over 
time as perceptions about biofu ls change. To capture th  change in both income and time, the 
following formulation is used in the model:
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, (40)
The factors γi are income elasticities, which might be either positive (for preferred fuels, such as liquid 
f els) o negative (for less attr ctive fuels, su h a  wood). As average income increases, the reference 
price ri es for pr fer e  fuels and declines for undesirable fuels, as households climb the energy ladder. 
From equations 39 and 40 it can be seen that average income [?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦], and time [t] are the parameters ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 that 
determine the reference prices ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) and the coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣), so that ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 = (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡).
4.4. Multinomial logit demand function
The normalisation coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) is determined by calculating the sum in Equation 35,
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)� �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�
11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 , (41)
where the income and time dependence of the reference prices and the normalization coefficient are 
shown explicitly. Solving for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) and substituting into Equation 38 gives an expression for fuel 
consumption,
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �
−1
�
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�
11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (42)
 can depend on many 
factors; however, the factors are expected to change 
systematically with income level. To take one exampl , 
when roads are poor, modern fuels that must be 
transported from cities to rural areas can be less
convenient than traditional fuelwood. To take another 
ex mple, people with low and uncertain incomes may 
be less able to afford an expensive but efficient device, 
even if it should save them money in the long term. 
This is consistent with the concept of the ‘energy 
ladder’, whe  househ lds move through a relatively 
edict ble sequence of fuels as their incomes increase 
(Hosier 1993, 2004). Preferences can al o be expected 
to change over time, independent of income. Most 
importantly for this model, preferences for biofuels 
ay change over time as perceptions about biofuels 
change. To capture the change in both income and 
t me, the following formulat on is used in the model:
𝑆𝑆 = � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
�
1
𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
= ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼−1 � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣) �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ � )𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼. (38)
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ , (39)
𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖ln?¯?𝑦, (40)
𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦, 𝑡𝑡)� �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
, (41)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 � �?ˆ?𝑝𝑗𝑗(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
�
−1
�
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼. (42)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖. (43)
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
� 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
, (44)
    (40)
The factors 
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REFERENCE PRICES
The expression on the right-hand-side of Equation (38) suggests an interpretation of the utility 
coefficients piv  . They can be thought of as the the threshold prices at which a consumer finds each 
fuel desirable. When the price pi of a fuel exceeds the coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses in 
Equati  (38) is less than one, reflecting its lower desirability; when the price falls below the 
coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses is greater than one, reflecting desirability. The 
coefficients piv   will be referred to as “reference prices” henceforth.
The reference prices can be formulated in a convenient way. Note that if all that a consumer wanted out 
of a fuel were the energy services it provided, then she would set her reference prices to scale with the 
product of efficiency and energy density, ii  That is, prices in terms of energy services provided 
should be identical. However, there are many characteristics other than energy services that people look 
for in a fuel, such as c nvenience a d the taste they impart to foods. Even for closely substitutable 
fuels, such as ethanol and petrol, people may in some circumstances think one of them less attractive. 
F r example, biofuels may be thought less desirable b cause they have a lower energy density than 
their fossil quival nts, and so require more fr quent fill-ups, or because they are not seen as 
suffici ntly “moder ”. Alt rnatively, consum rs may see biofuels as more attractive because they are 
seen as “green”. For this eason, references prices are expected to have a form like the following,
piv =i i ei v , (39)
where π is a constant that is commo  to all fuels and iv   reflects a relative preference for the fuel. 
When the prefer nce term is posi ve, the r ference price is higher than expected, and so the fuel will be 
attractive at a highe  than expected price. The opposite is true when the preference term is negative.
The pref r nce term iv   can d pend n many factors; however, the factors are expected to change 
systematically with income level. To t ke ne example, when roads are poor, modern fuels that must be 
transp rted from cities to rural are s can be less convenient than traditional fuelwood. To take another 
exa ple, people with low and uncertain incomes may be less able to afford an expensive but efficient 
device, even if it shou  save them m ney i  the l ng term. This is consistent with the concept of the 
“ nergy adder” wh re hous h lds m ve throug  a relatively predictable sequence of fuels as their 
incom s in rease, as though they were climbing a ladder [31,32].  Preferences can also be expected to 
change over time, independe t of income. Most importantly for this model, preferences for biofuels 
may cha ge over time as perceptions about biofuels change. To capture the change in both income and 
time, the following formulation is used in the model:
i=i0t i ln y , (40)
The f  γi are income elasticities, which might be either positive (for preferred fuels, such as liquid 
fuels) or negative (for less attractive fuels, such as wood). As average income increases, the reference 
 rises for preferred fuels, and declin s for undesirable fuels, as households climb the energy ladder. 
From Equations (39) a d (40) it can be s en that the parameters v  that determine the reference prices 
piv   and th  coeffi ient C v   are the average income, and time, v=y , t  .
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT DEMAND FUNCTION
The normalization coefficient C y ,t   is determined by calculating the sum in Equation (35),
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 i co e elastic ties, whic  might be 
either positive (f r preferred fuels, such as liquid fuels) 
or neg ive (for less attractiv  uels, such as wood). As 
averag inco e increases, the reference price rises for 
eferred fuels and declines for undesirabl  fuels, as 
households climb t e nergy ladder. From equations 
39 and 40 it can be seen that average income 
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of efficiency and energy density [𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]. That is, prices in terms of energy services provided should be 
identical. However, people look for many characteristics ther than en rgy servic s in a fuel, such as 
co v nien e and the t ste they impart to food . Even for cl sely substitutable fuels, such as ethanol and 
petrol, peopl  may in som  circu stances think one of t m l ss attractive. For example, biofuels may 
be thought less desirable because they have a lower energy density than their fossil equivalents, and so 
require more frequent fill-ups, or because they are not seen as sufficiently ‘modern’. Alternatively, 
consumers may see biofuels as more attractive because they are seen as ‘green’. For this reason, 
references prices are exp cted to have the following form:
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
where π is constant that is common to all fuels a d 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) reflects a relative preference for the fuel. 
Wh n the preferen e term is posit ve, the reference price i higher than expected, and so the fuel will be 
attractiv  at a higher than expected price. Th  opposite is true when the preference term is negative.
T e prefere ce term 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) can de nd on many factors; however, the factors are exp cted to ch g  
syst matically with in me level. To take one ex mple, when roads a e poor, modern fuels that must be 
transp rted from ci ies o rural ar as can b  l s  conv nient than tradi ional fu wood. To take another 
example, pe ple with l w and ncertain incom s may b  less able to afford an expensive but efficient 
device, even if it should sav  them money in the long term. This is consistent with the concept of the 
‘ nergy ladder’, where households move through a relatively predictable sequence of fuels as their 
incomes i crease (Hosi r 1993, 2004). Preferences can also be expected to change over time, 
independent of income. Most importantly for this model, preferences for biofuels may change over 
time s perceptions about biofuels change. To capture the change in both income and time, the 
following formulation is used in the model:
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, (40)
Th  factors γi are income lasticiti , which might b  either po itive (for referred fuels, such as liquid 
f els) or n g tive (for l ss attractive fuels, such as wood). As average inco e increases, the reference 
price r ses for preferred fuels and declines for n e irable fuels, as households climb the energy ladder. 
From equations 39 and 40 i  c n b  seen that verage inc [?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦], and time [t] are the parameters ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 that 
d t rmine the r ference prices ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) and the coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣), so that ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 = (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡).
4.4. Multinomial logit demand function
The normalisation coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) is determined by calculating the sum in Equation 35,
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)� �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
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where the income and time dependence of the reference prices and the normalization coefficient are 
shown explicitly. Solving for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) and substituting into Equation 38 gives an expression for fuel 
consumption,
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
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𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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, 
and time [t] are the param ters 
The National Bioenergy Investment Model NBIM: Technical Documentation DRAFT
REFERENCE PRICES
Th  expression on the right-hand-side of Equation (38) suggests an interpretation of th  utility 
coefficients piv  . They can be thought of as the the threshold pric s at which a consumer finds each 
fuel d sirable. When the price pi of a fuel exceeds the coefficient value, then the ratio in parentheses in 
Equation (38) is less than one, reflecting its lower desirability; when the price falls below the 
oefficient value, then th  ratio in parenth ses is greater than one, refl cting desirability. The 
coefficients piv   will be referred to as “reference prices” hencef rth.
The ref rence prices can be formulat d in a convenient way. Note that if all th t a consu er wanted out 
of a f el wer  th  ergy s rvices it provided, then she would s t her efer nce prices to s ale with th  
product of efficiency and energy density, ii  That is, prices in terms of energy ervices provided 
should be identical. However, there are many characteristics other than energy servic s that people look 
for in a fuel, suc  as convenience and the taste they impart to foods. Ev n for closely substitutable 
fuels, such as etha ol and petrol, peopl  may in some circumstances think one of them l ss attractive. 
For xample, biofu l  m y be thought less d sirable because they h ve a lower energy density than 
their fossil equivalents, and so require more frequent fill-ups, or because they re not seen as 
suff ciently “modern”. Alternatively, consumers may see biofuels as more attractive because they are 
seen as “green”. For this reason, refer nces prices are exp ct d to hav  a form like the following,
piv =i i ei v , (39)
where π is a constant t at is c mmon to all fuels and iv   reflects a relative preference for the fuel. 
When the pr fer nce term is positiv , t e ref rence price is higher than exp cted, and so th  fuel will be 
attractive at a higher tha  expected pric . The opposite is true when the preference term is negative.
The preference t m iv   can dep nd on ma y f ctors; however, the factors ar  xpected to change
systematically with incom  lev l. To take o e example, wh  roads are poor, m dern fuels that must be 
transported from cities to rura  areas  be less onven ent than tr ditional fuelwo d. To take another 
xa ple, people w th low and uncertai  incom s ay be l ss ab e to aff rd an expensive but efficient 
device, ev n if it sh uld sav  them oney in the long t rm. This is consistent with he concept of the 
“energy ladder” wher  hous holds move t rough a re atively pr di table sequence f fuels as their 
incom s increase, as though they were climbing a ladder [31,32].  Preferences can als  be expected to 
change ver time, inde ndent f inc me. Most importantly for this model, preferences for biofuels 
may cha g  over time as perceptions about biofuels chang . To apture the change in oth income and 
time, th  foll wing formula ion is u e  i he m del:
i=i 0t i ln y , (40)
The factors γi re incom  l st ities, whic  might be eith r positi  (for pref rred fuels, such as liquid
fuels) or ne ative (for l s att active fuel , uch as wood). A  av rag  inc me increase , the reference 
price ises for prefe r d fu ls, and declines for undesirable fuels, as households climb the energy ladder. 
From Equations (39) a d (40) it can b  seen that the parameters v  that determine the reference prices 
piv   and the coefficient C v   are the average incom , and time, v=y , t  .
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT DE AND FUNCTION
The ormalization coeffici  C y ,t   is determined by calculating the sum in Equation (35),
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of efficien  and en rgy density [𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]. That is, rices in t rms of ergy services provided should be 
id ntical. How v r, people look fo  many c arac eristics oth tha energy ervic s in a fu l, such as 
convenience and the taste they impart o fo ds. Even fo  closely substitutable fu ls, such as ethanol and 
petrol, people may i m  circumstanc  think on  of th m less attractive. For xample, biofuels may 
be thought le s desirable bec use hey have a lower n rgy densit than heir fossil equivalents, and so 
require m r  frequent fill-ups, o because they are n  s n as sufficiently ‘modern’. Alternatively, 
consumers m y se  biofu l as mor  attractive because hey ar  seen a  ‘gr en’. For this reason, 
references prices ar  xpect d t  have th  foll wing form:
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
where π is a const t that is common to all fuel nd 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) refl cts a relativ  pr ference for the fuel. 
When t e preferenc  term is positiv , the ref enc  price is higher than expected, and so the fuel will be 
attr ct ve at a higher than expected price. Th  opposite is true when the prefer nce term is negative.
The preferenc  term 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) can depend n many factors; however, the factors are expected to change 
syste atically with income level. To take one example, when roads are poor, modern fuels that must be 
transported from cities to rural areas can be less convenient than traditional fue wood. To take another 
ex mpl , people with ow and uncertain i comes m y be less able to afford an xp nsive but efficient 
device, even if it should save them mon y in the long term. This is consistent with the concept of the 
‘energy ladder’, where households move through a relatively predictable s quence of fuels as their 
incomes increase (Hosier 1993, 2004). Preferences can also be expected to change over time, 
indepe dent of income. Most importantly for this model, preferences for biofuels ay change over 
time s perceptions about biofuels change. To capture t e change in bot  inc me and time, the 
following formul tio  is us d in the model:
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, (40)
The factors γi are income elasticities, which might be either positive (for preferred fuels, such as liquid 
fuels) or negative (for less attractive fuels, such as wood). As average income increases, the reference 
price rises for preferred fuels and d clines for undesirable fuels, as households climb the energy ladder. 
From equations 39 and 40 it can be seen hat aver ge incom [?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦], and time [t] are the parameters ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 that 
determine the ref r ce prices ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) a d the coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣), so that ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 = (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡).
4.4. Multinomial logit demand function
Th  normalisation coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) is determined by calculating the sum in Equation 35,
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)� �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 , (41)
where the income and time dependence of the reference prices and the normalization coefficient are 
shown explicitly. Solving for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) and substituting into Equation 38 gives an expression for fuel 
consu ption,
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
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𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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of efficiency and energy d nsity [𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]. That is, price in t ms of nergy services provide  should be 
ide tical. However, e pl  look for m ny har cteristi s ot er than energy services in  fuel, such as 
c nvenience and the aste they impar  t  foods. Even for c o ely substitutabl  fuels, such as thanol and 
petrol, people may in some circu stanc s think one of them less attractive. For example, biofuels may 
b  th ught less desirable b caus  t ey have  lower e ergy ensity than their fossil equivalents and so 
require more frequent fi l-ups,  because they are not seen as sufficiently ‘mode n’. Alternatively, 
consumers may se  biofuels as more at r ct ve because they ar  ee  as ‘green’. For this reason, 
ref r ces prices are xpected to hav  the following form:
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
whe  π is a co ta that is com on to all fuels and 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) refl cts a r lativ  pref r nce for the fuel. 
When the pref r nce t rm is positive, the ref r nce pric  is higher than xp cted, and so the fuel will be 
attra tiv  at a higher than expected pr ce. The opposite is true when the pr f r nce term is negative.
The pref nce t rm 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) can depend  many factors; however, th  f ctors ar  xp cted o change 
systematically with inc me l vel. To take ne xampl , w e roa s ar  poor, odern fuels that must be 
tran p rted from cities to rural r s can be less conve ient tha  tr dition l fuelwood. To take ano her 
exa pl , people with low and unc rta n incom s m y be l s  abl  to afford an expensive but efficient 
device, e  if it sh uld av  the oney in th long term. Th s is con istent with the conc pt of the 
‘energy ladder’, wher ouseh lds mo  through  relatively pr dictab e sequ nce of fuels as their 
incom s incr ase (Hosier 1993, 2004). Pref r nces can also be xpected to change ver time, 
i depend n  f income. ost importantly for this model, pref r nces for biofuels may change over 
 time, the 
foll wing f rmulation is u d in the mod l:
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, (40)
T factor  γi ar  income l s citi s, which might be ith r positiv  (f r pref rred fuels, such as liquid 
fuel ) r neg tive (f r l s t r ctive fuels, such s w od). As v rage income ncreases, the ref r nce 
price ris s for pref rred fuels and cli es for und sirable fuels, as hous holds climb the nergy ladder. 
F om quations 39 a d 40 it c n be seen that a erage income [?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦], and time [t] a e the par met rs ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 that 
d t rmine the r f nc  pr ces ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) and the coeffi i t 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣), so that ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 = (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡).
4. . Multinomial logit demand function
The normalisation co fficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) is d t rmined by calculating the sum in Equation 35,
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)� �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
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𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 , (41)
wher  the ncome and time depende ce of the ref r nce prices and the normalization coefficient are 
shown explicitly. Solving for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) and substituting into Equation 38 gives an expression for fuel 
consumption,
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
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of efficiency and energy density [𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]. That is, prices in terms of en rgy services provided sh uld b  
identical. However, people look for many charact istics oth r han n rgy service  in a fu l, such s 
convenience and the taste they impart to foods. Even f r cl sely substitutabl  fuel , such as etha l and
etrol, peopl  may in some circumstances th k on  of them e s attractiv . For xample, biofuels m y 
be thought less desirabl  because they h v  a low r en rgy d nsity tha  their fossil q ival nts, d s
require more frequent fill-ups, or because they are n t s n as sufficiently ‘modern’. Al er atively, 
consumers may see biofuels as more attractive because they ar  se  a  ‘green’. For this r a n, 
references prices are expected to have the following form:
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
where π is a constant that is omm  to all fuels and 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) refl cts a relativ  prefere c  fo  the fuel. 
When th  prefer ce t rm is pos tive, the refer ce price is hig er than exp cte , and so the fu l will b  
att active at a higher than ex ct d price. The opposite is true when the preference term is negative.
The preference term 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) can d pend on many fact rs; h wever, e factors r  exp cted to ch ng  
systematically with income level. T  take one ex m le, when road  are p or, mod rn fuels that must b  
transported from cities t  rural r as can b  l ss c e ie t than tra ition l fuelw od. To take another 
example, people with low an  un rtain incomes may be le s able to afford an expensiv  but efficie t 
device, even if it should save them money in the lo  term. This is consistent ith the nc pt of th  
‘energy ladder’, where households mov  t rough a relatively predictable s quence of fuels as th ir 
incomes increas  (Hosier 1993, 2004). Prefer nces ca  also be expected t  change ver time, 
independent of income. Most i port tly or this odel, p eferenc s for i f ls m y change over 
time as perc pt s about biofuels change. To capture the change in both incom  and tim , th  
following formulation is used in th  m del:
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, (40)
The factors γi ar  income lasticities, which might be eith r pos tive (for prefe red fuels, such as liquid 
fuels) or negativ  (for l ss attractive fuels, su h as wood). As averag  income i creases, the r fer nce 
price rises for preferred fuels and decline  for undesirable fuels, as households climb the energy ladd r. 
From ation  39 nd 40 it can be see  th t av rag  i come [?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦], a d ti [t] are the param ers ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 that 
determi e th  referenc  price ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) and the coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣), so t ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 = (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡).
4.4. Multinomial logit demand function
The normalisation coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) is determined by calculating the sum in Equation 35,
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)� �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�
11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 , (41)
where the inco e and time dependence of the refere ce ri es and the normalization coefficient are 
shown explicitly. Solving for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) and substituting in o Equation 38 gives an expression for fuel 
consumption,
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �
−1
�
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�
11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (42)
4.4 Multinomial logit demand function
The normalisation coefficient 
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of efficiency and ergy density [𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]. Tha is, p ices in terms o  nergy servic s provided should be
ident cal. H ev r, eopl look for ma y racteristics oth r than ergy servi es in a fuel, uch as 
conveni ce and th  t ste h y impar  t ds. Even for close y s b tit table fuels, such s ethanol and 
trol, pe pl may in om  circums nces think one of them less attr ctiv . For exa ple, biofuels may 
b hought less desirable b cause th y have a lower energy d nsity than their fos il equivalents, and so 
require mor frequent f ll-ups, or becaus  they are not seen as sufficiently ‘mod rn’. Alternatively, 
consu ers m y e biofu ls s more ttrac ive bec use th y ar se n as ‘gre n’. For this r ason, 
ref re ces rices are e p cte  t a  the followi g form:
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
where π is a nstant that is common to all fuels and 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) reflects a r lative preference for the fuel. 
When th  preference t rm is positiv , the ref rence price is higher than exp cted, and so the fuel will be 
att active at a higher than xpected rice. Th  opposite is tru  when th  preference term is negative.
Th  preference term 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) c  depend on many factors; h wever, the fa tors are expected to change 
systemati ally with income l v l. To tak  one ex mple, when oa s are poor, modern fuels that must be 
tr n ported fro  citi to rural reas can be less conv nient t an traditional fuelw od. To take another 
xampl , peopl ith l  d uncertain incomes m y be less able to afford an expensive but efficient 
device, even if i  should save em m ney in t e ong erm. This is consiste t with the concept of the 
‘energy ladd r’, w ere househ lds move through a r lativ ly predi able s quence of fuels as their 
incomes ncreas  (H sier 1993, 2004). Preferences can also be expect d to change over time, 
i dependent f i c me. Most importantly for this model, preferences for biofuels may change over 
time as perceptions ab ut biofuels change. To capture the change in both incom and time, the 
fol owi g formulation is us d in the model:
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, (40)
The factors γi re income elasticities, whic  might be either positive ( or preferred f els, such as liquid 
fuels) negative (for l s attra tive fuels, such s wood). As averag  income increas s, the reference 
price rises or preferr d fu ls and declines for undesirable fuels, as hous holds climb th  energy ladder. 
From equati ns 39 and 40 i  c n b  s e  that average inco ?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦], and time [t] ar  the parameters ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 that 
d termi th  r ference p i s ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) a d he coeffici n 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣), so that ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 = (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡).
4.4. Multino ial logit demand function
The normalisation coeffi 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) is determi ed by calculating the sum in Equation 35,
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�
11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 , (41)
wh re the income and time d p ndence of th  reference prices nd he normalization coefficient are 
shown xplicitly. Solvi g for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) and substituti g into Equation 38 gives an expression for fuel 
consumpt on,
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �
−1
�
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�
11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (42)
  determined 
by calc lating the sum in Equation 35,
𝑆𝑆 = � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
�
1
𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
= ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼−1 � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣) �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ � )𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼. (38)
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖ln?¯?𝑦, (40)
𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦, 𝑡𝑡)� �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
, (41)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 � �?ˆ?𝑝𝑗𝑗(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
�
−1
�
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼. (42)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖. (43)
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
� 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
, (44)
 
      (41)
where the income and time depe de ce of the
reference prices and the n rmalisation coefficient are 
shown explicitly. Solving for 
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of efficiency and energy density [𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]. That is, prices in terms of energy services provided should be 
identical. However, people look for many characteristics other than energy services in a fuel, such as 
c veni n  and the t te they part to foods. Even for closely substitutable fuels, such as et anol and 
petrol, people may i  s me circumsta es think one of them less attractive. For example, biofuels may 
be thought less desirable becaus  t y have a lower energy density than their fossil equivale ts, and so 
require mor  fr quent fill-ups, or because they are not seen as sufficiently ‘modern’. Alternatively, 
consumers m y see biofuels as more attractive because they are seen as ‘green’. For this reason, 
references prices are expect d to have the following form:
?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
where π is a constant that is common to all fuels and 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) reflects a relative preference for the fuel. 
When the preference t rm is positive, the reference price is higher than expected, and so the fuel will be 
attractive at a higher than expected price. The opposite is true when the preference term is negative.
The prefer nce term 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) can d pend on many factors; however, the factors are expected to change 
syste atically with inco e l vel. To take one example, when roads are poor, modern fuels that must be 
transp rted from citi s to rural areas can be less convenient than traditional fuelwood. To take another 
exa ple, p ople with low and uncertain incomes m y be less able to afford an expensive but efficient 
device, even if it should save them mon y in the long t rm. Thi  is consistent with the concept of the 
‘en rgy ladder’, where household mov  through a relatively pr dict ble sequ nce of fu ls as th ir 
incom s rease (Hosi r 1993, 2004). Preference  can also b  expected o change over time, 
i dependent f i o . Most importantly for this model, pref rences for biofuels may c ng  over 
time s pe ceptions about b ofuels change. To apture the change in both inco e and time, the 
following formulatio  is used in the model:
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, (40)
The factors γi are income elasticities, which might be either positive (for preferred fuels, such as liquid 
fuels) or neg t ve (for l ss attractive fuels, such as wood). As average income incre ses, the reference 
price rises for preferred fuels and declines for undesirable fuels, as households climb the energy ladder. 
From equations 39 and 40 it can be seen that average income [?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦], and time [t] are the parameters ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 that 
determine the reference prices ?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣) and the coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣), so that ?⃗?𝑣𝑣𝑣 = (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡).
4.4. Multinomial logit demand function
The n rmalisation coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) is determined by calculating the sum in Equation 35,
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�
11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 , (41)
where the income and time dependence of the reference prices and the normalization coefficient are 
shown explicitly. Solving for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) and substituting into Equation 38 gives an expression for fuel 
consumption,
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 �
−1
�
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�
11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 . (42)
 an  substituting 
into Equation 38 gives an expression for fuel 
consumption,
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𝑆𝑆 = � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
�
1
𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
= ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼−1 � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣) �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ � )𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼. (38)
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖ln?¯?𝑦, (40)
𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦, 𝑡𝑡)� �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
, (41)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 � �?ˆ?𝑝𝑗𝑗(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
�
−1
�
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼. (42)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖. (43)
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
� 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
, (44)
 (42)
This expression predicts that energy expenditure shares 
[si] will follow a multinomial logit model (Kennedy 
2003), where expenditure shares are linked to fuel 
consumption [xi] via
𝑆𝑆 = � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
�
1
𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
= ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼−1 � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣) �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ � )𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼. (38)
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖ln?¯?𝑦, (40)
𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦, 𝑡𝑡)� �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
, (41)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 � �?ˆ?𝑝𝑗𝑗(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
�
−1
�
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼. (42)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖. (43)
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
� 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
, (44)
     (43)
In the multinomial logit model,
𝑆𝑆 = � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
�
1
𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆(𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)− ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 ), (36)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
= ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ )
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼−1 � ?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1 �1𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 0. (37)
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶(?⃗?𝑣) �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ � )𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 � 11−𝛼𝛼. (38)
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?⃗?𝑣) = 𝜋𝜋𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣�⃗ ), (39)
𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖ln?¯?𝑦, (40)
𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦) = 𝐶𝐶(?¯?𝑦, 𝑡𝑡)� �?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖=1
, (41)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 � �?ˆ?𝑝𝑗𝑗(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � 11−𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
�
−1
�
?ˆ?𝑝𝑖𝑖(?¯?𝑦,𝑡𝑡)
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
�
1
1−𝛼𝛼. (42)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖. (43)
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖
� 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
, (44)    (44)
where the variables 
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This expression predicts that energy expenditure shares [si] will follow a multinomial logit model 
(Kennedy 2003), where expenditure shares are linked to fuel consumption [xi] via
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (43)
In the multinomial logit model,
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
� 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 , (44)
wher  the varia l  [zi] depend on prices, average income and time. Substituting for the reference 
prices using equations 39 and 40, the expression for the variables zi can be shown to be
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + const. (45)
In the model, an auxiliary Excel workbook estimates the parameters in Equation 45 using data on fuel 
shares, fuel prices and device efficiencies in rural and urban areas. The parameters are estimated using 
Excel’s Solver facility. For both household and transport fuels, the solver is run twice: in the first run 
the substitutability parameter α is set equal to 0.5; in the second run it is left free. This two-pass 
strategy avoids some problems when α = 1 in Equation 45.
4.5. Implementing a mandatory blend ratio
Under a mandatory blend ratio, whenever a fossil fuel is consumed, a proportional amount of an 
equivalent biofuel must also be consumed. It is permissible for more of the biofuel to be consumed, but 
not less. If the blend ratio is rblend, then the relationship between biofuel consumption [xB] and fossil 
fuel consumption [xF] is
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ≥
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟blend1−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟blend 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 . (46)
This is handled in the model by replacing the fossil fuel [F] with a blend, at the mandatory blend ratio 
in the demand function. The equivalent to Equation 45 for the blended fuel is
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧blend = 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝blend𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂blend�+ 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + const. (47)
That is, the price and energy density are calculated by averaging with the blending fraction, but the 
demand parameters γF and 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) and the device efficiency 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 are those of the corresponding fossil 
fuel. Consumption of the equivalent fossil fuel and biofuel are then calculated as
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟blend) 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠blend (48a)
and
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟blend 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠blend + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵. (48b)
This ensures that demand for the biofuel is at least at the level given by the mandatory blending target, 
but may also be higher if there is demand for the biofuel independent of the blending target.
 d on prices, average 
income and time. Substituti g for the reference prices 
using equations 39 and 40, the expression for the 
variables 
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B y =C  y ,t ∑
i=1
M  pi y , t pi  11− piii , (41)
where the income and time dependence of the reference prices and the normalization coefficient are 
shown explicitly. Solving for C y ,t   and substituting into Equation (38) gives an expression for fuel 
consumption,
xi= B yii [∑j=1M  p j y , t p j  11− p jii ]−1 piy , t pi  11− . (42)
This expression predicts that energy expenditure shares si will follow a multinomial logit model [33], 
where expenditure shares are linked to fuel consumption xi via
xi= B ypi si . (43)
In the multinomial logit model,
si= e
z i
∑ j=1M ez j , (44)
where the variables zi depend on prices, average income, and time. Substituting for the reference prices 
using Equations (39) and (40), the expression for the variables zi can be shown to be
z = i1− ln y−

1− ln piii  11−i 0t const . (45)
In the model, an auxiliary Excel workbook stimates the parameters in Equation (45) using data on fuel 
shares, fuel prices, and device efficiencies in rural and urban areas. The parameters are estimated using 
Excel’s Solver facility. For both household and transport fuels the solver is run twice: in the first run 
the substitutability parameter α is set equal to 0.5. In the second run it is left free. This two-pass 
strategy avoids some problems when α = 1 in Equation (45).
IMPLEMENTING A MANDATORY BLEND RATIO
Under a mandatory blend ratio, whenever a fossil fuel is consumed, a proportional amount of an 
equivalent biofuel must also be consumed. It is permissable for more of the biofuel to be consumed, but 
not less. If the blend ratio is rblend, then the relationship between biofuel consumption xB and fossil fuel 
consumption xF, is
x B r blend1−rblend xF . (46)
This is handled in the model by replacing the fossil fuel F with a blend at the mandatory blend ratio in 
the demand function. The equivalent to Equation (45) for the blended fuel is
z blend= F1− ln y−

1− ln pblendF blend  11−F 0t const . (47)
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𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (45)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 ≥
𝑟𝑟blend
1−𝑟𝑟blend
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹. (46)
𝑧𝑧blend = 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝blend𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝜂𝜂blend�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (47)
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝑟𝑟blend) 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend (48a)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑟blend 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend + 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵. (48b)
producer price = export share × international price + (1 – export share) × domestic price. (49)
𝑐𝑐prod ≡ 𝑐𝑐recur +� 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑣𝑣by. (50)
adjusted FOB price + freight, wharfage, etc. = landed price
+ taxes and levies =  domestic price
+ domestic subsidies  =  domestic producer price
adjusted FOB price + export taxes + export subsidies = international producer price. (51)
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾,𝐹𝐹,𝑝𝑝)
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦) , (52)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼(𝑎𝑎) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿. (53)
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1−𝑟𝑟blend
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹. (46)
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𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝑟𝑟blend) 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend (48a)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑟blend 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend + 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵. (48b)
producer price = export share × international price + (1 – export share) × domestic price. (49)
𝑐𝑐prod ≡ 𝑐𝑐recur +� 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑣𝑣by. (50)
adjusted FOB price + freight, wharfage, etc. = landed price
+ taxes and levies =  domestic price
+ domestic subsidies  =  domestic producer price
adjusted FOB price + export taxes + export subsidies = international producer price. (51)
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾,𝐹𝐹,𝑝𝑝)
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦) , (52)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼(𝑎𝑎) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿. (53)
   (45)
In the model, an auxiliary Excel workbook estima es 
he parameters in Equation 45 using data on fuel 
shares, fu l ices and device efficiencies in rural and 
urban areas. The parameters are estimated using Excel’s 
Solver facility. For both household and transport 
fuels, the solver is run twice: in the first run the 
substitutability parameter a  is set equal to 0.5; in the 
second run it is left free. This two-pass strategy avoids 
some problems when 1=a  in Equation 45.
4.5 Implementing a mandatory 
blend ratio
Under a mandatory blend ratio, whenever a fossil fuel 
is consumed, a proportional amount of an equivalent 
biofuel must also be consumed. It is permissible for more 
of the biofuel to be consumed, but not less. If the blend 
ratio is 
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B y =C  y ,t ∑
i=1
M  pi y , t pi  11− piii , (41)
where the income and time dependence of the reference prices and the normalization coefficient are 
shown explicitly. Solving for C y ,t   and substituting into Equation (38) gives an expression for fuel 
consumption,
xi= B yii [∑j=1M  p j y , t p j  11− p jii ]−1 piy , t pi  11− . (42)
This expression predicts that energy expenditure shares si will follow a multinomial logit model [33], 
where expenditure shares are linked to fuel consumption xi via
xi= B ypi si . (43)
In the multinomial logit model,
si= e
z i
∑ j=1M ez j , (44)
where the variables zi depend on prices, average income, and time. Substituting for the reference prices 
using Equations (39) and (40), the expression for the variables zi can be shown to be
zi= i1− ln y−

1− ln piii  11−i 0t const . (45)
In the model, an auxiliary Excel workbook estimates the parameters in Equation (45) using data on fuel 
shares, fuel prices, and device efficiencies in rural and urban areas. The parameters are estimated using 
Excel’s Solver facility. For both household and transport fuels the solver is run twice: in the first run 
the substitutability parameter α is set equal to 0.5. In the second run it is left free. This two-pass 
strategy avoids some problems when α = 1 in Equation (45).
IMPLEMENTING A MANDATORY BLEND RATIO
Under a mandatory blend ratio, whenever a fossil fuel is con umed, a proportional amount of an 
equivalent biofuel must also be consumed. It is permissable for mor  of the biofuel to be consumed, but 
not less. If the blend ratio rblend, then the relationship between biofuel consumption xB and fossil fuel 
consumption xF, is
x B r blend1−rblend xF . (46)
This is handled in the model by replacing the fossil fuel F with a blend at the mandatory blend ratio in 
the demand function. The equivalent to Equation (45) for the blended fuel is
z blend= F1− ln y−

1− ln pblendF blend  11−F 0t const . (47)
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This expression predicts that energy expenditure shares [si] will follow a multinomial logit model 
(Kennedy 2003), where expenditure shares are linked to fuel consumption [xi] via
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (43)
In the multinomial logit model,
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
� 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 , (44)
where the variables [zi] depend on prices, average income and time. Substituting for the reference 
prices using equations 39 and 40, the expression for the variables zi can be shown to be
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + const. (45)
In the model, an auxiliary Excel workbook estimates the parameters in Equation 45 using data on fuel 
shares, fuel prices and device efficiencies in rural and urban areas. The parameters are stimated sing 
Excel’s Solver facility. For both household and transport fuels, the solver is run twice: in the first run 
the substitutability parameter α is set equal to 0.5; in the second run it is left fr e. Thi  two-p ss 
strategy avoids some problems when α = 1 in Equation 45.
4.5. Implementing a mandatory blend ratio
Under a mandatory blend ratio, whenever a fossil fuel s co sumed, a proporti nal am nt f an 
equivalent biofuel must also be consumed. It is permissible for more of the biofuel to b  consumed, but
not less. If the blend ratio is rblend, then the relationship betwee  biofuel cons  [xB] and fossil 
fuel consumption [xF] is
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ≥
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟blend1−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟blend 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 . (46)
This is handled in the model by replaci g the fossil fuel [F] with a blend, at the mandatory blend ratio 
in the demand function. The equivalent to Equation 45 for the blended fuel is
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧blend = 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝blend𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂blend�+ 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + const. (47)
That is, the price and energy density are calculated by averaging with the blending fraction, but the 
demand parameters γF and 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) and the device efficiency 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 are those of the corresponding fossil 
fuel. Consumption of the equivalent fossil fuel and biofuel are then calculated as
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟blend) 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠blend (48a)
and
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟blend 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠blend + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵. (48b)
This ensures that d mand for the biofuel is at least at the level given by the mandatory blending target, 
but may also be high r if there is demand for the biofuel independent f the blending target.
 f ssil fuel consumption 
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This expression predicts that energy expenditure shares [si] will follow a multinomial logit model 
(Kennedy 2003), where expenditure shares are linked to fuel consumption [xi] via
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (43)
In the multinomial logit model,
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
� 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 , (44)
where th  variables [zi] depend on prices, averag  income and time. Substituting for the reference 
prices using equations 39 and 40, the expression for the variables zi can be shown to be
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + const. (45)
In the model, an auxiliary Excel workbook estimates the parameters in Equation 45 using data on fuel 
sh r , fuel p ices and device efficiencie  in rural a d rban areas. The parameters are estimated using 
Excel’s Solver facility. For both household and transport fuels, the solver is run twice: in the first run 
the substitutability parameter α is set qual to 0.5; in the second run it is left free. This two-pass 
strategy avoids some probl ms when α = 1 in Equation 45.
4.5. Implementing a mandatory blend ratio
Under a mandatory blend ratio, whenever a f ssil fuel is consumed, a proportional amount of an 
quivalent biofuel must also be consumed. It is permissible for more of the biofuel to be consumed, but 
n t less. If he lend ratio is rblend, hen the relationship between biofuel consumption [xB] and fossil 
fuel consu ti [xF] is
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ≥
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟blend1−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟blend 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 . (46)
This is handled in the model by replacing the fossil fuel [F] with a blend, at the mandatory blend ratio 
in the demand function. The equivalent to Equation 45 for the blended fuel is
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧blend = 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝blend𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂blend�+ 11−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + const. (47)
That is, the price and energy density are calculated by averaging with the blending fraction, but the 
demand parameters γF and 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) and the device efficiency 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 are those of the corresponding fossil 
fuel. Consumption of the equivalent fossil fuel and biofuel are then calculated as
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟blend) 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠blend (48a)
and
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟blend 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠blend + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵. (48b)
This ensur s that demand for the biofuel is at least at the level given by the mandatory blending target, 
but may also be higher if there is demand for the biofuel independent of the blending target.
 
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (45)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 ≥
𝑟𝑟blend
1−𝑟𝑟blend
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹. (46)
𝑧𝑧blend = 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝blend𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝜂𝜂blend�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (47)
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝑟𝑟blend) 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend (48a)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑟blend 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend + 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵. (48b)
producer price = export share × international price + (1 – export share) × domestic price. (49)
𝑐𝑐prod ≡ 𝑐𝑐recur +� 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑣𝑣by. (50)
adjusted FOB price + freight, wharfage, etc. = landed price
+ taxes and levies =  domestic price
+ domestic subsidies  =  domestic producer price
adjusted FOB price + export taxes + export subsidies = international producer price. (51)
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾,𝐹𝐹,𝑝𝑝)
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦) , (52)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼(𝑎𝑎) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿. (53)
    (46)
This is handled in the model by replacing the fossil fuel 
[F] with a blend, at the mandatory blend ratio in the 
demand function. The equivalent to Equation 45 for the 
blended fuel is
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (45)
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𝑟𝑟blend
1−𝑟𝑟blend
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹. (46)
𝑧𝑧blend = 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝blend𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝜂𝜂blend�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (47)
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝑟𝑟blend) 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend (48a)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑟blend 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend + 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵. (48b)
producer price = export share × international price + (1 – export share) × domestic price. (4 )
𝑐𝑐prod ≡ 𝑐𝑐recur +� 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑣𝑣by. (50)
adjusted FOB price + freight, wharfage, etc. = landed price
+ taxes and levies =  domestic price
+ domestic subsidies  =  do estic p oducer pr ce
adjusted FOB price + export taxes + export subsidies = international producer price. (51)
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾,𝐹𝐹,𝑝𝑝)
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦) , (52)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼(𝑎𝑎) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿. (53)
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾,𝐹𝐹,𝑝𝑝)
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦) , (52)
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼(𝑎𝑎) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿. (53)
   (47)
That is, the price and energy density are calculated by 
averaging with the blending fraction, but the demand 
parameters 
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That is, the price and energy density are calculat  by averaging with the blending fraction, but the 
demand para  γF and  F 0t   and the device efficiency F  are those of the corresponding fossil 
fuel. Consumption of the equivalent fossil fuel and biofuel are then calculated as
x F=1−rblend  B ypblend sblend (48a)
and
x B=rblend B y pblend s blend
B y
pB s B . (48b)
T is e sures that demand for the bi uel is at least at the level given by the mandatory blending target, 
but may also be higher if there is demand for the biofuel independent of the blending target.
Prod ction and prices
Prices are determined within a dynamic equilibrium-seeking framework. In this equilibrium-seeking 
model, at any given time there are potentially distinct prices for each type of consumer – rural, urban, 
and international. Within the country, prices for each consumer category can be affected by transport 
costs, local demand pat erns, taxes, and subsidies. International prices are determined, fundamentally, 
by the fr e on-board (FOB) price f fuels as determ ned in international markets, but are further 
i fluenced by costs at port, dome tic taxes, subsidies, and tariffs.
Feedstock producers respond to the domestic price. Biofuel producers respond to an average of 
international and domestic prices, based on the share of total biofuel production that is exported rather 
han consumed domestically. That is,
producer price = export share × int’l price + (1 – export share) × domestic price. (49)
Producers respond to prices in two ways. First, sufficiently high expected profit (which depend on 
prices) drives investment, leading to increased production. Second, if prices fall below operating costs, 
then producers reduce their production. They compare the production cost, calculated as
cprod≡crecur∑
i=1
N pi
i−vby (50)
to the producer price, pprod, and, if the price falls sufficiently far below production costs, they reduce 
production X to a fraction of the maximum, following the curve in Figure 2.
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but may also be higher if there is demand for the biofuel independent of the blending target.
Production and prices
Prices are determined within a dynamic equilibrium-seeking framework. In this equilibrium-seeking 
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are those of the corr spondi g il fuel. C nsumption 
of the equivalent fossil fuel and biofuel are then 
calculated as
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (45)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 ≥
𝑟𝑟blend
1−𝑟𝑟blend
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹. (46)
𝑧𝑧blend = 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝blend𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝜂𝜂blend�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (47)
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝑟𝑟blend) 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝ble d 𝑠𝑠blend (48a)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑟blend 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝 lend 𝑠𝑠blend + 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵. (48b)
producer price = export share × international price + (1 – export share) × domestic price. (49)
𝑐𝑐prod ≡ 𝑐𝑐recur +� 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑣𝑣by. (50)
adjusted FOB price + freight, wharfage, etc. = landed price
+ taxes and levies =  domestic pric
+ domestic subsidies  =  domestic p oducer price
adjusted FOB price + export taxes + export subsidies = international producer pr c . (51)
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾,𝐹𝐹,𝑝𝑝)
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦) , (52)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼(𝑎𝑎) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿. (53)
   (48a)
and
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡 + const. (45)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 ≥
𝑟𝑟blend
1−𝑟𝑟blend
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹. (46)
𝑧𝑧blend = 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝blend𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝜂𝜂blend�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (47)
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝑟𝑟blend) 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend (48a)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑟blend 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend + 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵. (48b)
producer price = export share × international price + (1 – export share) × domestic price. (49)
𝑐𝑐prod ≡ 𝑐𝑐recur +� 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑣𝑣by. (50)
adjusted FOB price + freight, wharfage, etc. = landed price
+ taxes and levies =  domestic price
+ domestic subsidies  =  domestic producer price
adjusted FOB price + export taxes + export subsidies = international producer price. (51)
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾,𝐹𝐹,𝑝𝑝)
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦) , (52)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼(𝑎𝑎) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿. (53)
  (48b)
This ensures that demand for the biofuel is at least at 
the level given by the mandatory blending target, but 
may also be h gher if there is demand for the biofuel 
independent of the blending target.
5. Production and prices
For vertically integrated operations, production as a 
share of the maximum is determined by production 
costs relative to biofuel price. In the model, the 
capital flowing to feedstock production and to 
biofuel production in vertically integrated operations 
is tracked separately from investments made in 
strictly feedstock or strictly biofuel operations. The 
model distinguishes between vertically integrated 
and independent fuel and feedstock operations 
by the capital stock invested in each type of 
operation. Because capital stock is removed through 
depreciation, this accounts for the withdrawal of 
vertically integrated or independent operations from 
the market.
5.1 International fuel prices
Fossil fuel prices are set exogenously, as the price 
that prevails in international markets, the FOB 
price. It is assumed that at an international level, 
biofuels receive a premium or a penalty relative to the 
equivalent fossil fuel. For example, ethanol has about 
65% of the energy density of petrol, and so the FOB 
price of ethanol in the model is 65% of the price of 
petrol, multiplied by a markup (or markdown) that 
captures the preference on the international market 
for biofuels compared to fossil fuels. This gives an 
Figure 2. Production response to producer price 
and costs
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Prices are determined within a dynamic equilibrium-
seeking framework. In this equilibrium-seeking 
model, at any given time, there are potentially 
distinct prices for each type of consumer – rural, 
urban and international. Within the country, 
prices for each consumer category can be affected 
by transport costs, local demand patterns, taxes 
and subsidies. International prices are determined, 
fundamentally, by the free on-board (FOB) price of 
fuels as determined in international markets, but are 
further influenced by costs at port, domestic taxes, 
subsidies and tariffs.
Feedstock producers respond to the domestic 
price. Biofuel producers respond to an average of 
international and domestic prices, based on the share 
of total biofuel production that is exported rather 
than consumed domestically. That is,
producer price = export share ×  
international price + (1 – export share) ×  
domestic price      (49)
Producers respond to prices in two ways. First, 
sufficiently high expected profit (which depends 
on prices) drives investment, leading to increased 
production. Second, if prices fall below operating 
costs, then producers reduce their production. They 
compare the producer price 
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5. Production and prices
Prices are determined within a dynamic equilibrium-seeking framework. In this equilibrium-seeking 
model, at any given time, there are potentially distinct prices for each type of consumer – rural, urban 
and international. Within the country, prices for each consumer category can be affected by transport 
costs, local demand patterns, taxes and subsidies. International prices are determined, fundamentally,
by the free on-board (FOB) price of fuels as determined in international markets, but are further 
influenced by costs at port, domestic taxes, subsidies and tariffs.
Feedstock producers respond to the domestic price. Biofuel producers respond to an average of 
international and domestic prices, based on the share of total biofuel production that is exported rather 
than consumed domestically. That is,
producer price = export share × international price + (1 – export share) × domestic price. (49)
Producers respond to prices in two ways. First, sufficiently high expected profit (which depends on
prices) drives investment, leading to increased pr ductio . Second, if prices fall below perating costs, 
then producers reduce their production. They compare the producer pri [pprod] to the production cost, 
calculated as
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐prod ≡ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐recur +� 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣by. (50)
If the price falls sufficiently far below production costs, they reduce production [X] to a fraction of the 
maximum, following the curve in Figure 2.
The producer price for feedstocks is set to the domestic producer price. For biofuels, it is set to the 
international producer price, partly because of practical limitations of the model, but mainly because 
the biofuel market is directed primarily at an external market.
Figure 2: Production response to producer price and 
costs
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cost, calculated as
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producer price = export share × international price + (1 – export share) × domestic price. (49)
𝑐𝑐prod ≡ 𝑐𝑐recur +� 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑣𝑣by. (50)
adjusted FOB price + freight, wharfage, etc. = landed price
+ taxes and levies =  domestic price
+ domestic subsidies  =  domestic producer price
adjusted FOB price + export taxes + export subsidies = international producer price. (51)
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾,𝐹𝐹,𝑝𝑝)
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦) , (52)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼(𝑎𝑎) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿. (53)
  (50)
If the price falls sufficiently far below production 
costs, they reduce production [X] to a fraction of the 
maximum, following the curve in Figure 2.
The producer price for feedstocks is set to the 
domestic producer price. For biofuels, it is set to 
the international producer price, partly because 
of practical limitations of the model, but mainly 
because the biofuel market is directed primarily at an 
external market.
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adjusted FOB price. For internationally traded 
fuels, domestic and international producer prices are 
calculated as
adjusted FOB price + freight, wharfage, etc. = 
landed price
 + taxes and levies = domestic price
 + domestic subsidies = domestic producer price
adjusted FOB price + export taxes + export subsidies 
= international producer price.   (51)
5.2 Domestic fuel prices
Domestic fuel prices are calculated with an 
equilibrium-seeking algorithm. Because most of the 
cross-fuel and cross-business model interactions are 
captured either by the investment or demand models 
described in previous sections, a simplified notation is 
used in this section to explain the algorithm. In this 
simplified notation most subscripts are suppressed.
Once a biofuel producing facility has been 
established, its maximum capacity is limited either 
by the availability of capital [K] or feedstock [F]. As 
discussed above, if the price [p] falls too low, then it 
will run at a fraction of its maximum capacity, so the 
supply of biofuel [S(K, F, p)] depends on K, F, and 
p. The demand [D(p, y)] is calculated as described in 
Section 4, based on prices [p] and income [y]. Capital 
[K] is lost from depreciation, with a coefficient d6 @ 
and is increased by investment [I(p)], where the 
amount of investment depends on prevailing prices.
Prices adjust upward or downward depending 
on whether demand is greater than or less than 
supply (Quandt 1988, Ferguson 1998, Hallegatte 
et al. 2008),
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (45)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 ≥
𝑟𝑟blend
1−𝑟𝑟blend
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹. (46)
𝑧𝑧blend = 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝blend𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝜂𝜂blend�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (47)
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝑟𝑟blend) 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend (48a)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑟blend 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend + 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵. (48b)
producer price = export share × international price + (1 – export share) × domestic price. (49)
𝑐𝑐prod ≡ 𝑐𝑐recur +� 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑣𝑣by. (50)
adjusted FOB price + freight, wharfage, etc. = landed price
+ taxes and levies =  domestic price
+ domestic subsidies  =  domestic producer price
adjusted FOB price + export taxes + export subsidies = international producer price. (51)
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾,𝐹𝐹,𝑝𝑝)
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦) , (52)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼(𝑎𝑎) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿. (53)
   (52)
where a, which has units of inverse time, is a constant 
that relates excess demand to changes in price. The 
stock of capital changes due to investment and 
depreciation,
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (45)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 ≥
𝑟𝑟blend
1−𝑟𝑟blend
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹. (46)
𝑧𝑧blend = 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹1−𝛼𝛼 ln?¯?𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 ln � 𝑝𝑝blend𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹𝜂𝜂blend�+ 11−𝛼𝛼 𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹0(𝑡𝑡) + const. (47)
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝑟𝑟blend) 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend (48a)
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑟blend 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝blend 𝑠𝑠blend + 𝐵𝐵(?¯?𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵. (48b)
producer price = export share × international price + (1 – export share) × domestic price. (49)
𝑐𝑐prod ≡ 𝑐𝑐recur +� 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑣𝑣by. (50)
adjusted FOB price + freight, wharfage, etc. = landed price
+ taxes and levies =  domestic price
+ domestic subsidies  =  domestic producer price
adjusted FOB price + export taxes + export subsidies = international producer price. (51)
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾,𝐹𝐹,𝑝𝑝)
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝,𝑦𝑦) , (52)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼(𝑎𝑎) − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿. (53)    (53)
Together, equations 52 and 53 provide a dynamic, 
equilibrium-seeking behaviour in which consumers 
and producers move toward the price at which 
demand and supply are equal. Since various factors 
influencing demand and supply change over time in 
the model, it is possible that the equilibrium is never 
reached, and is always being sought – as in many 
real markets.
Additional features are added to this model to 
capture the fact that there are different kinds of 
producers (large and small scale) and different 
markets (rural, urban and international). First, 
prices in any market are adjusted by transport 
costs. It is assumed that small-scale producers are 
located in rural areas, while large-scale producers 
are assumed to be located close to urban areas (and 
international ports). Thus, transport costs between 
small-scale producers and rural consumers are lower 
than those between small-scale producers and urban 
consumers. Second, domestic prices do not rise above 
international prices. For example, if a rural consumer 
can get a better price by buying fuel imports, despite 
the cost of transporting the product from a port, 
then they will do that, rather than buying a local 
product. Third, both large and small producers sell 
into the rural, urban and international markets, with 
shares determined by price. Denoting the producer 
price in urban areas (corrected for transport costs) 
as pU, in rural areas as pR, and internationally as pI, a 
producer’s urban share [sU] is calculated as
𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈 = 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼. (54)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾feedstock,𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑) , (55)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾fuel
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼fuel(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿fuel𝐾𝐾fuel, (56a)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾feedstock
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼feedstock(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿feedstock𝐾𝐾feedstock. (56b)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) , (57)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏), (58)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≡ 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) = 1 − 𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑). (59)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≈ 1− � 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑*
�
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽
. (60)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏* 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (61)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (62)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ −𝑘𝑘(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏, (63)
  (54)
The rural and international shares are calculated 
similarly. The factor k/pI is a common scaling factor 
for all terms. The international price [pI] ensures 
correct units and a reasonable scale. The constant [k] 
is set to k = 1 in the model.
Because producers shift between markets based on 
shares, while consumers are assumed to buy the 
least expensive option, consumer prices can drop 
slightly below the international price if the local 
market is saturated, but they will not rise above the 
international price.
5.3 Feedstock prices
As with domestic fuel prices, feedstock prices are 
determined by an equilibrium-seeking algorithm, and 
the presentation uses a simplified notation. In the 
case of feedstocks, demand [D(Kfuel)] is determined 
by the capital invested in fuel production [Kfuel] 
and non-bioenergy demand [Dother(p)]. A baseline 
trajectory for non-bioenergy demand for feedstocks 
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is specified exogenously; otherwise, demand responds 
to changes in price relative to the previous time-
step through an elasticity. Supply [S(Kfeedstock, p)] is 
determined by the capital invested in feedstocks 
[Kfeedstocks] and possibly also price [p], if it falls low 
enough that feedstock producers operate below their 
maximum level. Investments in fuel production 
[Ifuel(p)] and feedstock production [Ifeedstock(p)] are 
each influenced by the feedstock price, [p]. The 
equation is then
𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈 = 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼. (54)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾feedstock,𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑) , (55)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾fuel
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼fuel(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿fuel𝐾𝐾fuel, (56a)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾feedstock
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼feedstock(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿feedstock𝐾𝐾feedstock. (56b)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) , (57)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏), (58)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≡ 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) = 1 − 𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑). (59)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≈ 1− � 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑*
�
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽
. (60)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏* 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (61)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (62)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ −𝑘𝑘(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏, (63)
 (55)
where b relates excess demand to changes in price. 
The stock of capital changes in each sector due to 
investment and depreciation,
𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈 = 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼. (54)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾feedstock,𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑) , (55)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾fuel
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼fuel(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿fuel𝐾𝐾fuel, (56a)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾feedstock
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼feedstock(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿feedstock𝐾𝐾feedstock. (56b)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) , (57)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏), (58)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≡ 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) = 1 − 𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑). (59)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≈ 1− � 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑*
�
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽
. (60)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏* 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (61)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (62)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ −𝑘𝑘(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏, (63)
  (56a)
𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈 = 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼. (54)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾feedstock,𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑) , (55)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾fuel
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼fuel(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿fuel𝐾𝐾fuel, (56a)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾feedstock
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼feedstock(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿feedstock𝐾𝐾feedstock. (56b)
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With these equations, prices adjust via differential 
rates of investment in fuel and feedstock 
operations, as well as the change in non-bioenergy 
feedstock demand.
Both Equation 56a and Equation 53 affect capital 
accumulation for fuel consumption. In the model, 
both the feedstock price and the biofuel price 
affect the attractiveness of biofuel production as 
an investment. To simplify the presentation of the 
algorithm, the combination of effects is not presented 
explicitly here.
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where k is the price adjustment coefficient. This is 
a version of the classical ‘tâtonnement’, or ‘groping’ 
process, described by Walras, in which prices 
are announced by sellers, buyers decide on their 
purchases on the basis of those prices, and then 
sellers subsequently adjust their prices based on their 
observations of the market (Walker 1987, Ferguson 
1998). In contrast to the canonical disequilibrium 
model, in which the adjustment parameter has units 
of quantity per unit price, per unit time, Equation 57 
has only a time scale, and the adjustment parameter k 
as units of inverse time.
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  (59)
At the equilibrium price [p*], the ratio [R(p)] is 
equal to zero, and S(p*) = D(p*). Suppose that 
near the equilibrium price, the price elasticity of 
demand is 
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R p ≡ D p −S  pD  p = 1−
S  p
D  p . (59)
At the equilibrium price p*, the ratio R(p) is equal to ze o, and S(p*) = D(p*). Supp se that near the 
equilibrium price, the price elasticity of de a  i -α, and the price elasticity of supply is β. Then, 
because supply and demand are equal at the equilibrium price, for prices near equilibrium,
R p≈1− pp*  . (60)
Setting the price equal to the equilibrium price plus a small gap, p= p* p , we have
dp
dt ≈k p
* R p*k  p R p*k p* dRdp∣p= p* p . (61)
Because R(p*) = 0, this simplifies to
dp
dt ≈k p
* dR
dp∣p= p* p . (62)
Taking the derivative of R(p) with respect to p using Equation (60), and substituting into Equation (62) 
gives
dp
dt ≈−k  p , (63)
so that, in a time step Δt, the price changes by an amount
 p ≡ dpdt  t ≈ −k t  p . (64)
The direction of change is opposite that of Δp, because the tâtonnement process restores prices to 
equilibrium. To understand the value of k, we rearrange Equation (64) and take the absolute value, to 
give
k= 1∣ p p∣ 1 t . (65)
The ratio ∣ p / p∣  is the size of the price step relative to the initial distance from the price at 
equilibrium. If the ratio is close to or greater than one, then price adjustments will tend to overshoot 
and prices will leap about their equilibrium value. If it is significantly less than one then the price will 
tend to converge smoothly towards its equilibrium. The sum α + β is the combined elasticity of demand 
and supply. Since it is in the denominator, for a fixed relative price step, the value of k when demand 
and supply are relatively elastic should be smaller than if demand and supply are relatively inelastic.
Demand and supply elasticities in the model are influenced by many factors, and differ in the short and 
long term due to lags in production. Moreover, the data needed to properly calibrate the model are 
lacking. Thus, we do not apply Equation (65) directly. Instead, in the model we assign default values to 
the price adjustment coefficients that give reasonable behavior, and then carry out sensitivity runs 
between one-half and twice the default value.
22
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (61)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (62)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ −𝑘𝑘(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏, (63)
   (60)
Setting the price equal to the equilibrium price plus a 
small gap, we have
𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈 = 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼. (54)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾feedstock,𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑) , (55)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾fuel
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼fuel(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿fuel𝐾𝐾fuel, (56a)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾feedstock
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼feedstock(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿feedstock𝐾𝐾feedstock. (56b)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) , (57)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏), (58)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≡ 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) = 1 − 𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑). (59)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≈ 1− � 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑*
�
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽
. (60)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏* 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (61)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (62)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ −𝑘𝑘(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏, (63)
 
          
𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈 = 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼. (54)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾feedstock,𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑) , (55)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾fuel
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼fuel(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿fuel𝐾𝐾fuel, (56a)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾feedstock
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼feedstock(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿feedstock𝐾𝐾feedstock. (56b)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) , (57)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏), (58)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≡ 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) = 1 − 𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑). (59)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≈ 1− � 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑*
�
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽
. (60)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏* 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (61)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (62)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ −𝑘𝑘(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏, (63)
  (61)
Because R(p*) = 0, this simplifies to
𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈 = 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼. (54)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷oth r(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾feedstock,𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fu l)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑) , (55)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾fuel
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼fuel(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿fuel𝐾𝐾fuel, (56a)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾feedstock
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼feedstock(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿feedstock𝐾𝐾feedstock. (56b)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) , (57)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏), (58)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≡ 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) = 1 − 𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑). (59)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≈ 1− � 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑*
�
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽
. (60)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏* 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (61)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (62)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ −𝑘𝑘(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏, (63)
   (62)
Taking the derivative of R(p) with respect to p, using 
Equation 60, and substituting into Equation 62 gives
𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈 = 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘/𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼. (54)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝐾𝐾f edstock,𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝐾𝐾fuel)+𝐷𝐷other(𝑑𝑑) , (55)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾fuel
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼fuel(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿fuel𝐾𝐾fuel, (56a)
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾feedstock
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐼𝐼feedstock(𝑏𝑏) − 𝛿𝛿feedstock𝐾𝐾feedstock. (56b)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) , (57)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏), (58)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≡ 𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑)−𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)
𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑) = 1 − 𝑆𝑆(𝑑𝑑)𝐷𝐷(𝑑𝑑). (59)
𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏) ≈ 1− � 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑*
�
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽
. (60)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘(𝑏𝑏*) + �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏* 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (61)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ �𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏*
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
𝑑𝑑=𝑑𝑑*
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. (62)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
≈ −𝑘𝑘(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏, (63)   (63)
so that, in a time-step [Δt], the price changes by an 
amount
 
𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝛥 ≡
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 ≈ −(𝑘𝑘𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥)(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥. (64)
𝑘𝑘 = 1
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽 ∣∣
∣𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝑑𝑑∣∣
∣ 1
𝛥𝛥𝑑𝑑
. (65)
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤0 � 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦0�𝜂𝜂, (66)
𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁 = 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁0 �1 + 12 � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴max−𝐴𝐴�3�. (67)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟curr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micro − 𝜃𝜃. (68)
𝜌𝜌macro = �𝑅𝑅IHS−1+𝜀𝜀5−𝑅𝑅IHS+𝜀𝜀�2 ?ˆ?𝜌macro. (69)
𝜌𝜌micro = ?ˆ?𝜌micro� (1− 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
, (70)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅(𝛥𝛥)(𝜆𝜆max(𝛥𝛥) − 𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥)). (71)
𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥) = 𝜆𝜆max − 𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅𝑃𝑃cum(𝑑𝑑)(𝜆𝜆max − 𝜆𝜆0), (72)
𝑦𝑦(𝜆𝜆) = 1
1−𝑑𝑑0
[1 − 𝜆𝜆0𝑦𝑦max + (𝑦𝑦max − 1)𝜆𝜆]. (73)
  (64)
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The direction of change is opposite that of Δp, 
because the tâtonnement process restores prices 
to equilibrium. To understand the value of k, we 
rearrange Equation 64 and take the absolute value, 
to give
𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝛥 ≡
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 ≈ −(𝑘𝑘𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥)(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥. (64)
𝑘𝑘 = 1
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽 ∣∣
∣𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝑑𝑑∣∣
∣ 1
𝛥𝛥𝑑𝑑
. (65)
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤0 � 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦0�𝜂𝜂, (66)
𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁 = 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁0 �1 + 12 � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴max−𝐴𝐴�3�. (67)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟curr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micro − 𝜃𝜃. (68)
𝜌𝜌macro = �𝑅𝑅IHS−1+𝜀𝜀5−𝑅𝑅IHS+𝜀𝜀�2 ?ˆ?𝜌macro. (69)
𝜌𝜌micro = ?ˆ?𝜌micro� (1− 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
, (70)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅(𝛥𝛥)(𝜆𝜆max(𝛥𝛥) − 𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥)). (71)
𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥) = 𝜆𝜆max − 𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅𝑃𝑃cum(𝑑𝑑)(𝜆𝜆max − 𝜆𝜆0), (72)
𝑦𝑦(𝜆𝜆) = 1
1−𝑑𝑑0
[1 − 𝜆𝜆0𝑦𝑦max + (𝑦𝑦max − 1)𝜆𝜆]. (73)
    (65)
The ratio 
24
The direction of change is opposite that of Δp, because the tâtonnement process restores prices to 
equilibrium. To understand the value of k, we rearrange Equation 64 and take the absolute value, to 
give
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 1
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 ∣∣∣𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∣∣∣ 1𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡. (65)
Th ∣∣𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝑝𝑝𝑝/𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∣∣ is the size of the price step relative to the initial distance from the price at 
equilibrium. If the ratio is close to or greater than one, then price adjustments will tend to overshoot 
and prices will leap about their equilibrium value. If it is significantly less than one then the price will 
tend to converge smoothly towards its equilibrium. The sum α + β is the combined elasticity of demand 
and supply. Since it is in the denominator, for a fixed relative price step, the value of k when demand 
and supply are relatively elastic should be smaller than if demand and supply are relatively inelastic.
Demand and supply elasticities in the model are influenced by many factors, and differ in the short and 
long term due to lags in production. Moreover, the data needed to properly calibrate the model are 
lacking. Thus, we do not apply Equation 65 directly. Instead, in the model, we assign default values to 
the price adjustment coefficients that give reasonable behaviour, and then carry out sensitivity runs 
between half and twice the default value.
5.5. Wages and land price
Wages and land prices are important determinants of investment and profitability for biofuel and 
feedstock operations. If they are too high, then investments will not flow. Also, as wages rise over time, 
a profitable operation can become unprofitable.
Over time, average income (gross domestic product per capita) is expected to rise. Wages will also tend 
to rise with average income, but perhaps not at the same rate. This is captured in the model by having 
wages [w] vary with average income [y] in the following way:
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤0 � 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦0�𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂 , (66)
where η is, for low-income jobs, typically less than one. If η = 1, then wages in the sector (and 
particular business model) rise at the same rate as average income across the economy. If η < 1, then 
wages rise less quickly than for the economy as a whole.
The price of land [pN] is expected to rise as land becomes more scarce. This is captured in the model 
with the following formula:
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁0 �1 + 12 � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴max−𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�3�. (67)
With this equation, prices stay low until the area planted with feedstock gets close to the maximum, as 
shown in Figure 3. The price diverges as the maximum area is approached – the steeply rising price 
effectively shuts off investment at some point below the maximum, when the price rises to the point 
that further investment becomes unprofitable.
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R p ≡ D p −S  pD  p = 1−
S  p
D  p . (59)
At the equilibrium price p*, the ratio R(p) is equal to zero, and S(p*) = D(p*). Suppose that near the 
equilibrium price, the price elasticity of demand is -α, and the price elasticity of supply is β. Then, 
because supply and demand are equal at the equilibrium price, for prices near equilibrium,
R p≈1− pp*  . (60)
Setting the price equal to the equilibrium price plus a small gap, p= p* p , we have
dp
dt ≈k p
* R p*k  p R p*k p* dRdp∣p= p* p . (61)
Because R(p*) = 0, this simplifies to
dp
dt ≈k p
* dR
dp∣p= p* p . (62)
Taking the derivative of R(p) with respect to p using Equation (60), and substituting into Equation (62) 
gives
dp
dt ≈−k  p , (63)
so that, in a time step Δt, the price changes by an amount
 p ≡ dpdt  t ≈ −k t  p . (64)
The direction of change is opposite that of Δp, because the tâtonnement process restores prices to 
equilibrium. To understand the value of k, we rearrange Equation (64) and take the absolute value, to 
give
k= 1∣ p p∣ 1 t . (65)
The ratio ∣ p / p∣  is the size of the price step rel tive to the initi l distance from the price t 
equilibrium. If the ratio is close to or greater than one, hen pr ce adjustm nts will end to ov r hoot 
and prices will leap about their equilibrium value. If it is significantly less than one then the price will 
tend to converge smoothly towards its equilibrium. Th α + β is the combined elasticity of demand 
and supply. Since it is in the denominator, for a fixed relative price step, the value of k when demand 
and supply are relatively elastic should be smaller than if demand and supply are relatively inelastic.
Demand and supply elasticities in the model are influenc d by m y factors, and differ in the short and 
long term due to lags in production. Moreover, the data needed to properly calibrate the model are 
lacking. Thus, we do not apply Equation (65) directly. Instead, in the odel we assign default values to 
the price adjustment coefficients that give reasonable behavior, and then carry out sensitivity runs 
between one-half and twice the default value.
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wages [w] vary with average income [y] in the 
following way:
𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝛥 ≡
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 ≈ −(𝑘𝑘𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥)(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥. (64)
𝑘𝑘 = 1
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽 ∣∣
∣𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝑑𝑑∣∣
∣ 1
𝛥𝛥𝑑𝑑
. (65)
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤0 � 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦0�𝜂𝜂, (66)
𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁 = 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁0 �1 + 12 � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴max−𝐴𝐴�3�. (67)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟curr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micro − 𝜃𝜃. (68)
𝜌𝜌macro = �𝑅𝑅IHS−1+𝜀𝜀5−𝑅𝑅IHS+𝜀𝜀�2 ?ˆ?𝜌macro. (69)
𝜌𝜌micro = ?ˆ?𝜌micro� (1− 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
, (70)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅(𝛥𝛥)(𝜆𝜆max(𝛥𝛥) − 𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥)). (71)
𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥) = 𝜆𝜆max − 𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅𝑃𝑃cum(𝑑𝑑)(𝜆𝜆max − 𝜆𝜆0), (72)
𝑦𝑦(𝜆𝜆) = 1
1−𝑑𝑑0
[1 − 𝜆𝜆0𝑦𝑦max + (𝑦𝑦max − 1)𝜆𝜆]. (73)
    (66)
where 
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WAGES AND LAND PRICE
Wages and land prices are important determinants of investment and profitability for biofuel and 
feedstock operations. If they are too high, then investments will not flow. Also, as wages rise over time, 
a profitable operation can become unprofitable.
Over time, average income (GDP per capita) is expected to rise. Wages will tend to rise with average 
income, but perhaps not at the same rate. This is captured in the model by having wages w vary with 
average income y in the following way:
w=w0 yy0  , (66)
 η is, for low-income jobs, typically less than one. If  η = 1, then wages in the sector (and 
particular business model) rise at the same rate as average income across the economy. If η < 1, then 
wages rise less quickly than for the economy as a whole.
The price of land pN is expected to rise as land becomes more scarce. This is captured in the model with 
the following formula:
p N=pN 0[112  AAmax−A 3] . (67)
With this equation, prices stay low until the area planted to feedstock gets quite close to the maximum, 
as shown in Figure 3. The price diverges as the maximum area is approached – the steeply rising price 
effectively shuts off investment at some point below the maximum, when the price rises to the point 
that further investment becomes unprofitable.
Withi  the model, each feedstock is assigned a maximum land area and a price, with one area specified 
in the case of no agroecological zoning and another area specified with agroecological zoning.
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Figure 3: Land prices with changing area under feedstock
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beco es more scarce. This is captured in the model 
with the following formula:
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 ≈ −(𝑘𝑘𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥)(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥. (64)
𝑘𝑘 = 1
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽 ∣∣
∣𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝑑
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𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤0 � 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦0�𝜂𝜂, (66)
𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁 = 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁0 �1 + 12 � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴max−𝐴𝐴�3�. (67)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟curr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micro − 𝜃𝜃. (68)
𝜌𝜌macro = �𝑅𝑅IHS−1+𝜀𝜀5−𝑅𝑅IHS+𝜀𝜀�2 ?ˆ?𝜌macro. (69)
𝜌𝜌micro = ?ˆ?𝜌micro� (1− 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
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, (70)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
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1−𝑑𝑑0
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  (67)
With this equation, prices stay low until the area 
planted with feedstock gets close to the maximum, 
as shown in Figure 3. The price diverges as the 
maximum area is approached – the steeply rising 
price effectively shuts off investment at some point 
below the maximum, when the price rises to the 
point that further investment becomes unprofitable.
Within the model, each feedstock is assigned a 
maximum land area and a price, with one area 
specified in the case of no agroecological zoning and 
another area specified with agroecological zoning.
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6. Risk and learning
that value into a premium on the discount rate, the 
following transformation is applied,
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   (69)
In Equation 69, 
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Risk and learning
In this model, risk is captured entirely in the expression for the expected return, copied here from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this expression, the risk factors γ and ρmacro can, in principle, be gathered from data. The systematic 
risk coefficient β can be calculated for many investments, but not for biofuel investments in most 
countries, as there are insufficient historical data to support the calculation. The micro term ρmicro 
depends to some extent on subjective factors, and so it cannot be estimated from historical data. In 
practice, ρmicro might be based on checklists, personal knowledge, or expert opinion [22]. The “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be estimable from behavioral finance research [30], but in the model it plays 
the role of a scenario parameter or as an adjustment parameter. For example, a scenario may explore 
irrational optimism over some particular biofuel. A positive value for θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explained in Section Investment, the parameter β is a measure of the correlation between the returns 
from an investment and the market as a whole – the systematic risk. Similarly, the currency risk 
parameter γ represents how correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ are introduced in the same way that they might be reported in earnings reports 
or international tables. While data for biofuel investments are scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro is estimated in the model using the country risk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following transformation is applied,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   is a small value that ensures that ρmacro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The value macro  is the value of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that is, at medium levels of 
risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  are shown in Table 1 for selected 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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higher risk levels.
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Risk and learning
In this model, risk is captured entirely in the expression for the expected return, copied here from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this expression, the risk factors γ and ρmacro can, in principle, be gathered from data. The systematic 
risk coefficient β can be calculated for many investments, but not for biofuel investments in most 
countries, as there are insufficient historical data to support the calculation. The icro term ρmicro 
depends to some extent on subjective factors, and so it cannot be estimated from historical data. In 
practice, ρmicro might be based on checklists, personal knowledge, or expert opinion [22]. The “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be estimable from behavioral finance research [30], but in the model it plays 
the role of a scenario parameter or as an adjustment parameter. For example, a scenario may explore 
irrational optimism over some particular biofuel. A positive value for θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explained in Section Investment, the parameter β is a measure of the correlation between the returns 
from an investment and the market as a whole – the systematic risk. Similarly, the currency risk 
parameter γ represents how correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ are introduced in the same way that they might be reported in earnings reports 
or international tables. While data for biofuel investments are scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρm cro is estimated in the model using the country risk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following transformation is applied,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equatio ,   is a small value that ensures that ρmacro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The val macro  is the valu  of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that is, at medium levels of 
risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  are shown in Table 1 for selected 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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In this model, risk is captured entirely in the expression for the expected return, copied here from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
I  this expression, the risk factors γ and ρmacro can, in rinciple, be g thered fro  data. The systematic 
risk coefficient β can be calculated or many investments, but not for biofuel investments in most 
countries, as there are insufficient historical data to support the calculation. The micro term ρmicro 
depends o some extent on subjective factors, and so t cannot be estimated from historical data. In 
p actice, ρmicro might be bas d n checklists, person l knowledge, or ex rt opinion [22]. The “ir ational 
optimism” term θ might be estimab e from behavi ral finance research [30], but in the model it plays 
the role of a scenario parameter or as an adjustment parameter. For example, a scenario may explore 
irrational optimism over some particular biofuel. A positive value for θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explain d in Section Investment, the parameter β is a meas e of the c rrel tion between th  returns 
from n investment and the mark t as a whole – the systematic r sk. Similarly, the cur ency risk 
parame er γ represents ow correlated the valu  of the n tional urrency is to a baske  of currencies. 
The parameter β and γ are introd ced in the same way that they might be reported in earnings reports 
or international tables. While data for biofuel investments are scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro isk fact r ρmacro  estimated in the model using the country risk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following transformation is applied,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   is a small value that ensures that ρmacro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The value macro  is the value of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that is, at medium levels of 
risk. Repr s ntative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  are shown in Table 1 for selected 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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In this model, risk is captured entirely in the expression for the expected return, copied here from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacro icro− . (68)
In this xpres io , th  ri k fac ors γ and ρmacro can, in principle, be gathered from data. The systematic 
risk coefficient β can be calculated for many investm ts, but not fo  b fuel investments in most 
co ntries, as ther  are insu ficie t hi tori al d ta to suppor  the calculation. The micro term ρmicro 
depends to some ext t on subjective factors, and so it cannot be estimated from historical data. In 
prac ce, ρmicro might be ba ed on ch cklists, person l knowl dge, or ex ert opinion [22]. The “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be esti able fr m behavioral finance research [30], but in the model it plays 
the role of a scenario parameter or as an adjustment p ram ter. For example, a scenario may explore 
irrational optimism over some particular biofuel. A positive value for θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explained in Section Inve tment, the para ete  β is a measure of the correlation between the returns 
from an investment and the market s a whole – the systematic risk. Similarly, the currency risk 
parameter γ represents ho  correlated the value of the nat onal currency is o a basket of currencies. 
Th  p rameters β and γ are introduced in the same way that they might be reported in earnings reports 
or international tab es. While data for biofuel investments are scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro is estimated in the model using the country risk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ isk on a cale from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following transformation is applied,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   is a small value that ensures that ρmacro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The v lue r  is the value of ρmacro wh n RIHS = 3: hat is, at medium levels of 
risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  are shown in Table 1 for selected 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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In this model, risk is captured entirely in the expression for the expected return, copied here from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this xpression, the risk factors γ and ρmacro can, in principle, be gathered from data. The systematic 
risk coefficient β can be calculated for many investments, but not for biofuel investments in most 
countries, as there ar  insufficient historical data to support the calculation. The micr  term ρmicro 
depends to some extent on subjectiv  factors, and so it cannot b  estimat d from historical data. In 
practice, ρmicro ight be based on checklists, personal knowledge, or expert opinio  [22]. Th  “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be estimable from behavioral financ  research [30], but in the model it lays 
the role of a scenario paramet r or as an adjustment aram ter. For example, a scenario may explore 
irrational optimism over some particular biofuel. A positive value for θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explai ed in Section Investment, the parameter β is a me sure of the correlation between the returns 
from an investm nt and the market as a whole – the systematic risk. Similarly, the currency risk 
parameter γ r prese ts how correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ are introduced in the sam  way that they might be reported in arnings reports 
or internation l tables. While data for biofuel investments are scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro is estimated in the model using the country risk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk). To convert that 
value int  a premium on the discount rate, the following transformation is applied,
macr = RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   is a small value that e sures that ρmacro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal t  f ve. The value macro  is the value of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that is, at medium levels of 
risk. Representativ  values f r ρmacro whe  =0.01  n  macro=1 %  are shown in Table 1 for selected 
ountries u ing d ta from IHS Global Insight. As can b  seen, the values begi  to increase rapidly at 
higher risk l vels.
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In this model, risk is captured entirely in the expression for the expected return, copied here from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this expression, the risk factors γ and ρmacro can, in princ pl , b g thered from data. The s stema ic 
risk coefficient β can be calculated for many investm t , but not for biofuel inv stm nts in most
countries, as there are insufficient historical data to support the calculation. The micro term ρmicro 
depends to some extent on subjective factors, and so it cannot be estimated from historical data. In 
practice, ρmicro might be based on checklists, pers nal knowledge, or ex e t opinion [22]. The “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be estimable from behavioral finance r search [30], but in the mo el i  plays 
the role of a scenario parameter or as an adjustment parameter. For example, a scenario may explore 
irrational optimism over some particular biofuel. A positive value for θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explained in Section Investment, the paramete  β is a measure of the c rrelation b twe n the returns 
from an investment and the market as a whole – the syste atic risk. Similarly, th  currency risk 
parameter γ represents how correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ are introduced in the same way that they might be reported in earnings rep rts 
or international tables. While data for biofuel investments are scarce, it is poss ble to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro is estimated in the model using the country isk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates cou tries’ risk on a sc le from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following tra sformation is applied,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equati n,   i  a mall v lue that ensures th t ρmacro does not becom undefined if t risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The valu  macro  is the v lu of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that i , at medi m le ls of 
risk. Representativ  values for ρmacro wh n =0.01   macro=1 % a e shown in T ble 1 for sele ted 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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In this model, risk is aptured entirely in the expression for the expected return, copied here from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this expression, the risk factors γ and ρmacro can, in principle, be gathered from data. The systematic 
risk coefficient β can be calculated for many investments, but not for biofuel investments in most 
countries, as there are insufficient historical data to support the calculation. The micro term ρmicro 
depends to some extent on subjective factors, and so it cannot be estimated from historical data. In 
practice, ρmicro might be based on checklists, personal knowledge, or expert opinion [22]. The “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be estimable from behavioral finance research [30], but in the model it plays 
the role of a scenario parameter or as an adjustment parameter. For example, a scenario may explore 
irrational optimism over some particular biofuel. A positive value for θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explained in Section Investment, the parameter β is a measure of the correlation between the returns 
from an investment and the market as a whole – the systematic risk. Similarly, the currency risk 
parameter γ represents how correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ are introduced in the same way that they might be reported in earnings reports 
or international tables. While data for biofuel investments are scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro is estimated in the model using the country risk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following transformation is applied,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   is a small value that ensures that ρmacro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The value macro  is the value of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that is, at medium levels of 
risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  are shown in Table 1 for selected 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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In this model, risk is captured ntirely in the expression fo  the xpe d return, copied here from 
Equati n (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromic o− . (68)
In this expression, the risk factors γ and ρmacro can, in principle, be gathered from data. The systematic 
risk coefficient β can be calculated for many investments, but not for biofuel investments in most 
countries, as there are insufficient historical data to support the calculation. The micro term ρmicro 
depends to some extent on subjective factors, and so it cannot be estimated from historical data. In 
practice, ρmicro might be based on checklists, personal knowledge, or expert opinion [22]. The “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be estimable from behavioral financ  rese ch [30], but in the model it plays 
the role of a scenario parameter or as an adjustment parameter. For example, a scenario may explore 
irrational optimism over so e particular biofuel. A positive value f r θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RI K
As explained in Section Investment, the parameter β is a measure of the correlation between the returns 
from an investment and the market as a whole – the systematic risk. Similarly, the currency risk 
parameter γ represents how correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ are introduced in the same way that they might be reported in earnings reports 
or international tables. While data for biofuel investments are scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro is estimated in the model using the country risk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following transformation is applied,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   is a small value that ensures that ρmacro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The value macro  is the value of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that is, at medium levels of 
risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  are shown in Table 1 for selected 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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In this model, risk is captured entirely in the expression for the expecte return, copied here from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r f  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this expression, the risk factors γ and ρmacro can, in principle, be gathered from dat . The systematic 
risk coefficient β can be calculated for many invest ents, but not for biofuel investments in most 
countries, as there are insufficient historical data to su port the calculation. The micro  ρmicro 
depends to some extent on subjective factors, and so it cannot be estim ted from historical dat . In 
practice, ρmicro might be based on checkli ts, pers nal knowledge, or expert opinion [22]. The “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be estimable from behavioral finance research [30], but in the model it plays 
the role of a scenario parameter or as an adjustment parameter. For example, a scenario may explore 
irrational optimism over some particular biofuel. A positive value for θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explained in Section Investment, the p rameter β i  a measure o  the corr ation between the returns 
from an investment and the market as a whole – the systematic risk. Similarly, the currency risk 
parameter γ represents how correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ are introduced in the same way that they might be reported in earnings reports 
or international tables. While data for biofuel investments are scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro is estimated in the model using the country risk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following transformation is applied,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   is a small value that ensures that ρmacro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The value macro  is the value of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that is, at medium levels of 
risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  are shown in Table 1 for selected 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝛥 ≡
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 ≈ −(𝑘𝑘𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥)(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥. (64)
𝑘𝑘 = 1
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽 ∣∣
∣𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝑑𝑑∣∣
∣ 1
𝛥𝛥𝑑𝑑
. (65)
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤0 � 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦0�𝜂𝜂, (66)
𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁 = 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁0 �1 + 12 � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴max−𝐴𝐴�3�. (67)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟curr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micro − 𝜃𝜃. (68)
𝜌𝜌macro = �𝑅𝑅IHS−1+𝜀𝜀5−𝑅𝑅IHS+𝜀𝜀�2 ?ˆ?𝜌macro. (69)
𝜌𝜌micro = ?ˆ?𝜌micro� (1− 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
, (70)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅(𝛥𝛥)(𝜆𝜆max(𝛥𝛥) − 𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥)). (71)
𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥) = 𝜆𝜆max − 𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅𝑃𝑃cum(𝑑𝑑)(𝜆𝜆max − 𝜆𝜆0), (72)
𝑦𝑦(𝜆𝜆) = 1
1−𝑑𝑑0
[1 − 𝜆𝜆0𝑦𝑦max + (𝑦𝑦max − 1)𝜆𝜆]. (73)
  (70)
ere the 
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Table 1: Represent tive values for country risk factors and macro contribution to discount rate
RIHS ρmacro
Sweden 1.33 0.01%
Jap n 1.75 0.05%
South K rea 2.06 0.13%
India 2.73 0.58%
M dium .00 1.00%
Ukraine 3.14 1.32%
Cameroon 3.53 2.95%
Tajikistan 3.89 6.70%
Sudan 4.28 20.31%
MICROPOLITICAL AND MICROECONOMIC RISK
The remaining term ρmicro is calculated in the model based on perceptions. It is calculated using a simple 
heuristic formula,
micro=micro∏
i=1
N
1−i ib , (70)
h  t  φi are various factors that affect perc ived risk, and the exponents bi are weights. In the 
d fault setting for the model, the weights are all set equal to one. All of the factors take values from 
zero to one, and as they increase, risk goes down. The factor icro  is the value of ρmicro when the level 
of risk is highest.
Separate sets of factors apply to feedstock production and fuel production. For feedstock production, 
the factors are
• political commitment (or political “will”),
• farm r knowledge,
• security of tenure,
while f r fuel production, the factors are
• political commitment,
• domestic experience with the particular fuel processing technology.
Political commitment and security of tenure are scenario variables that are simply set as values between 
zero and one. Farmer knowledge and domestic experience are calculated using a “learning” sub-model 
that allows for the stock of farmer and national knowledge to grow over time.
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Table 1: Representative values for country risk factors and macro contribution to discount rate
RIHS ρmacro
Sweden 1.33 0.01%
Japan 1.75 0.05%
South Korea 2.06 0.13%
India 2.73 0.58%
Medium 3.00 1.00%
Ukraine 3.14 1.32%
Cameroon 3.53 2.95%
Tajikistan 3.89 6.70%
Sudan 4.28 20.31%
MICROPOLITICAL AND MICROECONOMIC RISK
The remaining term ρmicro is calculated in the model based on perceptions. It is calculated using a simple 
heuristic formula,
micro=micro∏
i=1
N
1−i ib , (70)
where the φi are various factors that affect perceive  risk, and the exp ents bi are weights. In the 
default setting for the model, th  weig ts are all set equal to one. All of the factors take values from 
zero to one, and as they increase, risk goes down. The factor micro  is the value of ρmicro when the level 
of isk is highest.
Separate sets of factors apply to feedstock production and fuel production. For feedstock production, 
the factors are
• political commitment (or political “will”),
• farmer knowledge,
• security of tenure,
while for fuel production, the factors are
• political commitment,
• domestic experience with the p rticular fuel processi g technology.
Political commitment and security of tenure are scenario variables that are simply set as values between 
zero and one. Farmer knowledge and domestic experience are calculated using a “learning” sub-model 
that allows for the stock of farmer and national knowledge to grow over time.
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Table 1: Representative values for cou try risk factors and macro contribution to discount rate
RIHS ρmacro
Sweden 1.3 0. 1%
Japan 1.75 0. 5%
South Korea 2.06 0.13%
India 2.73 0.58%
Medium 3.0 1.0 %
Ukraine 3.14 1.32%
Camero n 3.53 2.95%
Tajikistan 3.89 6.70%
Sudan 4.28 20.31%
MICROPOLIT CAL AND MICROECONOMIC RISK
The remaining term ρmicro is calculated in the model based on perceptions. It is calculated using a simple 
heuristic formula,
micro=micro∏
i=1
N
1−i ib , (70)
where the φi are arious factors that affect perceived risk, and the xponents bi are weights. In the 
default setti g for the model, the weights are all set equal to ne. All of the factors ta e values from 
zero to ne, and as they increase, risk goes down. The factor micr  is the v l   ρmicro when the level 
of risk is highest.
Separate sets of actors ap ly to feedstock production and fuel production. For feedstock production, 
the factors are
• polit cal com itment (or polit cal “will”),
• farmer knowledge,
• security of tenure,
while for fuel productio , the factors are
• polit cal com itment,
• domestic experience with the particular fuel processing tec nology.
Polit cal com itment and security of tenure are scenario variables that are simply set as values between 
zero and one. Farmer knowledge and omestic experience are calculated using a “learning” sub-model 
that allows for the stock of armer and national knowledge to grow over time.
25
 whe  t  l el of risk 
is highest.
In the model, risk is captured entirely in the 
expression for the expected return, copied here from 
Equation 16,
𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝛥 ≡
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 ≈ −(𝑘𝑘𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥)(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥. (64)
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𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽 ∣∣
∣𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝑑𝑑∣∣
∣ 1
𝛥𝛥𝑑𝑑
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𝜌𝜌macro = �𝑅𝑅IHS−1+𝜀𝜀5−𝑅𝑅IHS+𝜀𝜀�2 ?ˆ?𝜌macro. (69)
𝜌𝜌micro = ?ˆ?𝜌micro� (1− 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
, (70)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
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1−𝑑𝑑0
[1 − 𝜆𝜆0𝑦𝑦max + (𝑦𝑦max − 1)𝜆𝜆]. (73)
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𝜌𝜌micro = ?ˆ?𝜌micro� (1− 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
, (70)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅(𝛥𝛥)(𝜆𝜆max(𝛥𝛥) − 𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥)). (71)
𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥) = 𝜆𝜆max − 𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅𝑃𝑃cum(𝑑𝑑)(𝜆𝜆max − 𝜆𝜆0), (72)
𝑦𝑦(𝜆𝜆) = 1
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[1 − 𝜆𝜆0𝑦𝑦max + (𝑦𝑦max − 1)𝜆𝜆]. (73)
   (68)
In this expressio , the risk factors 
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Risk and learning
In this model, risk is captured entirely in the expression for th  expected return, co ied here from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this expression, t e risk f  γ and ρmacro an, in principle, be gather d fro  at . Th  systematic 
risk coefficient β can b  calculated for many investments, but ot f r biofuel in estments in most 
countries, as there are insufficient historical data to supp rt the calculation. T  mi ro te m ρmicro 
depends to some ext t on subjective f ctors, and so it ca n t be tim ted from histori al ata. In 
pract ce, ρmicro might be based on c ecklists, personal knowl dge, r expert pini [22]. The “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be estimable from behavioral fi anc  r search [30], but i  the model it plays 
the role of a cenario parameter r as an adjustment param ter. For ex mpl , a scenari  ay explor  
irrational optimism over s me particular biofuel. A positive value for θ can be applied in that scenari .
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explained in Section Investment, the parameter β is a me sure of the correlation between the returns 
from an investment and the mark t as a w ole – the systematic risk. Similarly, the currency risk 
parameter γ represents how correlated t e value of the natio al currency is to  bask t of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ re introduce  in the sa e way that they might be reported in earnings rep rts 
or international tables. While dat  for biofuel investments re scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro is estimated in the model using t  country risk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk on a scal  from 1 (low risk) t  5 (high risk). T  convert that 
value into a premium o  the discount rate, the following transformatio  is pplied,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   is a small value that ensures that ρmacro does not become undefined if th  risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. Th  value macro  is the value of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that is, at medium levels of 
risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  are shown in Table 1 f r selected 
countries using data from IHS Glob l Insight. As can be seen, the v lues b gin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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Risk and learning
In this model, risk is captur d entirely in th  expression for the expected return, copied here from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmac o micro− . (68)
In this expressi , t ris  fact rs γ  ρmacro can, i  principle, be g thered from dat . The system ic
risk coefficient β can be calculated for many inv stments, but not for biofuel i vestments in most 
countries, as there are insuffici nt historical d ta to upport the lculati n. The micro erm ρ icro 
depends to some extent on ubj ctiv  factors, and so t cannot be esti at d from hist ical data. In 
practice, ρmic o might be b ed on checklist , perso al n wledge, or expert opinio  [22]. Th  “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be sti able from behavioral finance research [30], but in the odel t play
the role of a scenario paramete  or as an djustme t p rame er. For exampl , a scenar o m y explore 
irrational opti sm over some particular biofuel. A positive value for θ ca be appli d i  that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explained in Section I vestment, the parameter β is  measur  of he correlatio  between the returns 
from an investment and the marke s a whole – the ystematic risk. Similarly, the currency risk 
parameter γ represents how cor lat d the value of the national currency is to  basket of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ are introduced i  the ame way that t ey might be reported in e rnings r ports 
or international tables. While data for biofu l investm nts ar  scarce, it i possib e to stimate a range 
of possible values f r β. This is discussed below, n page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro  estimated in the model usi g the c untry risk fact rs RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ isk on a scale om 1 (low risk) to 5 (high . To convert that
value into a premium on the di co nt rate, the following transfor ation i  appli d,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   is a small alue th t ensures tha  ρmacro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The v ue macro  is the value of ρmacro w en RIHS = 3: that is, at medium levels of 
risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01 and macro=1 %  are sh wn in Tabl  1 for selected 
countries using data f om IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the valu s b gin to incr ase rapidly t 
higher risk levels.
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Risk and learning
In th s model, risk is captured entirely in the expression for the expected return, copied here from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this ex ression, the risk factors γ and ρmacro can, in principle, be gath red from data. The yst m tic 
risk coeffi t β can be c l ula d for m ny investments, but not for bi fuel investments in st 
cou tries, as there are insuffici nt historical data t supp rt h  calcul ion. T  micro term ρmicro 
depends to s e extent on subjective factors, and so it cannot be estim ted from hist rical data. In 
ra tice, ρmicro mi ht be as d on checklists, pers n k wl dge or expert pin on [22]. Th  “irrati nal 
optimism” term θ might be estimable fro  b havior l finance r search [30], bu  in the od l it plays 
the role f a scenari  p ra ter or as an adj stment p rameter. For example,  s enar o m y ex lore 
irrational optimism over some particular bi fuel. A positive value for θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explained in Section Investment, the paramet r β i  a easure of the correlation between the ret r s 
f o  an inv stment and the market a  a whol  – th  system ti  risk. Similarly, the currency risk 
p rameter γ epresents how correlated the valu  of the tio l curre cy is to a basket of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ re introduced in th  s me way that they ight be r ported in earnings r p rts 
or international tables. While data for biofuel inv stments are scarce, it is possible to estimate a ra ge 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro is est mated in the model using th  country risk factor  RIHS fro  IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 5 (h gh risk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following transf rmati n is applied,
macro= RIHS−1 5−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equa i n,  a small value tha ensures that ρmacro do s not become undefined f e r k factor 
RIHS is equal to f . Th  value macro  is the value f ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that is, at mediu  levels of 
risk. R presentative value  for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 % are shown in Table 1 for selected 
cou t es using data from IHS Global Insight. A  ca  b  s en, the values begin o increase ra idly at 
higher risk levels.
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Risk and learning
In this model, risk is captured entirely in the expression for the expected return, copied here from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this expression, the risk factors γ and ρmacro can, in principle, be gath red rom da a. Th  sys e a c 
risk coefficient β can be calculated for many investments, but not for biofu l investm nts in most
countries, as there are insufficient historical data t  support th  calculat on. The i ρmicro 
depends to some extent on subjective factors, and so it cannot be esti a ed fro  historic l data. In 
practice, ρmicro might be based on checklists, personal knowledge, o  exp t inion [22]. The “irrationa  
optimism” term θ might be estimable from behavioral finance research [30], but in the model it plays 
the role of a scenario parameter or as an adjustment p ram t . For ex mple, a scenario may explor  
irrational optimism over some particular biofuel. A positive value for θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explained in Section Investment, the parameter β is a measu e of the co r la i n betw en the ret rns 
from an investment and the market as a whole – the systematic risk. Simil rly, th  currency risk 
parameter γ represents how correlated the value of the national c rrency s to a basket of curr ncies. 
The parameters β and γ are introduced in the same way that they mig t be eported in earnings r ports 
or international tables. While data for bi fuel inv stments are scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro is estimated in the model using the country risk factors RIHS from IHS
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high isk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following transformation is applied,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   is a small value that ensures that ρmacro does not b ome undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The value macro  is the value of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that i , a  medium l vels of 
risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  are shown  Table 1 for select d 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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Risk and learning
In this model, risk is captured entirely in the expression for the expected return, copied h re from 
Equation (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this expression, the risk factors γ and ρmacro can, in principle, be gathered from data. The syste atic 
risk coefficient β can be calculated for many investments, but not for biofuel investme ts i  most 
countries, as there are insufficient historical data to support the c lculation. T e micro term ρmicro 
depends to some extent on subjective factors, and s  it c nnot be estimate  fro  h stor cal data. In
practice, ρmicro might be based on checklists, personal knowledge, or expert opinion [22]. The “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be estimable from behavioral finance research [30], but in the mod l it plays 
the role of a scenario parameter or as an adjustment parameter. For example, a scenario m y xplore 
irrational optimism over some particular biofuel. A positive value for θ can be ap lied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explained in Section Investment, the parameter β is a measure of the correl tion between the returns 
from an investment and the market as a wh le – the ystematic risk. Simil rly, th  currency ri k 
parameter γ represents how correlated the value of the national currency is to a basket of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ are introduced in the same way that they might be reported in e rning  reports
or international tables. While data for biofuel investments are scarce, it is possible t  estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro is estimated in the model using the country risk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following transformation is applied,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   is a small value that ensures that ρmacro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The value macro  is the value of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that is, at medium levels of 
risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  are shown in Table 1 for selected 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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Risk and learning
In this model, risk is captur entirely in th expr si n f r th  exp ct  return, copied her  from
E  (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this expr ssion, he risk actor  γ d ρma ro , in pr nciple, b  ga hered from data. The ystemat  
risk coeffici nt β can be cal ul te  for m ny inv stments, but not for biofuel inv stme s i most 
countries, as there are ins fficient histor l d ta to s pp rt the cal ulation. The micro te m ρmicro 
d p nds to s me exte t on subj ctiv  factor , d so it ca not be estimated fro  historic l data. In 
practice, ρmicro might be based on c ck ists, personal knowledg , expert pinio  [22]. Th  “irrational 
optimism” ter  θ might be estimabl  from behavioral finance resear h [30], b t in the mod l it plays 
the role of a scenario parameter or as an adjustment parameter. For example, a scenario may explore 
irrational optimis  over some particular biofuel. A pos tive value for θ can be applied i  that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explain d in Section Investm nt, the pa m ter β is a measure f e correlation betw en the retu ns 
from a i vestment an th  ark t as a wh le – th  systemat c i k. Sim larly, the currency risk 
parameter γ re re ents how correlated th  value of th  national currency s to a basket of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ are introduced in th s m  way that they might b  reported i e rnings reports 
or internation l tables. While data for biofuel investme ts are scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possib e valu s for β. This is discus ed below, o  page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The cr  ri k factor ρmacro is estimated in the model using the country isk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk on a cale from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following transformation is applied,
acro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   s a sm ll value that nsur s that ρm cro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is eq al to five. The valu macro  is the value of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that is, at medium l vels of 
risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  are shown in Table 1 for selected 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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Risk and learning
In this odel, risk is c ptur entire y in th  expressi n for th  expecte  return, copied re from 
Equatio (16),
r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this ex ressio , he risk actors γ nd ρmacro can, in rincip e, e ga hered from dat . The systematic 
ri k coefficient β can be calculated for many inv st ents, but no  for biofuel investments  most
c untries, as there are ins fficient hi torical data to support the calculation. The micro t rm ρmicro 
depends to some extent on subj ctive f ctors, and so it ca not be s ima ed from hist rical data. In 
practice, ρmicro ight be bas d on c cklists, personal kn wledge, r expert opinio  [22]. The “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be estimable from behavioral finance r search [30], but in the model it plays 
the role of a scenari  parameter or as an adjus ment para et r. For example, a scenario may explore 
irrational optimism over some particular bi uel. A positive valu  f θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As xplai ed in Section Investm nt, the param ter β is a easure of the correlation between the returns 
from an investment and the market as a whol  – the systematic risk. Similarly, th  currency risk 
parameter γ represents ow c rrelated the valu  of the national cu r ncy is to a basket of currencies. 
The para eters β and γ are introduced in the same way that they might be r ported in ear ings reports 
or internation l tables. While data for biofuel investments scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed bel w, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
The macro risk factor ρmacro is estimated in the model using the country risk factors RIHS from IHS 
Global Insight, which rates countries’ risk a cale from 1 (low risk) o 5 (high risk). To convert that 
value into a premium on the discount rate, the following tran formation is applied,
macro= RIHS−15−RIHS2 macro . (69)
In this equation,   is a small value that ensures that ρmacro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The value macro  is the v lue of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: hat is, at medium lev ls of 
risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  e shown in Table 1 f r selected 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values b gin to incre se rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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In is m del, risk is c ptur entirely in th  x es ion f  he expected r turn, copied here from 
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r E=rrf rave−r rf  r currmacromicro− . (68)
In this expressi n, the risk factors γ and ρmacro can, n principl , b  gathered from data. The systematic 
risk coeffici nt β can e calculated f r many investment , but not for biofuel investments in most 
count ie , as there re insuffici nt ist rical data to support the alculation. e micro term ρmicro 
depends to some extent on subjective fact rs, and so it cannot be estim ted from h torical data. In 
practice, ρmicro might be bas d on c cklist , rso l k owledge, or expert opinion [22]. The “irrational 
optimism” term θ might be esti able f om behavior l finance research [30], but in the model it plays 
the role of a sc nari  parameter or s an adju  p ameter. F r example, a scenario may explore
irration l optimism over ome par icular biofuel. A positive value for θ can be applied in that scenario.
SYSTEMATIC RISK AND CURRENCY RISK
As explained in Secti n Investm nt, the parameter β is a measure of the or elation between the returns 
from an investment and the market s a whole – the systematic risk. Sim larly, the curre cy risk 
parameter γ represents how correl d the value of the ati nal currency is to a basket of currencies. 
The parameters β and γ are introduced in the sa e way that they mig t be reported in ear ings rep rts 
or international tables. While data for biofuel investments are scarce, it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
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of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
MACROPOLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC RISK
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value into a premium on the discount rate, the following transformation is applied,
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countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
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irrational optimism over some particular bi fuel. A positive value for θ can be appli d in that scenario.
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Th  paramet rs β a d γ are introduced in the same ay that they might be reported in earnings reports 
or international tables. Whil  data for biofuel invest ents are scarc , it is possible to estimate a range 
of possible values for β. This is discussed below, on page 28.
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risk. Representative values for ρmacro when =0.01  and macro=1 %  are shown in Table 1 for selected 
countries using data from IHS Global Insight. As can be seen, the values begin to increase rapidly at 
higher risk levels.
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In this equation,   is a small value that ensures that ρmacro does not become undefined if the risk factor 
RIHS is equal to five. The value macro  is the value of ρmacro when RIHS = 3: that is, at medium levels of 
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Separate sets of factors apply to feedstock production 
and fuel production. For feedstock production, the 
factors are
 • political commitment (or political ‘will’);
 • farmer knowledge; and
 • security of tenure;
while for fuel production, the factors are
 • political commitment; and
 • domestic experience with the particular fuel 
processing technology.
Political commitment and security of tenure are 
scenario variables that are simply set as values 
between zero and one. Farmer knowledge and 
domestic experience are calculated using a ‘learning’ 
submodel that allows for the stock of farmer- and 
national-knowledge to grow over time.
6.4 Learning
In the learning submodel, learning takes place in 
the following way. For a learning community (for 
example, farmers or extension workers), there is a 
maximum level of knowledge they can attain, as 
determined by the global level of knowledge. The 
global level is set as an exogenous parameter, with a 
value of zero representing no information at all and 
a value of one representing thorough knowledge that 
supports routine operations and standardization. If 
the maximum level for the ‘learning index’ [
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LEARNING
In the learning sub-model, learning takes place in the following way. For a learning community (for 
example, f rme s or extension workers), there is some maximum level of knowledge that they can 
attain, as determined by the global level of knowledge. The global level is set as an exogenous 
parameter, with a value of zero representing no information at all and a value of one representing 
thorough knowledge that supports routine operations and standardization. If the maximum level for the 
“le ” λ(t) is λmax(t), then the stock of knowledge (the learning index) changes over time as
d t 
d t = P t max t −t  . (71)
In this equation, annual production is given by P(t). The parameter κ sets the maximum rate of 
accumulation of knowledge. Learning is fast if there is a large gap between local and general 
knowledge, and it slows down as the community’s knowledge approaches the maximum level, which 
can change over time.
For feedstocks, the model for farmer knowledge applies a nested version of Equation (71). First, 
knowledge of extension workers grows toward an exogenously-specified global level. Second, 
smallholder knowledge approaches a weighted average of the initial level and extension worker 
knowledge, depending on how effective extensive services are (a user-specified policy variable). 
Farmers on estates are assumed to have the same level of knowledge (or to have access to the same 
knowledge) as extension agents.
For the biofuel processing sector, Equation (71) is applied directly, with global experience specified 
exogenously and domestic experience approaching the global level with cumulative production.
Learning curves
In Equation (71), learning only takes place if there is production, consistent with conventional models 
of industrial learning [37]. This is a consequence of the factor P(t) before the expression in parentheses. 
The solutions to Equation (71) can be related to observations from studies of industrial learning. In the 
special case where λmax(t) is constant in time, Equation (71) can be solved explicitly to give
t =max−e−Pcum t  max−0  , (72)
where λ0 is the initial value for λ(t) and Pcum is cumulative (rather than annual) production. A sample 
curve is shown in Figure 4. As shown in the figure, the learning index increases in an s-shaped fashion 
with cumulative production. This is the shape observed in learning curves within firms, where 
“learning” is measured by worker productivity [37]. This pattern contrasts with the constant slope 
observed for “experience curves,” which plot the logarithm of unit cost against the logarithm of 
cumulative production within a sector, and are a conventional tool in business and management [38]. 
However, there is good reason to think that the linear slope of experience curves has more to do with 
the benefits of increasing scale and other factors, rather than learning [37]. As scale economies are 
explicitly taken into account in the model described in this report, it is reasonable that the learning 
curve described by Equations (71) and (72) follow the s-shaped pattern observed in studies of industrial 
learning. Nevertheless, we add as a caution  that industrial learning curves are based on the experience 
of individual plants, whereas Equations (71) and (72) are applied at sector level.
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Farmers on estates are assumed to have the same level of knowledge (or to have access to the same 
knowledge) as extension agents.
For the biofuel processing sector, Equation (71) is applied directly, with global experience spec fied 
exogenously and domestic experience approaching the global level with cumulative production.
Learning curves
In Equation (71), learning only takes place if there is production, consistent with conventional m dels 
of industrial learning [37]. This is a consequence of the factor P(t) before the expression in parenth ses. 
The solutions to Equation (71) can be related to observations from studies of i dustrial learning. In the 
special case where λmax(t) is constant in time, Equation (71) can be solved explicitly to give
t =max−e−Pcum t  max−0  , (72)
where λ0 is the initial value for λ(t) and Pcum is cumulative (rather than annual) pr duction. A sample 
curve is shown in Figure 4. As shown in the figure, the learn ng index increases in an s- d fashion
with cumulative production. This is the shape observed in learning curves ithin fi ms, where
“learning” is measured by worker productivity [37]. This patt rn contrasts with the constant slope 
observed for “experience curves,” which plot the logarithm of unit cost aga st the log rithm of
cumulative production within a sector, and are a conventional tool in business and management [38]. 
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the benefits of increasing scale and other factors, rather th n learning [37]. As scale economies are 
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1−𝑑𝑑0
[1 − 𝜆𝜆0𝑦𝑦max + (𝑦𝑦max − 1)𝜆𝜆]. (73)
  (71)
In this equation, annual productio  is given as 
P(t). The parameter 
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LEARNING
In the learning sub-model, learning takes place in the f llowing way. F r a learni g commu ity (for 
example, farmers or extension wor ers), ther  is some maxi m level of knowle ge that they ca  
attain, as determined by the global lev l of knowledge. The global level is set as an exogenous 
parameter, with a value of zero representing no informatio  at all and a value of one representing 
thorough knowledge that supports routine operations and standardization. If he aximum level for the 
“learning index” λ(t) is λmax(t), then the stock of knowledge (the learning i dex) changes over time as
d t 
d t = P t max t −t  . (71)
In this equation, annual production is given by P(t). The par  κ sets the maximum rate of 
accumulation of knowledge. Learning is fast if there is a large gap between local and general 
knowledge, and it slows down as the community’s knowledge approaches the maximum level, which 
can change over time.
For feedstocks, the model f r farm r knowledge applies a nested version of Equation (71). First, 
knowledge of extension wo kers grow  toward an exogen usly-specified global level. Seco d, 
smallholder knowledge approaches a weighted average of the initial level and extension worker 
knowledge, depending on how effective extensive services are (a user-specified policy variable). 
Farmers on estates are assumed to have the same level of knowledge (or to have access to the same 
knowledge) as extension agents.
For the biofuel processing sector, Equation (71) is applied directly, with global experience specified 
exogenously and domestic experience approaching the global level with cumulative productio .
Learning curves
In Equation (71), learning only takes place if there i  productio , consistent with conve tional mod ls 
of industrial learning [37]. This is a consequence of the factor P(t) before the expression in parentheses. 
The solutions to Equation (71) can be related to observations from studies of industrial learning. In the 
special case where λmax(t) is constant in time, Equation (71) can be solved explicitly to give
t =max−e−Pcum t  max−0  , (72)
where λ0 is the initial value for λ(t) and Pcum is cumulative (rather than annual) productio . A sample 
curve is shown in Figure 4. As shown in th  figur , the learning index increases in an s-shaped fashion 
with cumulative production. This is the shape observed in learning cu ves withi  firms, where 
“learning” is measured by worker productivity [37]. This pattern con rasts with the c nstant slope 
observed for “experience curv s,” which plot the log rithm of unit cost against the logarithm of 
cumulative production within a sec or, and are a conve tional tool in busin ss and management [38]. 
However, there is good reason to think that the linear lope of experience curv s has more to do ith 
the benefits of increasing scale and oth  factors, rather than learni g [37]. As cale eco omies ar  
explicitly taken into account in the model described in this report, it is reasonable that the learning 
curve described by Equations (71) and (72) follow the s-shaped pattern observed in studies of industrial 
learning. Nevertheless, we add as a caution  that industrial learning curves are based on the experience 
of individual plants, whereas Equations (71) and (72) are applied at sector level.
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I  the lear ing sub-model, learning takes place in the following way. For a learning community (for 
ex mple, farmers or extension worker ), there is some maximum level of knowledge that they can 
attain, as determined by the global level of knowledge. The global level is set as an exogenous 
paramet r, wi h a value of zero representing no information at all and a value of one representing 
th rough kn wledge that supports routine operations and standardization. If the maximum level for the 
“learning index” λ(t) is λmax(t), then the stock of knowledge (the learning index) changes over time as
d t 
d t = P t max t −t  . (71)
In this equation, annual production is given by P(t). The parameter κ sets the maximum rate of 
accumulation of knowledge. Learning is fast if there is a large gap between local and general 
knowledge, and it slows down as the community’s knowledge approaches the maximum level, which 
can change over time.
For f edstocks, the model for farmer knowledge pplies a ested version of Equation (71). First, 
kn wl dge of extension workers grows toward an x genously-specified global level. Second, 
smallholder knowledge pproaches a weight d average of the initial level and extension worker 
k owledge, depending on how effective extensive services a e (a user-specified policy variable). 
Far ers on estates are assumed to have the sam  le l of knowledge (or to have access to the same 
knowledge) as extension agents.
For the biofuel processing sector, Equation (71) is applied directly, with global experience specified 
exogenously and domestic experience approaching the global level with cumulative production.
L arning curves
In Equation (71), learning only takes place if there is production, consistent with conventional models 
of industrial learning [37]. This is a consequence of the factor P(t) before the expression in parentheses. 
The solutions to Equation (71) can be related to observations from studies of industrial learning. In the 
sp ial case where λmax(t) is constant in time, Equation (71) can be solved explicitly to give
t =max−e−Pcum t  max−0  , (72)
where λ0 is the initial value for λ(t) and Pcum is cumulative (rather than annual) production. A sample 
curve is shown in Figure 4. As shown in the figure, the learning index increases in an s-shaped fashion 
with cumulative production. This is the shape observed in learning curves within firms, where 
“learning” is measured by worker productivity [37]. This pattern contrasts with the constant slope 
observed for “experience curves,” which plot the logarithm of unit cost against the logarithm of 
cumulative production within a sector, and are a conventional tool in business and management [38]. 
However, there is good reason to think that the linear slope of experience curves has more to do with 
the benefits of increasing scale and other factors, rather than learning [37]. As scale economies are 
explicitly taken into account in the model described in this report, it is reasonable that the learning 
curve described by Equations (71) and (72) follow the s-shaped pattern observed in studies of industrial 
learning. Nevertheless, we add as a caution  that industrial learning curves are based on the experience 
of individual plants, whereas Equations (71) and (72) are applied at sector level.
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 is constant 
in time, Equation 71 can be solved explicitly to give
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 ≈ −(𝑘𝑘𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥)(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥. (64)
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. (65)
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤0 � 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦0�𝜂𝜂, (66)
𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁 = 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁0 �1 + 12 � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴max−𝐴𝐴�3�. (67)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟 urr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micro − 𝜃𝜃. (68)
𝜌𝜌macro = �𝑅𝑅IHS−1+𝜀𝜀5−𝑅𝑅IHS+𝜀𝜀�2 ?ˆ?𝜌macro. (69)
𝜌𝜌micro = ?ˆ?𝜌micro� (1− 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
, (70)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅(𝛥𝛥)(𝜆𝜆max(𝛥𝛥) − 𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥)). (71)
𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥) = 𝜆𝜆max − 𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅𝑃𝑃cum(𝑑𝑑)(𝜆𝜆max − 𝜆𝜆0), (72)
𝑦𝑦(𝜆𝜆) = 1
1−𝑑𝑑0
[1 − 𝜆𝜆0𝑦𝑦max + (𝑦𝑦max − 1)𝜆𝜆]. (73)
 (72)
where 
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In the learning sub-model, learning takes place in the following way. For a learning community (for 
example, farmers or extension workers), there is some maximum level of knowledge that they can 
attain, as determined by the global level of knowledge. The global level is set as an exogenous 
parameter, with a value of zero representing no information at all and a value of one representing 
thorough knowledge that supports routine operations and standardization. If the maximum level for the 
“learning index” λ(t) is λmax(t), then the stock of knowledge (the learning index) changes over time as
d t 
d t = P t max t −t  . (71)
In this equation, annual production is given by P(t). The parameter κ sets the maximum rate of 
accumulation of knowledge. Learning is fast if there is a large gap between local and general 
kno ledge, and it slows down as the community’s knowledge approaches the maximum level, which 
can change over time.
For feedstocks, the model for farmer knowledge applies a nested version of Equation (71). First, 
knowledge of extension workers grows toward an exogenously-specified global level. Second, 
smallholder knowledge approaches a weighted average of the initial level and extension worker 
knowledge, depending on how effective extensive services are (a user-specified policy variable). 
Farmers on estates are assumed to have the same level of knowledge (or to have access to the same 
knowledge) as extension agents.
For the biofuel processing sector, Equation (71) is applied directly, with global experience specified 
ex genously and domestic exp rience approaching the global level with cumulative production.
Learning curves
In Equation (71), learning only takes place if there is production, consistent with conventional models 
of industrial learning [37]. This is a consequence of the factor P(t) before the expression in parentheses. 
The solutions to Equation (71) can be related to observations from studies of industrial learning. In the 
special case where λmax(t) is constant in time, Equation (71) can be solved explicitly to give
t =max−e−Pcum t  max−0  , (72)
r  λ0 is the initial value for λ(t) and Pcum is cumulative (rather than annual) production. A sample 
curve is sh n in Figure 4. As shown in the figure, the learni g index increases in an s-shaped fashion 
with cumulative production. This is the shape observed in learning curves within firms, where 
“learning” is measured by worker productivity [37]. This pattern contrasts with the constant slope 
observed for “experience curves,” which plot the logarithm of unit cost against the logarithm of 
cumulative production within a sector, and are a conventional tool in business and management [38]. 
However, there is good reason to think that the linear slope of experience curves has more to do with 
the benefits of increasing scale and other factors, rather than learning [37]. As scale economies are 
explicitly taken into account in the model described in this report, it is reasonable that the learning 
curve described by Equations (71) and (72) follow the s-shaped pattern observed in studies of industrial 
learning. Nevertheless, we add as a caution  th  industrial learning curves are based on the xperi nc  
of individual plant , whereas Equations (71) and (72) are applied at sector evel.
26
 i itial value for 
The National Bioenergy Investment Model NBIM: Technical Documentation DRAFT
LEARNING
I  the learning sub-model, learning takes place in the following way. For a lear ing community (for 
example, farmers or extension workers), there is so e maximum level of knowledge that they can 
attain, as determined by the global level of knowledge. The global level is set as an exogenous 
parameter, with a value of zero representing no information at all and a value of one representing 
thoro gh knowledge that supports routine operations nd standardization. If the aximum level for the 
“learn ng ind x” λ(t) is λmax(t), then the stock of knowledge (the lea ni g index) cha g s over time as
d t 
d t = P t max t −t  . (71)
In this equation, annual production is given by P(t). The parameter κ sets the maximum rate of 
acc mulation of knowledge. Learning is fast if there is a large gap between local and general 
knowledge, and it slows down as the community’s knowledge approaches the maximum level, which 
can hange over time.
For feedstocks, the model for farmer knowledge applies a nested version of Equation (71). First, 
knowledge of extension workers grows toward an exogenously-specified global level. Second, 
smallholder knowledge approaches a weighted average of the initial level and extension worker 
knowledge, depending on how effective extensive services are (a user-specified policy variable). 
Farmers on estates are assum d to h ve the same evel of knowledge (or to have access to the same 
knowledge) as ext nsion agents.
For the biofuel processing sector, Equation (71) is applied directly, with global experience specified 
exo nously and domestic experience approaching the global level with cumulative production.
Learning curves
In Equation (71), learning only takes place if there is production, consistent with conventional models 
of industrial learning [37]. This is a consequence of the factor P(t) before the expression in parentheses. 
The solutions to Equation (71) can be related to observations from studies of industrial learning. In the 
special case where λmax(t) is constant in time, Equation (71) can be solved explicitly to give
t =max−e−Pcum t  max−0  , (72)
where λ0 is the nitial value for λ(t) and Pcum is cumulative (rather than annual) production. A sample 
curve is shown in Figure 4. As shown in the figure, th  learning i d x increases in an s-shaped fashion 
with cumulative produ tion. This is the shape observed in lear ing curve  within firms, whe  
“learning” is me sured by worker pro uctivity [37]. This pa tern contrasts with the consta t slope 
obs rved for “experience curves,” which p t the logarithm of unit cost against the logarithm of 
cumulative production within a sec or, and are a conventio al tool in busines  and management [38]. 
However, there is good reason t  think that the linear slope of experience curves has more to do with 
the benefits of increasing scale and other factors, rather than learning [37]. As scale economies are 
explicitly taken into account in the model described in this report, it is reasonable that the learning 
curve described by Equations (71) and (72) follow the s-shaped pattern observed in studies of industrial 
learning. Nevertheless, we add as a caution  that industrial learning curves are based on the experience 
of individual plants, whereas Equations (71) and (72) are applied at sector level.
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LEARNING
In the learning sub-model, learning takes place in the following way. For a learning comm nity (for 
example, farmers or extension workers), there is some maximum level of knowledge that they can 
attain, as determined by the global level of knowledge. The global level is set as an exogenous 
parameter, with a value of zero representing no information at all and a value of one representing 
thorough knowledge that supports routine operati ns and standardization. If the maximum level for the 
“learning index” λ(t) is λmax(t), then the stock of knowledge (the learning index) changes over time as
d t 
d t = P t max t −t  . (71)
In this equation, annual production is giv n by P t). The parameter κ sets the maximum rate f 
accumul tion of knowledge. L arning is fast if there is a large gap between local d general 
knowled e, and it slows d wn as the c mmun ty’  knowl dge approaches the maximum level, which 
can change over time.
For feedstocks, the model for farmer knowledge applies a nested version of Equation (71). First, 
knowledge of extension workers grows toward an exogenously-specified global level. Second, 
smallholder knowledge approaches a weighted average of the initial level and extension worker 
knowledge, depending on how effective extensive services are (a user-specified policy variable). 
Farmers on estates are assumed to have the same level of knowledge (or to have access to the same 
knowledge) as extension agents.
For the biofuel processing sector, Equation (71) is applied directly, with global experience specified 
exogenously and domestic experience approaching the global level with cumulative production.
Lear ing curve
In Equation (71), learning only takes place if there is production, consistent with conventional models 
of industrial learning [37]. This is a consequence of the factor P(t) before the expression in parentheses. 
The solutions to Equation (71) can be related to observations from studies of industrial learning. In the 
special case where λmax(t) is constant in time, Equation (71) can be solved explicitly to give
t =max−e−Pcum t  max−0  , (72)
where λ0 is the initial value for λ(t) and Pcum is cumulative (rather than annual) production. A sample 
curve is shown in Figure 4. As shown in the figure, the learning index increases in an s-shaped fashion 
with cumulative production. This is the shape observed in learning curves within firms, where 
“learning” is measured by worker productivity [37]. This pattern contrasts with the constant slope 
observed for “experience curves,” which plot the logarithm of unit cost against the logarithm of 
cumulative production within a sector, and are a conventional tool in business and management [38]. 
However, there is good reason to think that the linear slope of experience curves has more to do with 
the benefits of increasing scale and other factors, rather than learning [37]. As scale economies are 
explicitly taken into account in the model described in this report, it is reasonable that the learning 
curve described by Equations (71) and (72) follow the s-shaped pattern observed in studies of industrial 
learning. Nevertheless, we add as a caution  that industrial learning curves are based on the experience 
of individual plants, whereas Equations (71) and (72) are applied at sector level.
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think that the linear slope of experience curves has 
more to do with the benefits of increasing scale and 
other factors, rather than learning (Hall and Howell 
1985). As scale economies are explicitly taken into 
account in the NBIM, it is reasonable that the 
learning curve described by equations 71 and 72 
follow the s-shaped pattern observed in studies of 
industrial learning. Nevertheless, we add a caution 
that industrial learning curves are based on the 
experience of individual plants, whereas equations 71 
and 72 are applied at sector level.
6.4.2 Learning and yields
Yields in the model increase as farmers learn. Yields 
can increase by a maximum ratio ymax relative to 
the initial value, an increase which is achieved only 
when the learning factor 
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Lea ning and yi lds
Yields in the model increase as farmers learn. Yields can i crease by  maximum ratio ymax r lative to 
the initial value, an increase which is achieved only when the learning fact r λ = 1. The ratio y(λ) as a 
function of the learning level is given by
y = 11−0 [1−0 ymax ymax−1] . (73)
With this equation, when λ is at its initial value, =0 , y(λ0) = 1, as expected. When  λ is at its 
maximum value of λ = 1, y(1) = ymax, again as expected. Between the two extremes the yield increases 
linearly with the level of knowledge.
Parameter uncertainty
Scenario models are useful tools for exploring options under uncertainty. The most important type of 
uncertainty in a scenario  is the set of highly uncertain and high-impact external factors that can 
significantly affect the success of a policy. However, ordinary parameter uncertainty is also present, as 
it is with any modeling effort. The model described in this document is particularly afflicted by 
parameter uncertainty, as it simulates a poorly-understood (although well-studied) phenomenon, 
investor decision-making. To communicate this uncertainty to the model user, the model is run in a 
“sensitivity mode” in which parameter values are sampled from statistical distributions. Typically, the 
literature provides plausible minimum, maximum, and nominal values, but not a statistical distribution. 
For simplicity, we sample parameters from triangular distributions, as illustrated in Figure 5. As shown 
in the figure, the nominal value (that is, the model default value) is also the mode of the distribution. 
The probability is zero below the minimum and above the maximum, and otherwise the distribution is 
linear.
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function of the learning level is given as
𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝛥 ≡
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 ≈ −(𝑘𝑘𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥)(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥. (64)
𝑘𝑘 = 1
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽 ∣∣
∣𝛥𝛥?ˆ?𝑑
𝛥𝛥𝑑𝑑∣∣
∣ 1
𝛥𝛥𝑑𝑑
. (65)
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤0 � 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦0�𝜂𝜂, (66)
𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁 = 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁0 �1 + 12 � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴max−𝐴𝐴�3�. (67)
𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 = 𝑟𝑟rf + 𝛽𝛽(𝑟𝑟ave − 𝑟𝑟rf) + 𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟curr + 𝜌𝜌macro + 𝜌𝜌micro − 𝜃𝜃. (68)
𝜌𝜌macro = �𝑅𝑅IHS−1+𝜀𝜀5−𝑅𝑅IHS+𝜀𝜀�2 ?ˆ?𝜌macro. (69)
𝜌𝜌micro = ?ˆ?𝜌micro� (1− 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
, (70)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑑𝑑)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅(𝛥𝛥)(𝜆𝜆max(𝛥𝛥) − 𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥)). (71)
𝜆𝜆(𝛥𝛥) = 𝜆𝜆max − 𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅𝑃𝑃cum(𝑑𝑑)(𝜆𝜆max − 𝜆𝜆0), (72)
𝑦𝑦(𝜆𝜆) = 1
1−𝑑𝑑0
[1 − 𝜆𝜆0𝑦𝑦max + (𝑦𝑦max − 1)𝜆𝜆]. (73) (
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uncertainty in a scenario  is the set of highly uncertain and high-impact external factors that can 
significantly affect the success of a policy. However, ordinary parameter uncertainty is also present, as 
it is with any modeling effort. The model described in this document is particularly afflicted by 
parameter uncertainty, as it simulates a poorly-understood (although well-studied) phenomenon, 
investor decision-making. To communicate this uncertainty to the model user, the model is run in a 
“sensitivity mode” in which parameter values are sampled from statistical distributions. Typically, the 
literature provides plausible minimum, maximum, and nominal values, but not a statistical distribution. 
For simplicity, we sample parameters from triangular distributions, as illustrated in Figure 5. As shown 
in the figure, the nominal value (that is, the model default value) is also the mode of the distribution. 
The probability is zero below the minimum and above the maximum, and otherwise the distribution is 
linear.
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Figure 5. Triangular distribution for uncertain 
parameters
Scenario models are useful tools for exploring options 
under uncertainty. The most important types of 
uncertainty in a scenario are the highly uncertain and 
high-impact external factors that can significantly 
affect the success of a policy. However, ordinary 
parameter uncertainty is also present. The NBIM 
is particularly afflicted by parameter uncertainty, 
as it simulates a poorly understood (although well 
studied) phenomenon, investor decision making. 
To communicate this uncertainty to the model 
user, the model is run in a ‘sensitivity mode’, in 
which parameter values are sampled from statistical 
distributions. Typically, the literature provides 
plausible minimum, maximum and nominal values, 
but not a statistical distribution. For simplicity, we 
sample parameters from triangular distributions, as 
illustrated in Figure 5. The nominal value (that is, the 
model default value) is also the mode of distribution. 
The probability is zero below the minimum and 
above the maximum, and otherwise the distribution 
is linear.
7.1 Investment betas
The model simulates two distinct but connected 
markets: that for biofuel feedstocks and that for 
biofuels. To the extent that biofuel feedstock 
markets behave like the market for farmland, b  
can be expected to be relatively low, around 0.2 
(Barry 1980, Canavari et al. 2002). However, sb  for 
agribusiness firms have been found to be close to 1.0 
(Wilson and Featherstone 2006, Tepe 2010). Biofuel 
markets are likely to be sensitive to changes in the 
market as a whole, since they are linked to energy 
markets, so b  is expected to be relatively large. 
While studies of biofuel markets using the ICAPM 
are rare (for example, Baker et al. [2008] applies 
ICAPM to the biofuel market, but does not report 
estimates for b ), renewable energy markets have 
been studied. In Sadorsky (2012), sb  for renewable 
energy companies were found to be quite high, with 
benchmark estimates close to 2.0, but rising for some 
models close to 4.0. In the default settings for the 
model, b  for feedstocks takes a value of 0.50, while 
in sensitivity runs it is assumed to follow a triangular 
distribution with a minimum of 0.25, a maximum 
of 1.50, and a mode of 0.50. The b  for fuels defaults 
to 2.0, and in sensitivity runs follows a triangular 
distribution with a minimum of 0.75, a maximum of 
3.00, and a mode of 2.00.
7.2 Investment uncertainty (entropy 
weight)
The weight [{] given to the entropy term in the 
investment objective function of Equation 19 is 
a tuning parameter for the model. In principle it 
can be estimated by fitting the model to observed 
data. However, few data are available with which 
to calibrate the model, and so it is represented as 
an uncertain parameter. The model user can set 
the minimum, maximum and nominal values. By 
default, for international investors, the values are 
set at 0.10 (minimum), 0.20 (nominal) and 0.30 
(maximum). For domestic investors, the default 
values are 0.05 (minimum), 0.10 (nominal) and 0.15 
(maximum). These values reflect an assumption that 
domestic investors are comparatively knowledgeable 
about local investment opportunities, and so the 
distribution of investments shows less uncertainty 
and less spread than for foreign investors.
7. Parameter uncertainty
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7.3 Fuel and feedstock price 
adjustment coefficients
The price adjustment coefficients a and b for fuels 
and feedstocks determine the rate of price adjustment 
when supply and demand are out of equilibrium, as 
given in equations 52 and 55. As explained in Section 
5.4, the parameters are assigned values that give 
apparently reasonable model behaviour. The user can 
adjust these separately for each fuel and feedstock. 
By default, they are set to 0.04/year for feedstocks 
and 0.50/year for fuels. As the parameters are quite 
uncertain, by default they are set to vary between half 
and twice their default values, that is, 0.02–0.08/year 
for feedstocks and 0.25–1.00/year for fuels.
7.4 Crop yields
In the model it is assumed that investment decisions 
are made on the basis of anticipated yields – that is, 
on the basis of the nominal value for the yields of 
each crop. However, actual production may differ 
from the nominal value by a factor with a nominal 
value of 1.0, and a user-defined minimum and 
maximum value. Users can assign a larger range for 
crops whose yields are less well known than for better 
known crops.
8. Comments
models, which attempt to anticipate human 
behaviour, require particular caution. The intended 
use of the model is to quickly try out a variety of 
options in an environment where any surprising 
outcomes can be investigated in detail. Policy analysts 
and policymakers may eliminate some policy options 
after such an exercise, if they seem to provide limited 
benefits, while choosing other, more promising 
options for further investigation.
The NBIM is a non-equilibrium dynamic model 
that features ‘boom and bust’ cycles, as actually 
experienced in biofuel feedstock and other cash crop 
operations. The model is intended to be used in an 
interactive setting, complimented by a narrative 
scenario process.
As with any model, the outputs are only as good as 
the inputs and the model assumptions. Simulation 
9. References
Carlesi, L., Verster, B. and Wenger, F. 2007 The new 
dynamics of managing the corporate portfolio. 
McKinsey on Finance 23: 1-8.
Chaudhuri, S. and Banerjee, D. 2010 FDI in 
agricultural land, welfare and unemployment in 
a developing economy. Research in Economics 
64: 229-239.
Colman, D. and Young, T. 1989 Principles of 
agricultural economics: Markets and prices in 
less developed countries. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK.
Dahlquist, M. and Robertsson, G. 2001 Direct 
foreign ownership, institutional investors, 
and firm characteristics. Journal of Financial 
Economics 59: 413-440.
de Wit, M., Junginger, M., Lensink, S., Londo, 
M. and Faaij, A. 2010 Competition between 
biofuels: Modeling technological learning 
and cost reductions over time. Biomass and 
Bioenergy 34: 203-217.
Dippenaar, A. 2009 What drives large South African 
corporations to invest in sub-Saharan Africa? 
CEO’s perspectives and implications for FDI 
policies. Natural Resources Forum 33: 199-210.
Ferguson, B.S. 1998 Introduction to dynamic 
economic models. Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, UK.
Graham, J.R. and Harvey, C.R 2001 The theory and 
practice of corporate finance: Evidence from 
the field. Journal of Financial Economics 60: 
187- 243.
Hall, G. and Howell, S. 1985 The experience curve 
from the economist’s perspective. Strategic 
Management Journal 6: 197-212.
Hallegatte, S., Ghil, M., Dumas, P. and Hourcade, 
J. 2008 Business cycles, bifurcations and chaos 
in a neo-classical model with investment 
dynamics. Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organization 67: 57-77.
Hennart, J. and Park, Y. 1993 Greenfield vs. 
acquisition: The strategy of Japanese investors 
in the United States. Management Science 39: 
1054-1070.
Adams, S. 2009 Foreign direct investment, domestic 
investment, and economic growth in sub-
Saharan Africa. Journal of Policy Modeling 31: 
939-949.
Ahlquist, J. 2006 Economic policy, institutions, and 
capital flows: Portfolio and direct investment 
flows in developing countries. International 
Studies Quarterly 50: 681-704.
Akinkugbe, Oluyele. 2003 Flow of Foreign 
Direct Investment to Hitherto Neglected 
Developing Countries. Discussion Paper. 
Helsinki: UNU/WIDER. http://www.wider.
unu.edu/publications/working-papers/
discussion-papers/2003/en_GB/dp2003-
02/_files/78091724471534368/default/
dp2003- 02. pdf.
Asiedu, E. 2002 On the determinants of foreign 
direct investment to developing countries: 
Is Africa different? World Development 30: 
107- 119.
Asmussen, C.G., Benito, G.R. and Petersen, B. 2009 
Organizing foreign market activities: From 
entry mode choice to configuration decisions. 
International Business Review 18: 145-155.
Baker, M.L., Hayes, D.J. and Babcock, B.A. 
2008 Crop-based biofuel production under 
acreage constraints and uncertainty. Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State 
University, USA.
Barry, P.J. 1980 Capital asset pricing and farm 
real estate. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 62: 549-553.
Blonigen, B.A., Davies, R.B., Waddell, G.R. and 
Naughton, H.T. 2007 FDI in space: Spatial 
autoregressive relationships in foreign direct 
investment. European Economic Review 51: 
1303-1325.
Busse, M. and Hefeker, C. 2007 Political risk, 
institutions and foreign direct investment. 
European Journal of Political Economy 23: 
397- 415.
Canavari, M., Caggiati, P. and Easter, K.W. 2002 
Economic studies on food, agriculture, 
and the environment, New York, Kluwer 
Academic/ Plenum.
The national bioenergy investment model   25
Hosier, R.H. 1993 Urban energy systems in 
Tanzania: A tale of three cities. Energy Policy 21: 
510-523.
Hosier, R.H. 2004 Energy ladder in developing 
nations. In: Encyclopedia of energy, 423-435, 
Elsevier, New York, NY, USA.
Jenkins, R and Edwards, C. 2006 The economic 
impacts of China and India on sub-Saharan 
Africa: Trends and prospects. Journal of Asian 
Economics 17: 207-225.
Jinjarak, Y. 2007 Foreign direct investment and 
macroeconomic risk. Journal of Comparative 
Economics 35: 509-519.
Kennedy, P. 2003 A guide to econometrics. MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA, USA.
Kinda, T. 2010 Investment climate and FDI in 
developing countries: Firm-level evidence. World 
Development 38: 498-513.
Klier, D.O. 2009 Managing diversified portfolios: 
What multi-business firms can learn from private 
equity. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany.
Kogut, B. and Nath, R. 1988 The effect of national 
culture on the choice of entry mode. Journal of 
International Business Studies 19: 411-432.
Li, J. and Rugman, A.M. 2007 Real options and the 
theory of foreign direct investment. International 
Business Review 16: 687-712.
Li. Q. and Sherali, H.D. 2003 An approach for 
analyzing foreign direct investment projects 
with application to China’s Tumen River Area 
development. Computers and Operations 
Research 30: 1467-1485.
Li, S. and Filer, L. 2007 The effects of the governance 
environment on the choice of investment mode 
and the strategic implications. Journal of World 
Business 42: 80-98.
Lim, S. 2008 How investment promotion affects 
attracting foreign direct investment: Analytical 
argument and empirical analyses. International 
Business Review 17: 39-53.
Moosa, I.A. 2002 Foreign direct investment: 
Theory, evidence, and practice. Palgrave, 
Houndmills, UK.
Nocke, V. and Yeaple, S. 2007 Cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions vs. greenfield foreign direct 
investment: The role of firm heterogeneity. 
Journal of International Economics 72: 336-365.
Pompian, M.M. 2006 Behavioral finance and 
wealth management: How to build optimal 
portfolios that account for investor biases. Wiley, 
Hoboken, NJ, USA.
Quandt, R.E. 1988 The econometrics of 
disequilibrium. Blackwell, New York, NY, USA.
Sadorsky, P. 2012 Modeling renewable energy 
company risk. Energy Policy 40: 39-48.
Sethi, D., Guisinger, S., Ford, D.L. and Phelan, S.E. 
2002 Seeking greener pastures: A theoretical and 
empirical investigation into the changing trend 
of foreign direct investment flows in response to 
institutional and strategic factors. International 
Business Review 11: 685-705.
Solnik, B.H. 2000 International investments. 
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, USA,.
Tepe, F.S. 2010 Biofuel policy and stock price in 
imperfectly competitive markets. MS Thesis, 
Iowa State University, Ames, IA, USA.
Walker, D.A. 1987 Walras’s theories of tatonnement. 
The Journal of Political Economy 95: 758-774.
White, C. and Fan, M. 2006 Risk and foreign 
direct investment. Palgrave MacMillan, 
Houndmills, UK.
Wilson, C., and Featherstone, A., 2006 Adjusting the 
CAPM for threshold effects: An application to 
food and agribusiness stocks. Working Paper 06-
08, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, West 
Lafayette, IN, USA.
Annex 1. Policy instruments, drivers, critical uncertainties and trends
 • net present benefit to the economy;
 • net cost;
 • reduced deforestation due to bioenergy 
expansion;
 • percentage of liquid biofuels produced by 
smallholders;
 • total jobs created in the biofuel sector.
Critical uncertainties include the following:
 • risk tolerance;
 • potential to domesticate FDI flows;
 • World Trade Organization rules on biofuels;
 • suitability of auto fleet;
 • prices (fossil fuel, oil as food vs. biodiesel, 
variability);
 • productivity of food crops;
 • political will;
 • land tenure;
 • climate risk;
 • availability of financial resources to advance 
biofuels production;
 • regional coordination on biofuels production.
Trends include the following:
 • demands from EU standards;
 • local technology and innovations;
 • knowledge of extension workers;
 • rights of chiefs to allocate land;
 • domestic demand;
 • level of knowledge about biofuel feedstocks;
 • suitability of auto fleet;
 • economic orientation (export-oriented vs. import 
substitution);
 • value-added potential of agro-processing 
industries;
 • land suitability and availability;
 • international experience with relevant 
technologies and policies;
 • experience of farmers (current and over time) 
with cash crop production;
 • strategic plan to drive the biofuels industry;
 • undermining of price by neighbouring countries;
 • competition with fossil fuels;
 • environmental concerns (nongovernmental 
organisations).
The policy instruments are as follows:
 • Environmental impact assessment (self-reported 
environmental impact statement with and 
without monitoring);
 • tax incentives for foreign direct investment 
(FDI);
 • percentage of domestic ownership;
 • mandatory blend ratios;
 • priority sectors and free trade zones;
 • agroecological zoning (suitability);
 • minimum wages;
 • market-based application of sustainability 
standards;
 • regulations on land allocation;
 • extension and credit services to smallholders;
 • support to negotiation (terms of land lease);
 • repatriation of profits;
 • minimum percentage of smallholder produced 
biofuel;
 • legislating around sustainability standards;
 • tax incentives for FDI with conditionality
The national-level indicators are as follows:
 • percentage of liquid fuel produced domestically;
 • volume of oil imports;
 • value of energy imports as a percentage of gross 
domestic product;
 • kWh of co-generated electricity;
 • proportion of household energy consumption 
from biofuels;
 • volume of national charcoal consumption;
 • dollars saved on imports of oil;
 • value of biofuel exports;
 • percentage of domestic shareholding in biofuel 
companies;
 • proportion of feedstock processed domestically;
 • percentage of domestic biofuel production that is 
consumed nationally;
 • tax revenue at pump;
 • company tax (tax revenue and net profits);
 • tax revenue from salaried employees;
 • import taxes;
 • export taxes;
 • percentage of profits repatriated abroad;
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whether by contract or otherwise, or (ii) ownership 
of fifty percent (50%) or more of the outstanding 
shares, or (iii) beneficial ownership of such entity.
“You” (or “Your”) shall mean an individual or Legal 
Entity exercising permissions granted by this License.
“Source” form shall mean the preferred form for 
making modifications, including but not limited to 
software source code, documentation source, and 
configuration files.
“Object” form shall mean any form resulting from 
mechanical transformation or translation of a Source 
form, including but not limited to compiled object 
code, generated documentation, and conversions to 
other media types.
“Work” shall mean the work of authorship, whether 
in Source or Object form, made available under the 
License, as indicated by a copyright notice that is 
included in or attached to the work (an example is 
provided in the Appendix below).
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license to make, have made, use, offer to sell, sell, 
import, and otherwise transfer the Work, where such 
license applies only to those patent claims licensable 
by such Contributor that are necessarily infringed 
by their Contribution(s) alone or by combination 
of their Contribution(s) with the Work to which 
such Contribution(s) was submitted. If You institute 
patent litigation against any entity (including a cross-
claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) alleging that 
the Work or a Contribution incorporated within 
the Work constitutes direct or contributory patent 
infringement, then any patent licenses granted to You 
under this License for that Work shall terminate as of 
the date such litigation is filed.
4. Redistribution
You may reproduce and distribute copies of the Work 
or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or 
without modifications, and in Source or Object form, 
provided that You meet the following conditions:
1. You must give any other recipients of the Work 
or Derivative Works a copy of this License; and
2. You must cause any modified files to carry 
prominent notices stating that You changed the 
files; and
3. You must retain, in the Source form of any 
Derivative Works that You distribute, all 
copyright, patent, trademark, and attribution 
notices from the Source form of the Work, 
excluding those notices that do not pertain to 
any part of the Derivative Works; and
4. If the Work includes a “NOTICE” text file as 
part of its distribution, then any Derivative 
Works that You distribute must include 
a readable copy of the attribution notices 
contained within such NOTICE file, excluding 
those notices that do not pertain to any part 
of the Derivative Works, in at least one of the 
following places: within a NOTICE text file 
distributed as part of the Derivative Works; 
within the Source form or documentation, if 
provided along with the Derivative Works; or, 
within a display generated by the Derivative 
Works, if and wherever such third-party notices 
normally appear. The contents of the NOTICE 
file are for informational purposes only and do 
not modify the License. You may add Your own 
attribution notices within Derivative Works that 
You distribute, alongside or as an addendum to 
the NOTICE text from the Work, provided that 
such additional attribution notices cannot be 
construed as modifying the License.
You may add Your own copyright statement to Your 
modifications and may provide additional or different 
license terms and conditions for use, reproduction, 
or distribution of Your modifications, or for any such 
Derivative Works as a whole, provided Your use, 
reproduction, and distribution of the Work otherwise 
complies with the conditions stated in this License.
5. Submission of Contributions
Unless You explicitly state otherwise, any 
Contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion 
in the Work by You to the Licensor shall be under 
the terms and conditions of this License, without any 
additional terms or conditions. Notwithstanding the 
above, nothing herein shall supersede or modify the 
terms of any separate license agreement you may have 
executed with Licensor regarding such Contributions.
6. Trademarks
This License does not grant permission to use the 
trade names, trademarks, service marks, or product 
names of the Licensor, except as required for 
reasonable and customary use in describing the origin 
of the Work and reproducing the content of the 
NOTICE file.
7. Disclaimer of Warranty
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in 
writing, Licensor provides the Work (and each 
Contributor provides its Contributions) on an 
“AS IS” BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES 
OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either 
express or implied, including, without limitation, 
any warranties or conditions of TITLE, NON-
INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, or 
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 
You are solely responsible for determining the 
appropriateness of using or redistributing the Work 
and assume any risks associated with Your exercise of 
permissions under this License.
8. Limitation of Liability
In no event and under no legal theory, whether in 
tort (including negligence), contract, or otherwise, 
unless required by applicable law (such as deliberate 
and grossly negligent acts) or agreed to in writing, 
shall any Contributor be liable to You for damages, 
including any direct, indirect, special, incidental, or 
consequential damages of any character arising as a 
result of this License or out of the use or inability to 
use the Work (including but not limited to damages 
for loss of goodwill, work stoppage, computer failure 
or malfunction, or any and all other commercial 
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damages or losses), even if such Contributor has been 
advised of the possibility of such damages.
9. Accepting Warranty or Additional Liability
While redistributing the Work or Derivative Works 
thereof, You may choose to offer, and charge a fee for, 
acceptance of support, warranty, indemnity, or other 
liability obligations and/or rights consistent with 
this License. However, in accepting such obligations, 
You may act only on Your own behalf and on 
Your sole responsibility, not on behalf of any other 
Contributor, and only if You agree to indemnify, 
defend, and hold each Contributor harmless for any 
liability incurred by, or claims asserted against, such 
Contributor by reason of your accepting any such 
warranty or additional liability.
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